Blue Ridge Realty Co. v. Williamson

• Decision Date: 15 December 1965
• Docket Number: No. 18439,18439
• Citation: 145 S.E.2d 922,247 S.C. 112
• Parties: BLUE RIDGE REALTY COMPANY, Inc., and Clark L. Evans, Jr., Appellants, v. Wendell McGregory Steacy WILLIAMSON and Enola Kathryn Williamson, Respondents.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 922

145 S.E.2d 922

247 S.C. 112

BLUE RIDGE REALTY COMPANY, Inc., and Clark L. Evans, Jr., Appellants, v.Wendell McGregory Steacy WILLIAMSON and Enola Kathryn Williamson, Respondents.

No. 18439.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Dec. 15, 1965.

H. F. Partee, Greenville, for appellants.

Haynsworth, Perry, Bryant, Marion & Johnstone, Greenville, for respondents.

MOSS, Justice.

Blue Ridge Realty Co., Inc., an appellant herein, was the owner of a tract of land in Greenville County.This tract of land was subdivided and lots and streets were designated and mapped, and the plat thereof was recorded in the R. M. C. Office for Greenville County, on March 9, 1959, in Plat Book QQ, at page 44.The subdivision was known as 'Section One, Fenwick Heights'.According to the recorded plat, LotsNos. 10-18, inclusive, of this subdivision, abut on a street or road known as Gippy Court.This street or road is 50 feet wide and approximately 450 feet long and dead ends into a turn-around circle, which has a radius of 50 feet.LotsNos. 12, 13, 14 and 15 abut on the turn-around circle of Gippy Court.

The aforesaid appellant, on March 14, 1959, conveyed all of the streets shown on the aforesaid plat, including Gippy Court, to Greenville County, and this deed was recorded in Deed Book 629, at page 152.The aforesaid deed is in general warranty fee simple form and it was specifically recited in said deed that the property conveyed consisted of streets in the aforesaid subdivision.

It appears that on December 29, 1959, the appellant conveyed to Wendell McGregory Steacy Williamson LotsNos. 13 and 14 of said subdivision, which said deed is of record in the R. M. C. Office for Greenville County, in Deed Book 644, at page 172, and on January 10, 1961, the appellant conveyed to Wendell McGregory Steacy Williamson and Enola Kathryn Williamson, the respondents herein, LotNo. 15 of said subdivision, which deed is of record in the R. M. C. Office for Greenville County, in Deed Book 666, at page 286.All three of said lots were described by reference to and as shown on the aforesaid recorded plat.It further appears that on September 11, 1961, that Greenville County conveyed to Wendell McGregory Steacy Williamson, said deed being of record in Deed Book 682, at page 87, R. M. C. Office for Greenville County, the circular or turn-around portion of Gippy Court beginning at an iron pin on the western side of Gippy Court at the joint front corner of LotsNos. 12 and 13, and running to an iron pin at the joint front corner of LotsNos. 15 and 16.During the spring of 1962, the respondents constructed a concrete veil block wall along the western property line as set forth in the aforesaid deed from Greenville County, thereby preventing traffic on Gippy Court from using the turn-around circle.

Blue Ridge Realty Co., Inc., alleging that it was the owner of LotsNos. 11, 12 and 17 abutting on Gippy Court, commenced this action asserting that the respondents owned no part of the circular or turn-around portion of Gippy Court and that they have obstructed same by building the wall above referred to without any right or authority so to do.The aforesaid appellant seeks an order to require the respondents to remove the fence so constructed and that they be enjoined from obstructing or encroaching upon the said Gippy Court.

The respondents, by their answer, denied that the wall in question was an unlawful obstruction and alleged affirmatively that they own the property in question by virtue of the deed to them from Greenville County.

It is admitted that on April 24, 1964, subsequent to the bringing of this action, that Clark L. Evans, Jr. purchased LotNo. 16 on Gippy Court which adjoins LotNo. 15 of the respondents, as shown on the aforesaid plat, from M. L. Lanford, Jr. and William F. Lanford, who were successors in title to Blue Ridge Realty Co., Inc.Clark L. Evans, Jr. was, by consent, allowed to join in this action in the lower Court as an additional plaintiff and is now an appellant herein.

