Blount v. Sixteenth St. Baptist Church

• Citation: 206 Ala. 423,90 So. 602
• Decision Date: 30 June 1921
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 419
• Parties: BLOUNT et al. v. SIXTEENTH ST. BAPTIST CHURCH.
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

90 So. 602

206 Ala. 423

BLOUNT et al. v. SIXTEENTH ST. BAPTIST CHURCH.

6 Div. 419

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 30, 1921

Rehearing Denied Oct. 13, 1921

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Hugh A. Locke, Judge.

Bill by the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, a corporation, against R.A. Blount and others, to enjoin interference with the Church property and prohibit certain parties from governing the Church. From a decree declining to discharge the injunction and overruling pleas in abatement, defendants appeal. Reversed and rendered.

John W Altman, of Birmingham, for appellants.

Beddow & Oberdorfer and C.B. Powell, all of Birmingham, for appellee.

THOMAS J.

The bill by the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, a corporation was against certain of its members and one other not a member, and prayed injunction to prevent them or their servants, attorneys, and agents from interfering with the pastor and other named officers of the church in conducting and providing for the services held, from interfering in the use and occupation of the church and control, thereof by its board of deacons, from interfering with said board and the appointment of and invitation to ministers to fill said pulpit, and from interfering with said named officers in the control of the church finances and the custody thereof.

Objections to the bill, on the ground that injunctive relief may not be had to prevent a violation of the criminal law of the state, are inapt where the primary purpose is that complainant's right to operate and enjoy its properties as a church and by its congregation is so interfered with as to amount to an impairment of its right of property, or that to comply with or submit to the insistence of respondents would amount to an invasion and destruction of the property rights of complainants. Harris v. Barrett, 89 So 717; Board of Com'rs of City of Mobile v. Orr, 181 Ala. 308, 61 So. 920, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 575; Hill v. Cameron, 194 Ala. 376, 69 So. 636; Ward v. Markstein, 196 Ala. 209, 72 So. 41; Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Cruise, 189 Ala. 66, 81, 66 So. 657; Ex parte State ex rel. Martin, 200 Ala. 15, 75 So. 327; Renfroe v. Collins & Co., 201 Ala. 489, 78 So. 395; City of Montgomery v. Orpheum Taxi Co., 203 Ala. 103, 82 So. 117.

In this jurisdiction we have adhered to the rule that equity will not interfere with the enforcement of criminal law or check the activities of prosecuting officials when the injury inflicted or threatened is merely the vexation of frequent arrest and punishment for crime (Burnett v. Craig, 30 Ala. 135, 68 Am.Dec. 115; Ex Parte State ex rel. Martin, supra; Brown v. Birmingham, 140 Ala. 590, 37 So. 173; Old Dom. Tel. Co. v. Powers, 140 Ala. 220, 37 So. 195, 1 Ann.Cas. 119; Pike County Dispensary v. Brundidge, 130 Ala. 193, 30 So. 451; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Montgomery, 193 Ala. 234, 69 So. 428, Ann.Cas.1918B, 554); yet, where required to protect a property right, it may be done by injunction, if it be a case within the exceptions that are recognized (Brown v. Birmingham, supra; Mobile v. Orr, supra; Montgomery v. Orpheum Taxi Co., supra; Bryan v. Birmingham, 154 Ala. 447, 45 So. 922, 129 Am.St.Rep. 63; 5 Pom.Eq.Jur. § 354, p. 635; Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 25 Sup.Ct. 18, 49 L.Ed. 169; City of Austin v. Austin City Cem. Ass'n, 87 Tex. 330, 28 S.W. 528, 47 Am.St.Rep. 114; City of Atlanta v. Gate City Gaslight Co., 71 Ga. 106; Glucose Ref. Co. v. City of Chicago (C.C.) 138 F. 209.

A vital question was presented by respondents' special plea, incorporated as a part of the respective answers:

"(1) That the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, a religious corporation, did not, in any manner or in any wise, authorize the institution of this action which was begun by the filing of the bill of complaint in this cause.

