Blue Circle, Inc. v. Williams

• Decision Date: 15 February 1991
• Citation: 579 So.2d 630
• Parties: BLUE CIRCLE, INC. v. Fred WILLIAMS. Civ. 7908.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

Page 630

579 So.2d 630

BLUE CIRCLE, INC. v. Fred WILLIAMS.

Civ. 7908.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

Feb. 15, 1991.

Rehearing Denied April 5, 1991.

Certiorari Denied May 31, 1991

Alabama Supreme Court 1901117.

William P. Traylor III and Deborah S. Braden of Yearout, Myers & Traylor, Birmingham, for appellant.

Eason Mitchell, Alabaster, for appellee.

ROBERTSON, Presiding Judge.

In 1985, the employee, Fred Williams, suffered an injury to his wrist while working for his employer, Blue Circle. In 1987, the employee suffered another on-the-job injury. The second injury was also to the employee's wrist.

In 1989, the employee filed a complaint for workmen's compensation benefits from his employer for the 1987 injury. The employer's answer admitted that the employee suffered an on-the-job injury, but asserted as a defense that the employee had a pre-existing injury. Later, the employer amended its answer to include the defense of set-off. Specifically, the employer asserted that it had paid benefits to the employee in the amount of approximately $40,000 as a result of the 1985 work-related injury.

Following a hearing in which evidence was presented ore tenus, the trial court entered an order in which it found that the employee had suffered two injuries, one occurring in 1985 and one occurring in 1987. The trial court further found that a settlement agreement entered into between the employee and the employer was a settlement of the 1985 injury claim and that it did not preclude the employee from asserting a claim for his second injury.

With regard to the degree of disability suffered by the employee, the trial court determined that the employee was unable to perform the work of his trade and, further, that he was unable to obtain reasonably gainful employment. Thus, the trial court found the employee to be totally and permanently disabled.

Although the employer asserts numerous issues on appeal, its assertions of error fall into two basic areas: first, the employer maintains that the trial court erred with regard to its construction and application of the settlement agreement and, second, that the trial court erred in its findings of injury and disability.

First, we will resolve the employer's contentions concerning the settlement agreement. The employer asserts that, pursuant to the agreement, the employee's claim for benefits is precluded, because, it says, the settlement should have a res judicata effect on this litigation. Alternatively, the employer argues that the employee should have been collaterally estopped from pursuing this litigation.

The standard of review employed by appellate courts in workmen's compensation cases is this:

"Initially, the reviewing court will look to see if there is any legal evidence to support the trial court's findings. If such evidence is found, then the reviewing court determines whether any reasonable view of that evidence supports the trial court's judgment."

Ex parte Eastwood Foods, Inc., 575 So.2d 91 (Ala.1991).

First, we recognize that the settlement agreement was not pleaded as an affirmative defense in the employer's answer; however, it was presented at trial. Thus, the pleadings were amended to conform to the evidence. Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(b); Haynie v. Byrd, 429 So.2d 973 (Ala.1983).

With regard to settlement agreements, the general rule is that

" 'in the absence of fraud, a release supported by a valuable consideration, unambiguous in meaning, will be given effect according to the intention of the parties to be judged by the court from what appears within the four corners of the instrument itself, and parol evidence is not admissible to impeach it or vary its terms.' " (citations omitted).

Finley v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 456 So.2d 1065, 1067 (Ala.1984), quoting Miles v. Barrett, 223 Ala. 293, 134 So. 661 (1931).

The language of the settlement agreement entered into by the parties made reference only to the September 26, 1985, injury. Further, the settlement agreement provided that the employee would receive a lump sum settlement from the employer for the benefits owing and "arising out of the injury described herein above." The lump sum, according to the agreement, was to be a "full settlement of all claims for weekly benefits which lie against the employer(s) and the workmen's compensation insurance carrier under the Workmen's Compensation Law of the State of Alabama."

Pursuant to this settlement agreement, the Circuit Court of Jefferson County entered a decree, which provided that the "payment made hereunder shall constitute full and complete payment of any and all obligations owing the [employee] by the [employer]."

In view of the language of the settlement agreement, we cannot find that the trial court erred in determining that the settlement agreement was intended to settle only the employee's claims surrounding his first injury. In fact, the trial court specifically noted that "the settlement and the [Jefferson County Circuit] Court's decree made no reference to the [employee's] second injury." In short, the trial court determined that the settlement agreement "was unambiguous and further that it constituted the entire agreement between the parties" with regard to the 1985 injury claim only. See Holt v. Davidson, 388 So.2d 548 (Ala.1980). Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to apply res judicata or collateral estoppel to the employee's claim for benefits due to his 1987 injury.

We now turn to the employer's contentions concerning the employee's 1987 injury and the degree of disability which resulted therefrom.

We recognize that pursuant to § 25-5-58, Code 1975,

"[i]f the degree or duration of disability resulting from an accident is increased or prolonged because of a preexisting injury or infirmity, the employer shall be liable only for the disability that would have resulted from the accident had the earlier injury or infirmity not existed."

However, if an employee was able to perform his work prior to the time of the subject injury, then no preexisting condition was present for compensation purposes. International Paper Co. v. Rogers, 500 So.2d 1102 (Ala.Civ.App.1986).

The trial court's order contains this specific factual finding: the employee "was satisfactorily...