Blum v. State, No. C98-1031-MWB (N.D. Iowa 7/30/2001), C98-1031-MWB.
| Decision Date | 30 July 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. C98-1031-MWB.,C98-1031-MWB. |
| Parties | ANTHONY BLUM, Petitioner, v. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Before the court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner, Anthony Blum, is an inmate at the Newton Correctional Facility, Newton, Iowa. On October 2, 1989, following the commencement of a jury trial, petitioner Blum entered an Alford plea to second-degree murder. On October 10, 1989, Blum moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting he had been scared and was intimidated both by the judge and the jury. On November 21, 1989, after a hearing, Blum's request to withdraw his guilty plea was denied and he was sentenced to an indeterminate term of up to fifty years imprisonment.
Petitioner Blum did not directly appeal his sentence or conviction. Instead, on September 26, 1990, Blum filed an application for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing on his post-conviction relief application, petitioner Blum's post-conviction relief application was denied, the state court finding that petitioner Blum's plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. Blum appealed and the Iowa Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Blum did not receive a fair hearing on his motions to withdraw his guilty plea and in arrest of judgment "due to ineffective assistance of counsel and actions and statements of the presiding judge." Blum v. State, 510 N.W.2d 175, 178-80 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993). The Iowa Court of Appeals remanded the matter and ordered that Blum receive a new hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and motion in arrest of judgment before a judge who had not participated in his case. Id. at 179. On remand, Blum again argued his guilty plea was involuntary, asserting:
(1) that the trial judge and Blum's counsel forced him into making the plea;
(2) that he was intimidated by the jurors;
(3) that he was told he would not receive a fair trial;
(4) that extensive confinement immediately prior to trial caused him stress affecting his judgment;
(5) that a painful injury to his ankle affected his ability to think clearly and present issues at the hearing; and
(6) that a time limit the trial judge placed on accepting the plea put undue pressure on him. After a second post-conviction hearing before a different judge, the Iowa District Court again denied him relief.
Petitioner Blum appealed and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his state post-conviction petition, concluding:
The chief element of Blum's challenge assails Judge Stigler's time limitations on the plea discussions. During jury selection Judge Stigler indicated he would not accept a plea after the jury panel returned the following day. Blum claims this forced him to plead involuntarily. . . . As the second postconviction court noted:
[Blum's] counsel did not feel he was under any compulsion to have defendant accept a plea bargain and indicated he was prepared and comfortable to proceed to trial. [Blum] had almost two years prior to trial in which to consider the alternatives available to him and discuss those alternatives with counsel.
* * *
We find no merit in Blum's contention that the time limit rendered his guilty plea involuntary. [] Blum's other bases for his involuntariness claim fail on the facts. He did not establish that a prospective juror intimated three times that he was guilty. He did not establish that stress and pressure from his long confinement in jail prevented him from entering a voluntary and intelligent plea. The facts are quite the converse. As to his confinement, he had a large cell to himself and was allowed visitors and freedom to consult with his lawyer.
Blum also failed to show that pain from an ankle injury detracted from his ability to contemplate his options. The ankle injury occurred after he entered his plea.
Finally he cannot complain that worry about the likelihood of a fair trial in Clayton County robbed him of a free choice regarding a plea. On his motion venue was in fact changed to another county, and was returned to Clayton County only at his request.
Blum v. State, 560 N.W.2d 7, 9-10 (Iowa 1997).
Blum filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, on April 30, 1998. Blum asserts in his petition that the state court erred in refusing to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea, and that his guilty plea was involuntary. This case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Paul A. Zoss pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). On March 22, 2001, Judge Zoss filed a Report and Recommendation in which he recommends that Blum's petition be denied. Blum filed objections to Judge Zoss's Report and Recommendation on April 18, 2001. The court, therefore, undertakes the necessary review of Judge Zoss's recommended disposition of Blum's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Pursuant to statute, this court's standard of review for a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation is as follows:
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) provides for review of a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation on dispositive motions and prisoner petitions, where objections are made, as follows:
The district judge to whom the case is assigned shall make a de novo determination upon the record, or after additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judge's disposition to which specific written objection has been made in accordance with this rule. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that it is reversible error for the district court to fail to conduct a de novo review of a magistrate judge's report where such review is required. See, e.g., Hosna v. Groose, 80 F.3d 298, 306 (8th Cir.) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 860 (1996); Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Belk v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 803, 815 (8th Cir. 1994)); Hudson v. Gammon, 46 F.3d 785, 786 (8th Cir. 1995) (also citing Belk). Because objections have been filed in this case, the court must conduct a de novo review. With these standards in mind, the court will briefly review the requirements of the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and then turn to consider petitioner Blum's objections to Judge Zoss's Report and Recommendation.
Section 2254(d)(1) of Title 28, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, provides as follows:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[.]
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). As the United States Supreme Court explained in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000), "[F]or [a petitioner] to obtain federal habeas relief, he must first demonstrate that his case satisfies the condition set by § 2254(d)(1)." See id.
In Williams, the Supreme Court addressed the question of precisely what the "condition set by § 2254(d)(1)" requires. See id. at 374-390 (); id. at 402-12 ().1 In the portion of the majority decision on this point, the majority summarized its conclusions as follows:
[Section] 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied-the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Id. at 413 (emphasis added); see also Whitmore v. Kemna, 213 F.3d 431, 433 (8th Cir. 2000) ( ).
The Court...
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