Blum v. General Elec. Co.
| Citation | 536 F.Supp.2d 720 |
| Decision Date | 27 February 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. EP-07-CV-099-PRM.,EP-07-CV-099-PRM. |
| Parties | Kenneth BLUM et al., Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant. Enno Edzards et al., Plaintiffs, v. Raytheon Company, Defendant. Ulrich Behrendt et al., Plaintiffs, v. Lucent Technologies, Inc. and General Electric Company, Defendants. Karl-Heinz Schatz et al., Plaintiffs, v. Honeywell International, Inc. et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Aron Uri Raskas, Philip Rogers Stein, James P. Ulwick, Steven M. Klepper, Kramon & Graham, PA, Baltimore, MD, Enrique Moreno, Law Offices of Enrique Moreno, El Paso, TX, Jonathan Auerbach, Marcus Auerbach & Zylstra LLC, cote, PA, William A. Kershaw, Lyle W. Cook, Kershaw Cutter & Ratinoff LLP, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiffs.
Carole A. Cheney, Kevin T. Van Wart, Michael Dierkes, Kirkland & Ellisy LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
Mark N. Osborn, Shelly W. Rivas, Kemp Smith LLP, El Paso, TX, for Raytheon Company, Lucent Technologies, Inc., General Electric Company, Honeywell International Inc.
Charles F. Rysavy, J. Wylie Donald, Kari B. Samuels, McCarter & English, LLP, Newark, NJ, Moyahoena N. Ogilvie, McCarter & English, Hartford, CT, for Lucent Technologies, Inc.
Joanna Shally, John C. Scalzo, Shearman & Sterling, New York, NY, Shaniek Mills Maynard, Thomas Stephen Martin, Shearman & Sterling LLP, Washington, DC, for General Electric Company.
Kurt Hamrock, Michelle L. Hylton, Raymond B. Biagini, McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP, Washington, DC, for Honeywell International Inc.
On this day, the Court considered Defendants Lucent. Technologies, Inc., General Electric' Company, Raytheon Company, and Honeywell International, Inc.'s (collectively, "Defendants") "Motion to Dismiss the Claims of Plaintiffs Who Previously Stipulated to Dismissal with Limited Time to Re-File," ("Motion") filed on May 31, 2007; Plaintiffs Harald Schwankl ("Schwankl"), Klaus Schneider ("Schneider"), Daniel Duncan ("Duncan"), Henning gchinun ("Schimm"), Donald Cox ("Cox"), Guenter Vietor ("Vietor"), and Roger Steinbauer's ("Steinbauer") (collectively, "Respondents") "Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Previously Dismissed Plaintiffs,"1 filed on July 30, 2007; and Defendants'"Reply in Support of Defendants Motion to Dismiss the Claims of Plaintiffs Who Previously Stipulated to Dismissal with Limited Time to Re-File," filed on August 27, 2007, in the above captioned cause. After careful consideration, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion should be denied for the reasons set forth below.
The instant case is a consolidated action related to two other actions currently pending before the Court. Respondents, seven plaintiffs in the instant action, initially filed their claims as representatives of a class, and sought class certification in Norwood v. Raytheon Co., No. EP-04-CA-127-PRM ("Norwood").2 See Mot. 3-4. All seven Respondents allege they were harmed by certain radar devices designed or manufactured by one or more of the Defendants. Id.
On September 13, 2005, the parties in Norwood filed a "Stipulation of Dismissal of Certain Plaintiffs' Claims Without Prejudice," ("Stipulation") in which twenty-one of the named plaintiffs. ("Dismissed Plaintiffs"), including all Respondents, agreed to the dismissal of their claims without prejudice. Norwood, Docket No. 252. The plaintiffs in Norwood had filed a "Motion for Class Certification" on October 1, 2004, which motion was still pending when the parties filed the Stipulation, and the Stipulation provided that the Dismissed Plaintiffs would "continue to maintain their claims against Defendants ... as absent members, of the proposed classes." Id.; Norwood Docket No. 194. On September 15, 2005, the Court entered an order dismissing the claims of the twenty-one named plaintiffs pursuant to the Stipulation. The Stipulation provided,
In the event that the Court should deny the motion for class certification, or if any court should decertify the class(es) at some later time, the Dismissed Plaintiffs may re-file their claims against Defendants, if and to the extent otherwise permitted by the governing law, within thirty days after such a ruling, or be barred from doing so.
