Blue Springs Bowl v. Spradling

• Decision Date: 10 May 1977
• Docket Number: No. 59523,59523
• Citation: 551 S.W.2d 596
• Parties: BLUE SPRINGS BOWL et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. James R. SPRADLING et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 596

551 S.W.2d 596

BLUE SPRINGS BOWL et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. James R. SPRADLING et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 59523.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

May 10, 1977.

Rehearing Denied June 14, 1977.

Clarence Thomas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for defendants-appellants.

Richard M. Shteamer, Kansas City, for plaintiffs-respondents.

Betty Jane Okenfuss, Asst. County Counselor, Clayton, for amicus curiae.

FINCH, Judge.

This appeal, involving construction of the revenue laws of this state, is one of which we have jurisdiction. Mo.Const. art. V, § 3. The precise single question presented is whether the Missouri sales tax law imposes a tax on receipts derived from fees or charges paid for participating in the activity of bowling at commercial bowling establishments. The trial court, considering itself bound under the decision in L & R Distributing, Inc. v. Missouri Department of Revenue, 529 S.W.2d 375 (Mo.1975), held that the sales tax law does not impose a tax on such receipts. Accordingly, it invalidated a Department of Revenue rule which called for imposition of a tax thereon and enjoined the Department of Revenue from collecting such taxes. We reverse and remand with directions.

The facts were stipulated. Effective April 30, 1974, the Department of Revenue promulgated a revised Revenue Rule 49 which reinterpreted the sales tax act, in particular § 144.020.1(2), RSMo Supp.1973, ¹ as imposing a sales tax on gross receipts derived from fees or charges paid for participating in bowling in any place of amusement, entertainment or recreation. ² This represented a change in the position of the Department of Revenue because previous department rules had not included in receipts to be taxed those fees paid for participating in bowling. ³ Respondents paid the tax under protest and then brought this action, seeking a declaration that revised Rule 49 is invalid insofar as it requires payment of sales tax on receipts from bowling fees or charges. The suit also sought injunctive relief.

At the outset, we address the question of whether, as respondents contend and the trial court believed, L & R Distributing, Inc. rules the decision herein. If it does, we need do no more than to so recognize and state. That would mean affirming the action of the trial court.

In L & R Distributing, Inc. the issue was whether § 144.020.1(2) imposed a sales tax on gross receipts of coin operated devices such as pinball machines placed in " 'restaurants, confectionaries, bowling alleys, hotels, motels, bus stations, airports and other similar places' ". The court pointed out that the statute provides for taxation of fees paid to or in a place of amusement, entertainment or recreation, saying "two elements are essential, that there be fees or charges and that they be paid in or to a place of amusement, etc." Id. at 378. The court was of the view that places such as hotel lobbies, restaurants, motels, bus stations and airports are not, within normal contemplation, places of amusement or entertainment and are not converted into such types of places by the placement therein of pinball machines. Thus, the second part of the two element test, namely, that the fees or charges be paid in or to a place of amusement, entertainment or recreation, was lacking. Hence, the court reasoned, the statute did not impose a sales tax on receipts from those devices as such. As the court pointed out, the tax is imposed only if there are fees paid in or to a place of amusement, etc.

In this case, we do not have an attempt to impose a tax on fees received for bowling as such, regardless of where paid. Rather, we have for decision whether fees paid in commercial bowling establishments for participation in bowling are taxable. Such places clearly fall within one or more of the categories of places of "amusement, entertainment or recreation" mentioned in the statute. Thus, the situation is not comparable to the one considered in L & R Distributing, Inc. It follows that the holding therein that receipts from coin operated machines such as pinball machines, located elsewhere than in places of amusement, etc., were not taxable does not dictate a result in this case.

