Bluebeard's Castle, Inc. v. Hodge
| Decision Date | 01 April 2009 |
| Docket Number | D.C. Civ.App. No. 2002–154. |
| Citation | 51 V.I. 672 |
| Parties | BLUEBEARD'S CASTLE, INC., Appellant, v. Lawrence HODGE, Maria Hodge and Government of the Virgin Islands, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, Superior Court Judge: The Honorable Rhys S. Hodge. Super. Ct. Civ. No. 925/1997.
Gregory, Hodges, Esq., St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., For the Appellant.
Denise M. Francois, Esq., St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., For Appellees Lawrence Hodge and Maria Hodge.
Douglas J. Juergens, Esq., St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., For Appellee Government of the Virgin Islands.
Before: RAYMOND FINCH, Judge of the District Court of the Virgin Islands; JUAN R. SANCHEZ, Judge of the District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation; JULIO A. BRADY, Judge of the Superior Court, Division of St. Croix, sitting by designation.
Bluebeard's Castle, Inc. (“BCI”) appeals from (1) a judgment of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands 1 in favor of the appellees; (2) an award of attorney's fees and costs; and (3) an order denying BCI's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.
BCI is a Virgin Islands corporation that operates a hotel known as Bluebeard's Castle Hotel on St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, The hotel sits on land known as Taarneberg, Bluebeard's Castle Property, King's Quarter (the “BCI Property”), which BCI purchased in 1974 by quitclaim deed from Henry H. Reichhold. Reichhold had purchased the BCI Property by quitclaim deed in 1959 from Antilles Enterprises, Inc., which, in turn, had purchased it by quitclaim deed in 1954 from the United States Government. The United States had acquired the BCI Property by quitclaim deed in 1933 from City Bank Farmers Trust Co., Frederick H. Nies and Benedict S. Wise, as Trustees under the Last Will and Testament of James Buchanan Nies.
Lawrence and Maria Hodge (together, the “Hodges”) are the owners of certain real property located at Parcel 39c Estate Taarneberg, St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands (“Parcel 39c”). The Hodges acquired Parcel 39c by warranty deed in December 1985 from the West Indian Company Limited.
The BCI Property and Parcel 39c abut each other and are both accessed by a road known alternatively as Frederiksberg Cade, Street to Frederiksberg and Bluebeard's Castle Entrance Road (the “Disputed Roadway”). The Disputed Roadway provides the only access to Parcel 39c.
In 1994, BCI erected a gate on the western end of the Disputed Roadway. A sign on the gate read “Bluebeard's Castle.” For some time thereafter, the gate was open from 12:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m. BCI later began locking the gate twenty-four hours per day, effectively preventing the Hodges from accessing Parcel 39c from the west.2 In 1997, the Hodges discovered that BCI had also mounted a chain on the eastern entrance to the Disputed Roadway, thus blocking their access to Parcel 39c from the east.
In November 1997, the Hodges filed an eleven-count action against BCI in the Superior Court.3 The Hodges asserted various theories of relief and requested, among other things, injunctive relief to prevent BCI from obstructing their access to Parcel 39c.
In January 1998, the Hodges requested an entry of default against BCI. After entering default against BCI, the Superior Court held a bench trial and entered default judgment in favor of the Hodges. For reasons not relevant here, the default judgment was later set aside. BCI filed an answer. Protracted discovery ensued.
In January 2002, the Government of the Virgin Islands (the “Government”) filed an intervener's complaint against BCI. The Government sought a declaration that the Disputed Roadway is public, a mandatory injunction to compel BCI to remove any barriers blocking public access to the Disputed Roadway and a permanent injunction to prevent BCI from erecting or maintainning any barrier on the Disputed Roadway.
BCI thereafter moved for summary judgment, contending that the Disputed Roadway is not a public road; the Hodges failed to prove the elements of an easement by prescription; and two of the Hodges' claims—in Counts I and II of the complaint—were barred by a two-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied ECI's motion in all respects, finding that genuine questions of material fact remained for trial.
A jury trial was held from May 28, 2002 to June 3, 2002. By stipulation of the parties, the jury's findings were advisory only. In a special verdict, the jury made the following findings: the Disputed Roadway is a public road owned by the Government; BCI intentionally and unreasonably interfered with the Hodges' use and enjoyment of Parcel 39c; BCI intentionally and unreasonably interfered with the Hodges' right as members of the public to use and Disputed Road; and the Hodges' damages were proximately caused by BCI. The jury recommended awarding the Hodges compensatory damages in the amount of $6,000 and punitive damages in the amount of one dollar.
On June 17, 2002, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion, setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court concluded that the Disputed Roadway is a public road and that BCI interfered with the public's right to use it. The trial court issued a permanent injunction to prevent BCI from obstructing access to the Disputed Roadway. The trial court also awarded the Hodges $6,000 in compensatory damages and one dollar in punitive damages.
BCI subsequently filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure SO. Reasoning that the jury's verdict was supported by substantial evidence at trial, the trial court denied BCI's motion.4 The trial court also awarded the Hodges $116,008.90 in attorney's fees and costs.
This timely appeal followed. BCI submits the following three main issues, with numerous subsidiary issues, for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying BCI's motion for summary judgment on statute-of-limitations grounds with respect to Counts I and II of the complaint; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying BCI's motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in its award of attorney's fees and costs.
A. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to review final judgments and orders of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands. SeeRevised Organic Act of 1954 23A, 48 U.S.C. § 1613a; Act No. 6730 § 54(d)(1) (Omnibus Justice Act of 2005). 5
B. Standard of Review1. Summary Judgment
We exercise plenary review over the trial count's denial of a motion for summary judgment. Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. Am. States Life. Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir.1993). This means that we “review the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered.” Id.; see also Stouts–Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Bankers Trust Co., 173 Fed. Appx. 109, 111 (3d Cir.2006). “On review ‘the appellate court is required to apply the same test that the lower court should have utilized.’ “ Carty v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 78 F.Supp.2d 417, 419 (D.V.I.App.Div.1999) (quoting Tree of Life Distributing Co. v. National Enterprises of St. Croix, Inc., Civ. No. 19 97–30, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17980, at *6 (D.V.I.App.Div. Nov. 5, 1998), aff'd,208 F.3d 206 (3d Cir.2000)).
Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Hersh v. Allen Products Co., 789 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir.1986).
“Where the trial court's determination was based on its application of legal precepts or interpretation of a statute, our review is also plenary.” Wing–It Delivery Servs. v. V.I. Cmty. Bank, Civ.App. No.2000–176, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *5, 2005 WL 1653104 (D.V.I.App. Div. June 24, 2005) (citing HOVIC v. Richardson, 894 F.Supp. 211, 214 (D.V.I.App.Div.1995)). “However, we review the trial court's factual determinations for clear error.” Id. (citing In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 233 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir.2000)).
2. Judgment as a Matter of Law
“Judgment as a matter of law may he granted only if ‘as a matter of law, the record is critically deficient in that minimum quantity of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.’ “ Whelan v. Teledyne Metalworking Prods., 226 Fed. Appx. 141, 145 (3d Cir.2007) (quoting Trabal v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 269 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir.2001)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir.1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
“The standard: of review for an order granting or denying a motion for judgment as a matter of law is plenary.” Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir.2007) (citing Lightning Lube, 4 F.3d 1153 at 1166). Our “review of a jury's verdict is limited to determining whether some evidence in the record supports the jury's verdict.” LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir.2003) ().
3. Attorney's Fees
We review the reasonableness of the trial court's award of attorney's fees for abuse of discretion. People...
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