Blueford v. Arkansas
| Decision Date | 24 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 10–1320.,10–1320. |
| Citation | 566 U.S. 599,132 S.Ct. 2044,182 L.Ed.2d 937 |
| Parties | Alex BLUEFORD, Petitioner v. ARKANSAS. |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Clifford M. Sloan, for Petitioner.
Dustin McDaniel, Attorney General, for Respondent.
William R. Simpson, Jr., Sharon Kiel, Clint Miller, Sixth Judicial District (Arkansas), Public Defenders Office, Little Rock, AR, Clifford M. Sloan, Counsel of Record, Geoffrey M. Wyatt, David W. Foster, Moshe Spinowitz, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Dan Schweitzer, of Counsel, Washington, DC, Dustin McDaniel, Arkansas Attorney General, David R. Raupp, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Counsel of Record, Eileen W. Harrison, Lauren Elizabeth Heil, Valerie Glover Fortner, Assistant Attorneys General, Office of the Attorney General, Little Rock, AR, for Respondent.
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against being tried twice for the same offense. The Clause does not, however, bar a second trial if the first ended in a mistrial. Before the jury concluded deliberations in this case, it reported that it was unanimous against guilt on charges of capital murder and first-degree murder, was deadlocked on manslaughter, and had not voted on negligent homicide. The court told the jury to continue to deliberate. The jury did so but still could not reach a verdict, and the court declared a mistrial. All agree that the defendant may be retried on charges of manslaughter and negligent homicide. The question is whether he may also be retried on charges of capital and first-degree murder.
One-year-old Matthew McFadden, Jr., suffered a severe head injury on November 28, 2007, while home with his mother's boyfriend, Alex Blueford. Despite treatment at a hospital, McFadden died a few days later.
The State of Arkansas charged Blueford with capital murder, but waived the death penalty. The State's theory at trial was that Blueford had injured McFadden intentionally, causing the boy's death "[u]nder circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." Ark.Code Ann. § 5–10–101(a)(9)(A) (Supp.2011). The defense, in contrast, portrayed the death as the result of Blueford accidentally knocking McFadden onto the ground.
The trial court instructed the jury that the charge of capital murder included three lesser offenses: first-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. In addition to describing these offenses, the court addressed the order in which the jury was to consider them: App. 51–52.
The prosecution commented on these instructions in its closing argument. It told the jury, for example, that "before you can consider a lesser included of capital murder, you must first, all 12, vote that this man is not guilty of capital murder." Id., at 55. The prosecution explained that this was Id., at 59. Rather, the prosecution emphasized, "unless all 12 of you agree that this man's actions were not consistent with capital murder, then and only then would you go down to murder in the first degree." Ibid.
After the parties concluded their arguments, the court presented the jury with a set of five verdict forms, each representing a possible verdict. There were four separate forms allowing the jury to convict on each of the charged offenses: capital murder, first-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. A fifth form allowed the jury to return a verdict of acquittal, if the jury found Blueford not guilty of any offense. There was no form allowing the jury to acquit on some offenses but not others. As stated in the court's instructions, the jury could either "find the defendant guilty of one of these offenses" or "acquit him outright." Id., at 51. Any verdict—whether to convict on one or to acquit on all—had to be unanimous.
A few hours after beginning its deliberations, the jury sent the court a note asking "what happens if we cannot agree on a charge at all." Id., at 62. The court called the jury back into the courtroom and issued a so-called "Allen instruction," emphasizing the importance of reaching a verdict. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501–502, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896). The jury then deliberated for a half hour more before sending out a second note, stating that it "cannot agree on any one charge in this case." App. 64. When the court summoned the jury again, the jury foreperson reported that the jury was "hopelessly" deadlocked. Ibid. The court asked the foreperson to disclose the jury's votes on each offense:
Following this exchange, the court gave another Allen instruction and sent the jurors back to the jury room. After deliberations resumed, Blueford's counsel asked the court to submit new verdict forms to the jurors, to be completed "for those counts that they have reached a verdict on." Id., at 67. The prosecution objected on the grounds that the jury was "still deliberating" and that a verdict of acquittal had to be "all or nothing." Id., at 68. The court denied Blueford's request. To allow for a partial verdict, the court explained, would be "like changing horses in the middle of the stream," given that the jury had already received instructions and verdict forms. Ibid. The court informed counsel that it would declare a mistrial "if the jury doesn't make a decision." Id., at 69.
When the jury returned a half hour later, the foreperson stated that they had not reached a verdict. The court declared a mistrial and discharged the jury.
The State subsequently sought to retry Blueford. He moved to dismiss the capital and first-degree murder charges on double jeopardy grounds, citing the foreperson's report that the jurors had voted unanimously against guilt on those offenses. The trial court denied the motion, and the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed on interlocutory appeal. According to the State Supreme Court, the foreperson's report had no effect on the State's ability to retry Blueford, because the foreperson "was not making a formal announcement of acquittal" when she disclosed the jury's votes. 2011 Ark. 8, p. 9, 370S.W.3d 496, ––––. This was not a case, the court observed, "where a formal verdict was announced or entered of record." Ibid . The court added that the trial court did not err in denying Blueford's request for new verdict forms that would have allowed the jury to render a partial verdict on the charges of capital and first-degree murder.
Blueford sought review in this Court, and we granted certiorari. 565 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 397, 181 L.Ed.2d 255 (2011).
The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const., Amdt. 5. The Clause "guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict the accused, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty." United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Blueford contends that the foreperson's report means that he cannot be tried again on charges of capital and first-degree murder. According to Blueford, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a second trial on those charges, for two reasons.
Blueford's primary submission is that he cannot be retried for capital and first-degree murder because the jury actually acquitted him of those offenses. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). The Arkansas Supreme Court noted—and Blueford acknowledges—that no formal judgment of acquittal was entered in his case. But none was necessary, Blueford maintains, because an acquittal is a matter of substance, not form. Quoting from our decision in Martin Linen, supra,
at 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, Blueford contends that despite the absence of a formal verdict, a jury's announcement constitutes an acquittal if it " ‘actually represents a resolution ... of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.’ " Brief for Petitioner 21. Here, according to Blueford, the foreperson's announcement of the jury's unanimous votes on capital and first-degree murder represented just that: a resolution of some or all of the elements of those offenses in Blueford's favor.
We disagree. The foreperson's report was not a final resolution of anything. When the foreperson told the court how the jury had voted on each offense, the jury's deliberations had not yet concluded. The jurors in fact went back to the jury room to deliberate further, even after the...
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