Bloxam v. Low Cost Interlock, Inc.

Docket Number3:21-CV-00391 (KAD)
Decision Date09 June 2022
PartiesCURTIS BLOXAM Plaintiff, v. LOW COST INTERLOCK, INC. Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 21)

KARI A. DOOLEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

This case arises out of Plaintiff Curtis Bloxam's (Plaintiff) use of an ignition locking device manufactured by Defendant Low Cost Interlock, Inc. (LCI), and the alleged failure of the device to operate or function properly. Plaintiff brings two claims-negligent infliction of emotional distress and a violation of the Connecticut Products Liability Act (“CPLA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572n, for failure to warn. Pending before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), in which Defendant asserts that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims and that Plaintiff fails to adequately allege the elements of either cause of action. Defendant also seeks dismissal of the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim because it is precluded by the exclusivity provision of the CPLA. Plaintiff opposes the motion. For the following reasons, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

Allegations

The Court accepts as true the following facts drawn from the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff is a resident of Connecticut. Compl. ¶ 1. Defendant is a foreign corporation incorporated in California, that manufactures and provides breathalyzer devices (“the LCI device”) placed in the motor vehicles of people arrested for Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”). Compl. ¶ 2-3. The LCI device allows those with DUI arrests to continue driving during the pendency of their cases. Compl. ¶ 4. The arrestee blows into the LCI device, and if the device detects no alcohol, the driver can start the vehicle. Compl. ¶ 5. If the LCI device detects any alcohol on the driver's breath, it prevents the vehicle from starting. Compl. ¶ 6. Arrestees pay LCI for use of the product and pay the state of Connecticut installation fees. Compl. ¶ 8.

On September 27, 2020, Plaintiff was arrested for DUI by the Seymour Police Department. Following the arrest, the state granted Plaintiff a work permit and instructed the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) to have an LCI device installed in Plaintiff's truck so that he could continue to run his company pending the resolution of his case. Compl. ¶ 9-10. Almost immediately upon installation of the LCI device, Plaintiff started experiencing issues with it. Compl. ¶ 11. The device prohibited Plaintiff's car from starting first thing in the morning, which caused him to be late and made his customers angry. Compl. ¶ 12. The alarm on the LCI device would also sound “for no good reason, ” which startled the Plaintiff and caused him annoyance. Compl. ¶ 13. On one occasion, the alarm sounded while Plaintiff was driving on the highway, which put him in severe danger. Id. He pulled off Interstate 95 to stop the alarm, but the truck would not start again forcing Plaintiff to sit on the LCI device to warm it. Id. This incident caused him to be late for “his appointment.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that “the colder it got outside, the more failures the device would have, ” and that the device's installer told him that the LCI device might register more failures the colder it is. Compl. ¶ 14. Plaintiff was also told to unplug the device at night to ease the LCI device starts in the mornings. Id. Plaintiff complained to the installer, who in turn attempted to call LCI but could not reach customer service. Compl. ¶ 15. The installer indicated that other people had complained about the LCI device. Id. Plaintiff ultimately through his attorney, complained to LCI via letter and email but received no response. Compl. ¶ 16. On February 15, 2021, the Connecticut DMV notified Plaintiff that the requirement to have the LCI device in his vehicle was going to be extended by thirty days due to the reported false failures. Id. Plaintiff alleges that because of LCI's “actions and inactions to rectify the failure of their device, ” Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress, resulting in loss of sleep, anxiety, loss of appetite, reduction in libido, reduced production of work, feelings of failure and mood swings. Compl. ¶ 17.

Discussion
Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Court first addresses, as it must, the question of whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. See Alliance for Environmental Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid Crossgates Co., 436 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 2006) (“a district court must generally.. .establish that is has federal constitutional jurisdiction.. .before deciding a case on the merits.”); see also Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Determining the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry.”). Plaintiff has invoked this court's diversity jurisdiction pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. § 1332. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged a good faith claim that the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000, as is necessary to satisfy the requirements of diversity jurisdiction.

When the parties are diverse, District courts have “original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75, 000, exclusive of interests and costs.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332. The party who invokes the jurisdiction of the court must prove with “reasonable probability” that its claim is for more than the statutory jurisdictional amount. Tatum v. Odberg, 650 F.Supp.2d 185, 190 (D. Conn. 2009) (citing Tongkook Am., Inc., v. Shipton Sportswear Co., 14 F.3d 781, 784 (2d Cir. 1994)). And when the party invoking jurisdiction alleges an amount exceeding the jurisdictional threshold, there exists a “rebuttable presumption that the face of the complaint is a good faith representation of the actual amount in controversy.” Id. (citing Wolde-Meskel v. Vocational Instruction Project Cmty., Servs., Inc., 177 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1999)). The party opposing jurisdiction can then overcome the presumption by demonstrating to a “legal certainty” that the plaintiff cannot recover the jurisdictional amount. Id. (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938)); see also Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353 (1961). And legal certainty is analyzed by what appears on the face of the complaint. See Wolde-Meskel, 166 F.3d at 63; see also Horton, 367 U.S. at 353 (quoting St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 289) (“The amount in controversy is to be determined from the complaint itself, and, absent a showing that the amount claimed was not sought ‘in good faith,' it must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.”). “The legal impossibility of recovery must be so certain as virtually to negat[e] the plaintiff's good faith in asserting the claim.” Chase Manhattan Bank, M.A. v. Am. Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi., 93 F.3d 1064, 1070 (2d Cir. 1996). [E]ven where [the] allegations leave grave doubt about the likelihood of a recovery of the requisite amount, dismissal is not warranted.” Zacharia v. Harbor Island Spa, Inc. 684 F.2d 199, 202 (2d Cir. 1982).

Although the pleadings do not specify the amount of damages sought by the Plaintiff, by invoking only the Court's diversity jurisdiction, the Plaintiff tacitly makes a good faith representation that the amount in controversy is greater than $75, 000.[1] See Tongkook, 14 F.3d at 785-86. Defendant challenges this assertion as a factual matter but does not point to any evidence to suggest bad faith on the part of the Plaintiff or an attempt to feign jurisdiction. See Wolde-Meskel, 166 F.3d at 63. Defendant does attempt to rebut the presumption of good faith by reference to a communication between Plaintiff's counsel and LCI's insurance carrier, in which counsel ostensibly offered to settle the claim pre-suit for $10, 000. Further, Defendant relies on its counsel's discussions with Plaintiff's counsel, in which there was no mention of monetary damages, but only a request that LCI contact the State of Connecticut to have Plaintiff's additional time with the LCI device reduced or removed.[2] As a result of these discussions, Defendant opines that Plaintiff filed this action in order to affect the outcome of his criminal proceeding. This accusation, however, is conclusory and irrelevant to the question of whether the plaintiff might seek damages in excess of $75, 000, regardless of his possibly mixed motives. Plaintiff lists a host of compensable injuries, including “loss of sleep, anxiety, loss of appetite, reduction in libido, reduced production of work, feelings of failure and mood swings.” Compl. ¶ 17. The Court cannot conclude to “a legal certainty” that the amount in controversy does not reach the jurisdictional threshold. See Adler v. Payward, Inc., 827 Fed.Appx. 133, 135 (2d Cir. 2020).

Rule 12(b)(6) - CPLA Claims

Defendant next seeks to dismiss all claims on the basis that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) the Court “must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Kinsey v. New York Times Co., 991 F.3d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 2021) (quotation marks alterations and citation omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the “complaint must ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, ' setting forth “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Kolbasyuk, 918 F.3d at 239 (quoting Bell...

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