"(2) That said church did not, in conference or otherwise, authorize any one to begin such an action on its behalf, and that no one has nor had authority, from a business meeting, conference, or otherwise of said religious corporation, the power or authority to institute on its behalf the cause of action which was begun by the filing of the bill of complaint herein."

The inquiry propounded under these pleas and evidence supporting the same is whether the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, a religious corporation organized and existing under the laws of Alabama--a congregation governed corporation--is shown to have granted authority for the institution of the instant suit.

It is not contradicted, and is assumed as true, that the Baptist Church is a congregation of believers, united for the purpose of religious worship, and that it is independent of all other organizations, and is self-governing. The incorporated body is nothing more or less than an incorporated board of trustees of such organization, made up generally of members of the ecclesiastical body, holding title to property, having certain or limited control thereof, and subject to direction over its control, transfer, or incumbrance, under the guidance and direction of its congregation; and it may be, in some instances, the care and management of the physical properties is with them. The courts take judicial knowledge of general religious matters. 23 C.J. p. 117, § 1926, p. 160, § 1983; Malone v. Lacroix, 144 Ala. 648, 41 So. 724; Humphrey v. Burnside, 4 Bush. (Ky.) 215.

In the first place, speaking generally, the membership in the corporation is in no sense the same as membership in the Baptist Church, as a religious congregation of believers. This distinction is brought out by Judge Cooley, in the case of Hardin v. Trustees of the Second Baptist Church, 51 Mich. 137, 16 N.W. 311, 47 Am.St.Rep. 555, where the action was by a member in good standing to recover damages for expulsion from the church. In that case, among other things, it was said:

"Connected with the corporation the statute contemplates that there will be a church, though possibly this may not be essential. In this case there is one. The church has its members who are supposed to hold certain beliefs and subscribe some covenant with each other if such is the usage of the denomination to which the church is attached. The church is not incorporated, and has nothing whatever to do with the temporalities. It does not control the property of the trustees; it can receive nobody into the society and can expel nobody from it. On the other hand, the corporation has nothing to do with the church except as it provides for the church wants. It cannot alter the church faith or covenant, it cannot receive numbers, it cannot expel members, it cannot prevent the church receiving or expelling whomsoever that body shall see fit to receive or expel. This concise statement is amply sufficient to show that this suit has no foundation."

The same position was elaborated by Mr. Justice Lurton (Nance v. Busby, 91 Tenn. 303, 18 S.W. 874, 15 L.R.A. 801), in a case it is true, of the Primitive Baptist Church; but the organization of that church is analogous, if not identical, with what are commonly called Missionary Baptist Churches, of which church was the complainant. He reviewed the authorities to great extent, cited Hardin v. Baptist Church, supra, saying in the course of his opinion:

"Where a society has become incorporated for the purpose of maintaining religious worship, the rights of a member of the incorporation are one thing, and his rights as a member of the church worshipping in the building owned by the corporation may be quite another thing. His rights in the corporation and as a corporator will depend exclusively upon the law creating the corporation."

These two opinions and the authorities collected amply support the proposition that the corporation is the mere invention of a means of holding title for the benefit of the members of the corporation, and to facilitate its transfer or incumbrance of property, as may be desired for the business of the corporation, when duly authorized and directed by its membership, pursuant to the rules of its church government.

The second question is, What are the powers of the congregation and the character of the church government? Judge Lurton said of this:

"This church is an independent congregational church. Discipline is administered by the body of the congregation. It has no body of canon law prescribing procedure in such cases. No written rules prescribe notice or require a trial. A majority of those members voting when the church sits in conference determines the result upon any motion or resolution disciplining a member. *** The congregation to which complainants belonged was congregational and independent. It was a pure democracy. The power of excommunication reposed in the majority of the members voting at any conference. From its action there was no appeal. This fact may be a defect in the organization. It is not for us to say, nor for those affected by its judgments to complain. They voluntarily submitted themselves to the absolute power of a majority. They tacitly agreed to abide by and submit to such judgment. This church, when sitting in conference was a judicature. It may have erred in construing the

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