Bluitt v. State

Decision Date13 October 1978
Docket NumberNo. 1277S809,1277S809
Citation381 N.E.2d 458,269 Ind. 438
PartiesVernon Thomas BLUITT, John Marshall Whitfield, Edgar Lamar Scott, Appellants (Defendants below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Arnold Paul Baratz, Indianapolis, for appellants.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

HUNTER, Justice.

Vernon Bluitt, John Whitfield, and Edgar Scott were jointly tried after an incident in which a federal drug enforcement agent was robbed and shot. Each defendant was found guilty of armed robbery; each defendant was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. In their joint appeal to this Court, three issues are presented:

1. Did the trial court err in overruling the defendants' motion to suppress their confessions?

2. Did the trial court err in denying the defendants' motions for separate trials?

3. Did the trial court err in denying the defendants' motions for a mistrial?

Michael Jackson testified that three young men accosted him in the parking lot of the Quality Inn near the Indiana State Fairgrounds, Indianapolis, Indiana, on August 17, 1976. Two Indianapolis Police Department officers were to have met Jackson at the motel, and they witnessed the final episode of the robbery. The three armed youths had taken Jackson's wallet, watch, and service revolver. Then, as the youths began to leave, with Jackson standing with his hands in the air, they repeatedly shot Jackson. Jackson stated, "(F)or no apparent reason they turned and started firing." The police estimated that as many as ten shots were directed at Jackson. Jackson was hit twice in the groin and once in the hand; he had to crawl under a pick-up truck for cover. The officers were able to identify positively a Jeffrey Wilson as one of the attackers; he was tried separately. Although no positive eye-witness identification was made on the others, investigation revealed that Bluitt and Scott were at the robbery scene, and Whitfield was waiting in an automobile close by.

I.

Between August 17, 1976, and August 25, 1976, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Indianapolis Police Department conducted an investigation of the attack on Jackson. On August 25, 1976, three teams of investigators from the FBI separately interrogated Bluitt, Whitfield, and Scott. Each team went to one of the three defendants' homes; each defendant was questioned in the presence of a parent.

Each defendant now raises as error the refusal of the trial court to suppress the statements obtained. The defendants argue that since they were juveniles at the time they were questioned they should have been provided time to meaningfully consult with their parents before statements were taken. They maintain that the failure of the law enforcement officials to provide such meaningful consultation time renders their confessions involuntary and inadmissible. To support their allegations, the defendants cite our decision in Hall v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 448, 346 N.E.2d 584. The defendants insist that "a meaningful consultation can only occur in the absence of the neutralizing pressures which result from police presence, . . ." and that since the record here demonstrates that the defendants were never left alone with their parents before the statements were taken, the statements were not voluntarily given. We disagree.

Before we analyze the factual posture of the defendants' confessions and waivers, it is important that we briefly review those Indiana decisions which address the special problems inherent within confessions obtained from juveniles. The minimum standards for procuring a valid waiver from a juvenile were set forth in Lewis v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138:

"(A) juvenile's statement or confession cannot be used against him at a subsequent trial or hearing unless both he and his parents or guardian were informed of his rights to an attorney, and to remain silent. Furthermore, the child must be given an opportunity to consult with his parents, guardian or an attorney representing the juvenile as to whether or not he wishes to waive those rights. After such consultation the child may waive his rights if he so chooses provided of course that there are no elements of coercion, force or inducement present." 259 Ind. 431, 439, 288 N.E.2d 138, 142.

In Bridges v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 651, 299 N.E.2d 616, we added that before a confession may be deemed admissible a judge must inquire of the juvenile and his parents whether the waiver is voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently given. We held that "(s)uch an inquiry would be meaningless unless the judge established that the juvenile and his parents, if available, knew what his rights were." 260 Ind. 651, 654, 299 N.E.2d 616, 618.

As we stated in a footnote in Hall v. State, supra, the holding in Lewis v. State, supra, was fashioned to provide a special measure of care for juveniles prior to their waiving of the important constitutional rights which must be disclosed to them under Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. In further defining this "special measure of care," we did make the statement that an opportunity to consult with a parent Prior to the execution of the waiver is meaningful only in the absence of the neutralizing pressures which result from police presence. There is, therefore, a factual determination to be made in all cases of juvenile confessions: (1) were there neutralizing pressures which rendered the confession involuntary, and (2) did those neutralizing pressures result from police presence? In order to make this factual determination, the trial court is bound to examine the totality of the circumstances. As we have stated in Burnett v. State, (1978) Ind., 377 N.E.2d 1340:

"In juvenile confession cases, we should only look to the record to determine if there was a meaningful opportunity for full consultation between the juvenile and his parent or guardian, Without any coercion on the part of the police. . . ." 377 N.E.2d 1340, 1342-1343 (emphasis added).

