Blum v. Caldwell, A-946

Decision Date06 May 1980
Docket NumberNo. A-946,A-946
Citation446 U.S. 1311,64 L.Ed.2d 225,100 S.Ct. 1635
PartiesBarbara BLUM, Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, Applicant, v. Ethel CALDWELL, etc., et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Mr. Justice MARSHALL, Circuit Justice.

Applicant Barbara Blum, the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, seeks a stay of the mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit pending filing and disposition of her petition for a writ of certiorari. The mandate of the Court of Appeals will issue on May 7, 1980, and that court has denied a motion for a stay. This application for a stay was filed on May 5, 1980. Oral argument was heard in chambers. For the reasons that follow, I deny the application for a stay.

I

This case involves medical assistance to the needy pursuant to the Medicaid program. Subchapter XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396k, establishes the fed- eral statutory guidelines which govern plans for medical assistance if a State chooses to participate in the Medicaid program. Any State which participates in Medicaid must extend medical benefits to all persons receiving supplemental security income (S.S.I.) benefits under subchapter XVI (Supplemental Security Income For The Aged, Blind, and Disabled), see 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A). Such persons are known as the "categorically needy." The State may also provide medical assistance under Medicaid for persons "who would, except for income and resources, be eligible . . . to have paid with respect to them supplemental security income benefits under subchapter XVI of this chapter, and who have insufficient (as determined in accordance with comparable standards) income and resources to meet the costs of necessary medical and remedial care and services," 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i). Such persons are known as the "medically needy."

New York opted to participate in the Medicaid program and to provide Medicaid payments to the medically needy as well as the categorically needy. The State has imposed an eligibility requirement for those persons seeking to qualify as medically needy. New York Social Services Law § 366.1(e) limits eligibility to those persons who have not made "a voluntary transfer of property (i) for the purpose of qualifying for such [medical] assistance, or (ii) for the purpose of defeating any current or future right to recovery of medical assistance paid, or for the purpose of qualifying for, continuing eligibility for or increasing need for medical assistance." A transfer of property within 18 months prior to application for Medicaid is presumed to have been for the purpose of qualifying for medical assistance. Any such transfer results in the denial of Medicaid benefits. See also N.Y.C.R.R. § 360.8. No such "no-transfer" rule applies to the categorically needy, since an applicant is allowed to transfer property in order to qualify for S.S.I. benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(b).

Respondents are aged, blind, or disabled persons who would be eligible for S.S.I. benefits but for their income and resources and who have been denied medical assistance benefits for the medically needy because they voluntarily transferred property prior to application for such benefits or while receiving such benefits. They filed suit in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of New York pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge New York Social Services Law § 366.1(e) and 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 360.8 as violative of due process, equal protection, and the Supremacy Clause. The District Court found jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). The suit was certified by the District Court as a class action on behalf of all aged, blind, or disabled persons who have been denied or will in the future be denied medical assistance benefits for the medically needy in New York State on the basis of a transfer of assets in violation of Social Services Law § 366.1(e) and 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 360.8.

The District Court granted respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded first that there had been a sufficient showing by respondents of likelihood of success on the merits. The Social Security Act provides that if the State chooses to provide benefits to the medically needy, the State must make such assistance available to all persons who would, except for income and resources, be eligible for S.S.I. benefits "and who have insufficient (as determined in accordance with comparable standards) income and resources to meet the costs of necessary medical and remedial care and services." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) (emphasis supplied). The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in its accompanying regulation has provided that a state agency "must not use requirements for determining eligibility [for Medicaid benefits] for optional coverage groups [such as the medically needy] that are . . . (2) For aged, blind and disabled individuals, more restrictive than those used under SSI. . . ." 42 CFR § 435.401(c). Since under S.S.I. an applicant may transfer assets voluntarily in order to become eligible, the District Court concluded that the more restrictive no-transfer rule of New York for the medically needy was in "apparent" conflict with federal law. The court noted that HEW officials had notified New York that its no-transfer rule violated federal requirements. The court therefore found that the respondents' likelihood of success was "strong." The District Court also concluded that the balance of harms weighed in favor of granting the injunction, because "the very survival of these individuals and those class members in similar situations is threatened by a denial of medical assistance benefits during the pendency of these actions."

The preliminary injunction was entered by the District Court on December 3, 1979. Pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, the Court of Appeals entered a temporary stay of the injunction on January 3, 1980. On April 16, 1980, the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of the preliminary injunction, "substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Munson." The Court of Appeals noted that the only other Court of Appeals to address this issue reached the same result, see Fabula v. Buck, 598 F.2d 869 (CA4 1979) (Maryland no-transfer rule). The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division has also found that Social Services Law § 366.1(e) conflicts with the Social Security Act and therefore violates the Supremacy Clause, see Scarpuzza v. Blum, 426 N.Y.S.2d 505 (2d Dept. 1980). The Court of Appeals also noted that Congress is considering legislation to authorize States to impose a no-transfer rule for Medicaid benefits, which suggests that such a rule is not presently allowed. The Court of Appeals...

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