On September 11, 2006, the Court denied the "Motion for Class Certification," which Defendants assert triggered a thirty-day deadline for the Dismissed Plaintiffs to re-file their claims. Norwood Memo. 2. None of the Dismissed Plaintiffs re-filed their claims within thirty days of September 11, 2006. However, five of the Respondents, Schneider, Duncan, Schimm, Vietor, and Steinbauer, re-filed their claims in Edzards v. Raytheon Co., No.2006-5829, in County Court at Law Number Three, El, Paso County, Texas, on December 15, 2006, which cause was removed to federal court on March 16, 2007. Docket No. 2. In addition, Schwankl and Cox re-filed their claims in Behrendt v. Lucent Tech., Inc., No.2006-5827, in County Court at Law Number Three, El Paso County, Texas, on January 25, 2007, which cause was also removed to federal One "on March 16, 2007. Behrendt v. Lucent Tech., Inc. No. EP-07-100-PRM, Docket No. 2. Edzards v. Raytheon Co., No. EP07-CV-99-PRM was consolidated with Blum v. General Electric Co., No. EP-07-CV-98-PRM and Behrendt v. Lucent Tech., Inc. No. EP-07-100-PRM, by Order of the Court, on April 26, 2007.3 Docket No. 15.
In their Motion, Defendants request the Court dismiss Respondents' claims in the instant action "on the grounds that their claims are expressly barred and waived by a Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal dated September 13, 2005, wherein [they] agreed to the dismissal of their claims against Defendants" subject to the thirty-day deadline. Mot. 2. Respondents do not contest that they filed their claims outside of the thirty-day deadline set forth in`the Stipulation. However, they assert that they agreed to the Stipulation only in order "[t]o streamline discovery and classcertification briefing," Norwood Memo. 2, and that the failure to timely re-file their claims was a result of attorney error. They argue that "the strict enforcement [of the thirty-day deadline] would disserve the interests of justice, resulting in the adjudication of claims by the sporting theory rather than on the merits." Norwood Memo. 2-3. Respondents request the Court grant them relief from the Stipulation, and allow for their claims to go forward. Id. 3. They assert such relief "would result in no prejudice to [Defendants], but rather in the resolution of [Respondents'] claims on their merits". Id.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 12(b)(6)") authorizes dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED.R.Crv.P. 12(b)(6). However, "the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir.1982). The Court must determine "whether in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved on his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief." Gregson v. Zurich Am. Ina Co., 322 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir.2003) (internal quotation omitted).
"To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint`does not need detailed factual allegations,' but must provide the plaintiff's grounds for entitlement to relief — including factual allegations that when assumed to be true`raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Cuvilliar Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, ___ _ ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
"A pleading may fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for one of two reasons." Walker v. S. Cent. Bell Tele. Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir.1990). "First, the law simply may not afford relief on the basis of the facts alleged in the complaint." Id. "Second, regardless of whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief, the pleadings may be so badly framed that the plaintiff is not entitled to a trial on' the merits." Id.
The Court begins its analysis by bearing in mind that [t]he basic purpose of the Federal Rules is to administer justice through fair trials, not through summary dismissals as necessary as they may be on occasion.... If rules of procedure work as they should in an honest and fair judicial system, they not only permit, but should as nearly as possible guarantee that bona fide complaints be carried to an adjudication on the merits.
Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373, 86 S.Ct. 845, 15 L.Ed.2d 807 (1966).
In this case, Respondents argue that enforcing the terms of the Stipulation, and thus barring them from prosecuting their claims, would be manifestly unjust. Norwood Memo 6. To support to their position, Respondents attach to the Norwood, Motion Attorney Steven M. Klepper's Id. App. 1. Attorney Klepper asserts: (1) he represents Respondents; (2) the parties entered into the Stipulation in order to ensure that the number of named plaintiffs in the proposed class action would be more manageable; (3) he negotiated with Defendants' counsel in drafting the Stipulation; (4) Plaintiffs' counsel never discussed with their clients the provision barring the Dismissed Plaintiffs from re-filing their claims; and (5) the failure to re-file Respondents' claims within the thirty-day deadline set forth in the Stipulation occurred because he failed to "calendar October 11 as the deadline, by which to re-file the previously dismissed plaintiffs' claims." Id....
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