We note that the totality of the circumstances in the Hall decision amply demonstrates that the juvenile was not afforded any Special measure of protection, but rather was denied the protections which should be afforded to Any defendant: he was not advised of any rights other than to have a parent or guardian present prior to questioning; by the time the defendant's guardian arrived, the juvenile had Already Been subjected to overzealous police activities, and therefore there Could be no meaningful consultation on whether the defendant should waive the rights. Contra, Tippitt v. State, (1977) Ind., 364 N.E.2d 763.

The fundamental fairness of the arresting officers and the overriding atmosphere of respect within the interrogation process are crucial indices to our examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the juvenile's confession. Where there is no evidence of pressure, And there is evidence of no pressure, the confession is admissible as voluntary.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, certain evidence was adduced. Scott was seventeen years, eleven months old when he was arrested. FBI officers initially contacted Scott at his home. Scott was placed in an FBI car and was advised of his rights. He was specifically told that since he was seventeen, the officers did not want to talk to him at all until one of his parents was present. Even though Scott indicated a desire, on the ride to the FBI office, to talk about the issue, he was told to wait until his parents got there. Scott was taken to an interview room at the FBI office. The officers brought Scott cigarettes and coffee and continued their efforts to locate his father. When Scott's father arrived, he was told the reason why Scott was being held, and he was told that the officers could not talk to Scott without the father's presence. Then, in front of both Scott and his father, the FBI officials explained the charges and the possible penalty. Scott's rights were explained orally; Scott and his father were given a rights form which they both read, stated they understood, and signed.

Scott's father had indicated in the hallway that he wished Scott would hurry up and turn eighteen so he would no longer have to come down when Scott was locked up. Scott and his father did speak to each other during the interrogation. Scott had completed the eleventh grade in high school and could read, write, and understand the English language. After the rights waiver was signed, Scott's father told Scott to "get it straightened out, . . . tell the truth . . . ." Neither Scott nor his father requested an opportunity to speak alone at the FBI office, and they were not left alone for that purpose. The FBI officer did testify that had the Scotts made such a request, it would have been permitted. The interview was characterized by a spirit of cooperation, according to the FBI officer. Scott's father himself testified that the FBI agents were very courteous during the interview. We find from the totality of the circumstances that Scott's confession was knowingly and voluntarily given, and it was properly admitted at trial.

The second defendant, John Whitfield, was seventeen years and two months old when he was arrested. The FBI agent testifying regarding Whitfield's arrest related that he went to Whitfield's home at 7:34 a. m. on the morning of August 25, 1976. Whitfield's mother answered the door. The agents were led to a bedroom where Whitfield was sleeping. The agents identified themselves and told Whitfield to get out of bed. They took Whitfield to the other room and sat on the couch. No conversation between the agents and Whitfield took place during this initial confrontation. Other agents arrived, and they explained to Whitfield who they were and why they were there; he was advised of his rights, first orally and then he read the form...

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12 cases
  • King v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • December 17, 1979
    ... ... 9 There is authority that Officer Hurlock's statement was not hearsay. What is normally "hearsay" testimony may be admissible to show the reason for further investigation by the police. McNew v. State (1979), Ind., 391 N.E.2d 607; Bluitt v. State (1978), Ind., 381 N.E.2d 458; Boles v. State (1973), 259 Ind. 661, 291 N.E.2d 357; Wills v. State (1974), 162 Ind.App. 159, 318 N.E.2d 385. But see Glover v. State (1969), 253 Ind. 121, 251 N.E.2d 814; Mayes v. State (1974), 162 Ind.App. 186, 318 N.E.2d 811 (hearsay information gathered ... ...
  • Underhill v. State
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    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • December 3, 1981
    ... ...         On appeal, defendant asserts the court either should have granted his request for a mistrial or permitted him to again address the jury. The latter contention, however, was not raised in his motion to correct errors and is consequently waived. Ind.R.Ap.P. 8.3(A)(7); Bluitt v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 438, 381 N.E.2d 458 ...         The grant or denial of a motion for mistrial rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Its determination is reversible only where an abuse of discretion is established. Blackburn v. State, (1979) Ind., 390 N.E.2d 653; ... ...
  • Taylor v. State
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    ... ... In these circumstances, we are compelled to conclude that the state exercised adequate precaution to insure that defendant had the opportunity for meaningful consultation with a person who had no "interest" adverse to him. Bluitt v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 438, 381 N.E.2d 458; Burnett v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 618, 377 N.E.2d 1340 ...         Extreme cases of hostility between parent and child might render consultation between that parent and his child inadequate. We recognize, however, that the statutory ... ...
  • Killian v. State
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    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • September 5, 1984
    ... ...         Killian finally argues an instruction to the jury dealing with the dismissal of charges against Moore was improper. However, Killian's motion to correct errors does not contain such issue. It is, therefore, waived. Underhill v. State, (1981) Ind., 428 N.E.2d 759, 769; Bluitt" v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 438, 449, 381 N.E.2d 458, 465; McVey v. State, (1982) Ind.App., 438 N.E.2d 770, 775; Ind.Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7) ...         Affirmed ...    \xC2" ... ...
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