In deciding whether § 144.020.1(2) imposes a sales tax on fees paid for bowling in commercial bowling alleys and whether revised Revenue Rule 49 does or does not correctly interpret and apply said statutory provision, there are certain well established rules of statutory construction which we must follow. "The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider words used in the statute in their plain and ordinary meaning." State v. Kraus, 530 S.W.2d 684, 685 (Mo. banc 1975). " * * * (W) here the language of a statute is plain and admits of but one meaning there is no room for construction." Cummins v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920, 931 (banc 1933). United Air Lines, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 377 S.W.2d 444, 448 (Mo. banc 1964); Rathjen v. Reorganized School District R- II, 365 Mo. 518, 284 S.W.2d 516, 523 (banc 1955). Tax laws are to be strictly construed and if the right to tax is not conferred by plain language, it will not be extended by implication. United Air Lines, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 377 S.W.2d at 449.

Applying those rules, we conclude that the language of § 144.020.1(2) is clear and unambiguous when applied to the facts stipulated in this case. First, the statute plainly provides for a sales tax on receipts from amounts paid for admission to places of amusement, entertainment or recreation, as well as to games and athletic events. Next, it clearly imposes a tax on receipts from amounts paid for seating accommodations in such places. However, the statute does not stop there. It goes on to impose a tax on receipts from fees paid to or in such places. Respondents argue that when the statute refers to "fees paid to, or in" places of amusement, etc., the plain and clear meaning thereof "is that the tax should be imposed on the charge that is made for reserved seats and tables within the place of amusement after admission". Such a meaning, argue respondents, "gives a reasoned, unstrained construction to the statute and gives full weight to the context created by the antecedent words of the subsection, i. e., 'for admission and seating accommodations'." In so contending, respondents, in effect, say that the words "fees paid to, or in" the place of amusement, etc., really add nothing new at all. They do not impose a tax on anything except what preceding language of the subsection already has taxed. They simply restate in different and more general language the previous direction that a tax is imposed on the amount paid for seating accommodations in places of amusement, etc. To so hold would be to say that by adding these additional words imposing a tax on "fees paid to, or in" such places, the legislature did a vain and useless thing.

In our view, this additional language is not subject to such an interpretation. The additional words say in plain language that in addition to those things already taxed in connection with any place of amusement, etc., namely, "admission and seating accommodations", the sales tax also is imposed on such other fees as are paid to or in said establishments. That simple general language is not limited or qualified in any way. It applies to all such fees paid to or in such establishments. It says nothing about excluding therefrom any fees paid for participating in sports or events in said establishments. Giving the words used their plain and ordinary meaning, it follows that § 144.020.1(2) simply says that a three percent sales tax is imposed (1) on sums paid for admission to places of amusement, etc., (2) on amounts paid for seating accommodations therein (whether simply seats or seating at tables), and (3) on such other fees as are paid to or in places of amusement, etc. We should so interpret the statute unless, for one of the reasons advanced by respondents, a contrary result is dictated.

Respondents first argue that the Department of Revenue's long standing administrative interpretation of the statute (1937-1974) as not taxing fees charged in places of amusement, etc., for participating in bowling should be given great weight and should result in the statute being construed as not imposing a sales tax on revenues derived from fees for participating in bowling. If we found the language of § 144.020.1(2) to be ambiguous and there was need to resort to extrinsic aids to statutory construction, this lengthy administrative interpretation, even when based, as it obviously was, on the opinion of the Attorney General dated August 21, 1937, would be considered and given appropriate weight along with such other extrinsic aids as might exist. State ex rel. Jackson County v. Public Service Commission, 532 S.W.2d 20, 28 (Mo. banc 1975). However, when a statute is clear and unambiguous, extrinsic aids to statutory construction cannot be used.

This well established rule was stated thus in Automobile Gasoline Co. v. City of St. Louis, 326 Mo. 435, 32 S.W.2d 281, 283 (1930):

" * * * The construction of a statute by those charged with the duty of enforcing it, when it has long prevailed, while not binding upon the courts, is entitled to weight where the meaning of the statute is uncertain. * * * "

In State ex rel. Bell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 349 Mo. 360, 160 S.W.2d 764, 769 (Mo.1942), the court, after quoting the above, added:

" * * * We find no ambiguity or uncertainty in this statute. * * * If section 8437, supra, is clear and unambiguous, it must be construed in accordance with its manifest intent and we may not search for a meaning beyond the statute itself. * * * "

This rule was repeated with emphasis in Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware v. State, 503 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo.1972), ...