Blount v. State

Decision Date12 August 1994
Docket NumberNo. 92-02872,92-02872
Citation641 So.2d 447
Parties19 Fla. L. Weekly D1737 Johnny BLOUNT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Megan Olson, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Ann P. Corcoran, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

ALTENBERND, Judge.

We affirm the defendant's convictions for battery on a law enforcement officer, obstructing or opposing an officer with violence, uttering a forged instrument, and grand theft. For the reasons stated below and pursuant to the rationale in State v. Camp, 596 So.2d 1055 (Fla.1992), we reverse the defendant's conviction for dealing in stolen property. Further, we reverse the consecutive habitual felony offender sentences imposed because all charges arose from the same criminal episode. Dietrich v. State, 635 So.2d 148 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). On resentencing, any habitual offender sentences must run concurrently.

On February 4, 1992, Johnny Blount entered a post office and tried to buy fourteen rolls of stamps with a $435 check drawn on the account of Bayland Printers, Inc. The postal clerk suspected the check was a forgery and notified a manager. After Mr. Blount spoke to the manager, he attempted to flee from the building. He was confronted by an investigator from the state attorney's office, who happened to be at the post office. When the investigator identified himself and attempted to detain Mr. Blount, he shoved the investigator and tried to escape. Mr. Blount struggled briefly with the investigator before being subdued. Upon questioning, Mr. Blount provided several varying stories to explain his possession of the check from Bayland Printers.

The state charged Mr. Blount with: (1) dealing in stolen property, i.e., the check; (2) battery on a law enforcement officer--because of the shoving incident; (3) obstructing an officer with violence--because of the subsequent struggle; (4) uttering a forged instrument; and (5) grand theft--because of the attempt to buy the stamps with the stolen check. A jury convicted Mr. Blount as charged. The trial court entered judgments of conviction on all five charges, but sentenced him on only the first four convictions. The trial court declared Mr. Blount a habitual offender and sentenced him to fifteen years' incarceration for the offense of dealing in stolen property. Concurrent with this sentence, the trial court also sentenced Mr. Blount to three consecutive habitual offender sentences for the charges of battery, obstruction, and uttering. The trial court orally "merged" the grand theft conviction into the conviction for dealing and declined to enter a written sentence for the grand theft. 1

In Camp, the supreme court held that "negotiating stolen checks for personal use, or otherwise deriving personal benefit from stolen merchandise, does not constitute the crime of 'dealing in stolen property' as envisioned by the legislature in enacting section 812.019." 596 So.2d at 1057. In that case, Ms. Camp negotiated stolen checks to pay a personal credit card debt. Here, Mr. Blount negotiated stolen checks in an attempt to buy stamps.

The state erroneously convinced the trial court to focus on the reference to "personal use" in Camp. The state maintained that one does not deal in stolen property if a stolen check is negotiated for food or other personal items, but that dealing occurs if a check is negotiated for non-personal items. Because Mr. Blount attempted to purchase $435 in stamps, and was unlikely to use these stamps for personal correspondence, the trial court allowed the charge of dealing in stolen property to be submitted to the jury.

Apparently, the state would not have charged Mr. Blount with dealing if he had attempted to...

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  • Callaway v. State
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    ...of this issue depends upon factual evidence involving the times, places, and circumstances of the offenses. See, e.g., Blount v. State, 641 So.2d 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (theft and battery on law enforcement officer are one episode); Willis v. State, 640 So.2d 220 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (drug pa......
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  • Smith v. State
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    ...in time or place, we are compelled to conclude that all of these offenses arose out of one single criminal episode. Blount v. State, 641 So.2d 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Walker v. State, 636 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Thus, under Hale, the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences ......
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