This case was tried before the Honorable James H. Price, Jr., Judge of the Greenville County Court, without a jury.Testimony was taken and a number of exhibits were offered in evidence.The Trial Judge, by its order, held that the respondents had such title as they would acquire in a public road were the same abandoned or vacated and that there were no other parties having rights or interests in this portion of the road.Specifically, he held that the respondents, under the deed from Greenville County, acquired title to that portion of Gippy Court on which their lots abutted.He did hold, however, that the property covered by the deed from Greenville County to the respondents was in excess of the property on which their lots abutted and it was decreed that a new line be established and the respondents required to give up the excess property beyond such line.The respondents were ordered to remove the existing wall or fence but were allowed to reconstruct a new one upon that part of the turn-around portion of Gippy Court as was indicated on a plat attached to the aforesaid order.All parties to this action gave timely notice of intention to appeal to this Court.

It is the position of the appellants that the owners of lots in a subdivision have an easement in all the streets shown on the plat thereof, independent of their rights therein as members of the public, which survives abandonment of such streets by the county which held title to them.

We have held that where a deed describes land as is shown on a certain plat, such plat becomes a part of the deed.Lynch v. Lynch, 236 S.C. 612, 115 S.E.2d 301.It is generally held that when the owner of land has it subdivided and platted into lots and streets and sells and conveys the lots with reference to the plat, he thereby dedicates said streets to the use of such lot owners, their successors in title, and the public.Outlaw v. Moise, 222 S.C. 24, 71 S.E.2d 509;Cason v. Gibson, 217 S.C. 500, 61 S.E.2d 58;Billings v. McDaniel, 217 S.C. 261, 60 S.E.2d 592;Newton v. Batson, 223 S.C. 545, 77 S.E.2d 212;Corbin v. Cherokee Realty Co., 229 S.C. 16, 91 S.E.2d 542.

We quote the following from the Outlaw case:

'It is generally held that where land is divided into lots according to a plat thereof, showing streets, and lots are sold and conveyed with reference to said plat, the owner thereby dedicates the street to the public.Ordinarily there must be an express or implied acceptance before the dedication is complete, 16 Am.Jur., Dedication, Section 31, and such acceptance must be made within a reasonable time.Chafee v. City of Aiken, 57 S.C. 507, 35 S.E. 800.However, 'as between the owner, who has conveyed lots according to a plat, and his grantee or grantees, the dedication is complete when the conveyance is made, even though the street is not accepted by the public authorities.'16 Am.Jur., Dedication, Section 31.In the recent case of Cason v. Gibson, 271 S.C. 500, 61 S.E.2d 58, the court held, quoting syllabus: 'Where plaintiff purchased a corner lot with reference to recorded subdivision map which showed lot to front on certain street and thereafter defendants separately purchased lots which contained a portion of street which bounded plaintiff's lot, plaintiff had such a special property interest in street as to entitle him to maintain suit for preservation of street even though dedication had never been accepted by municipal authorities."

In the Corbin case, it appears that the appellants who owned several lots bordering on Langston Avenue, a street in a subdivision known as Florenza Heights in the City of Florence, and who claimed title to a portion of said street by adverse possession, brought the action to enjoin the respondents from entering upon his property for the purpose of constructing or opening said avenue.The appeal was from an order refusing an injunction and dismissing the action.This Court, in affirming the judgment below, said:

'The Florenza Company by subdividing and platting this property into lots and streets and selling and conveying lots with reference to the plat, thereby manifested an intent to dedicate said streets to the use of the public, and is estopped to deny the rights of such purchasers and those claiming under them, to an easement in all the streets represented and as represented on the plat.* * * Such purchasers acquired every easement, privilege and advantage which the plat represented as belonging to them.The Florenza Company could not without the consent of appellant change the location or width of Langston Avenue.'

The purchasers of lots with reference to the plat of this subdivision acquired every easement, privilege and advantage shown upon said plat, including the right to the use of all of the streets, near or remote, as laid down on the plat by which the lots were purchased.It was so held in the case of Billings v. McDaniel, 217 S.C. 261, 60 S.E.2d 592....