Blume v. State

• Citation: 154 Ind. 343, 56 N.E. 771
• Case Date: March 14, 1900
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

154 Ind. 343
56 N.E. 771

BLUME
v.
STATE.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 14, 1900.

Appeal from circuit court, Boone county; Barton S. Higgins, Judge.

William Blume, convicted of murder, appeals. Affirmed.

[56 N.E. 772]

Sherman Mott, J. F. McCray, and Samuel M. Ralston, for appellant. Frank C. Groninger, Andrew J. Shelby, Wm. L. Taylor, Atty. Gen., Merrill Moores, C. C. Hadley, and J. B. Shelby, Pros. Atty., for the State.

DOWLING, J.

Indictment for murder in the first degree. On application of appellant, the venue was changed, and the cause was sent to Boone county. Plea of not guilty, together with a special plea of insanity. Trial, and verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, and that defendant be imprisoned in the state prison during life. Judgment on verdict. Motions to quash the indictment and for a new trial were made and overruled. The decisions on these motions are assigned for error.

1. It is first objected that the indictment was not properly indorsed, but we are unable to discover the supposed defect. The record entry, immediately following the indictment, gives the title of the cause and the name of the crime charged. The words, “A true bill. Albert Salem, Foreman,” next appear below the title and the name of the offense, and opposite these is written, “Indorsement of Indictment.” The requirement of the statute concerning the indorsement seems to have been strictly complied with. The ground of the objection is that it does not appear that the words, “A true bill. Albert Salem, Foreman,” were written upon the back of the indictment. With this view we are unable to agree. But, even if these words were written elsewhere than on the back of the bill, the indictment would probably be good. There is excellent authority for the proposition that it is immaterial on what part of the bill the foreman's signature appears. 1 Bish. Cr. Proc. (3d Ed.) § 698; State v. Bowman, 103 Ind. 69, 2 N. E. 289.

2. Counsel for appellant contend, in the second place, that the verdict, at least upon the issue as to the insanity of the defendant at the time of the homicide, is not sustained by sufficient evidence. It cannot be asserted that there was no evidence of appellant's entire sanity when the offense was committed. On the contrary, the testimony on that subject was so strong and conclusive that the jury were fully authorized to accept and act upon it. But whether the proof on this branch of the case was evident and convincing or otherwise, the jury were the exclusive judges of its weight and credibility, and the court cannot interfere with the conclusion reached by them. The fact of sanity, when properly put in issue, like every other material fact in the case, is considered by the jury and found by the verdict, and by the result, when fairly arrived at, we are bound.

3. It is next urged that the verdict is contrary to law, in that the evidence, at most, will sustain a conviction for manslaughter only. The facts, in brief, were as follows: The appellant, a young man of dissolute habits, became attached to Grace Harvey, an inmate of a house of prostitution in the city of Indianapolis. A loathsome disease rendered the appellant a cripple, and the refusal of the woman to cohabit with him while in this condition excited his resentment and jealousy. A short time before the homicide, in a conversation with a friend, he declared that he would “fix her.” Armed with a 32-caliber

[56 N.E. 773]

revolver, he went to the brothel where she resided, and, after a short and seemingly friendly interview at the foot of the stairway, down which she had accompanied him, he shot and killed her, and then fired two balls into his own body. While the woman lay dying, he asked if she was dead, and said, “I have fixed her.” The assassination of the unhappy woman was cruel, malicious, unprovoked, and premeditated. Not one mitigating circumstance appears in the case. There is nothing in the proof to reduce the offense of the appellant below murder in the first degree.

4. The third point made is that the testimony of the witness Davidson was improvidently admitted on behalf of the state on the issue of the sanity of the appellant. Counsel say that this person had not such opportunities for observing the appellant as were necessary to qualify him to give an opinion upon the subject of his mental condition. The weight to be given to the testimony of the witness was a question for the jury, and depended upon the facts related by the witness as the basis of his opinion. Davidson stated when and where he had seen the appellant, and what was said and done by him. He was present when appellant testified as a witness in a suit for damages prosecuted by him against the Western Union Telegraph Company, and took notes of his evidence. As this witness gave the facts and circumstances upon which his opinion was founded, we think the testimony was competent. Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 558, and cases cited; Grubb v. State, 117 Ind. 277, 20 N. E. 257, 725;Johnson v. Culver, 116 Ind. 278, 19 N. E. 129.

5. The next point made in the briefs for appellant is that the court erred in permitting one Perry Kennedy, a detective, to testify on behalf of the state, in rebuttal, that he had once arrested Dr. William H. Kluge, a witness for appellant, and that he had seen Kluge's picture in the “Rogues' Gallery” at Indianapolis. An examination of the record discloses that, when the witness testified that he had arrested Kluge, this statement was stricken out on motion of the appellant, and that the court sustained appellant's objection to the question whether the witness had seen Kluge's picture in the “Rogues' Gallery.” Having secured a ruling in his favor upon each of these points, the appellant had no reason to complain of the action of the court, and no question upon this evidence is presented by the record.

6. The sixth and seventh reasons assigned for a new trial are the rulings of the court upon objections to the admission in evidence of certain letters written by the appellant to the deceased. The letters, some 12 in number, were introduced for the purpose of obtaining the opinion of an expert witness, Dr. Frank B. Wynn, upon the question as to the sanity of the appellant at the time of the homicide and shortly before that occurrence. The first of these letters is dated August 4, 1897, and the last June 27, 1898, and they cover, at least, a portion of the period during which it was claimed that the appellant was of unsound mind. The letters were read in evidence, over the objection of the appellant, and were submitted to the examination of the expert witness. After such examination, and upon the basis of the same, the witness was permitted to give his opinion as to the sanity of the writer. We find no error in the action of the court. Written communications, as well as oral conversations, may afford evidence of the soundness or unsoundness of the mind of the writer, and may constitute a sufficient basis for the opinion of a skilled physician or alienist upon that subject. Indeed, evidence of this character is regarded as of especial value in many cases, and as furnishing important tests of insanity. The following, from a standard work upon Medical Jurisprudence, is directly in point: “The value of letters or other writings, as tests of insanity, has been shown by abundant illustrations by Marce, in a monograph on this particular topic. To these might be added a series of cases, English and American, in which the sanity of testators and of obligors has been in a large degree determined by the characters of written documents emanating from them. Nor is such evidence without its worth in criminal prosecutions, especially where the question is whether insanity is genuine or simulated. It is not merely the contents of writings that contribute to the decision of the question. The style and handwriting often supply important tests. ‘What experienced forensic physician,’ asks Liman, ‘is not familiar with the writings of certain classes of lunatics, namely, the so-called “querulants,”-writings teeming with flourishes, words and sentences italicized singly, doubly, or trebly, with parentheses, interlineations, notes of quotation; writings often very voluminous, swollen with citations of alleged laws?’ In other cases of lunacy are noticed peculiar modes of construction, words and expressions both original and incomprehensible, such as are familiar to every psychological physician. The first stages of paralysis are characterized by flightiness of writing, omission of words and sentences, blots,” etc. 1 Whart. & S. Med. Jur. § 387. The witness, who showed himself thoroughly competent, described in a very intelligent manner the characteristics of the written compositions of the insane. He called attention to the absence of these peculiarities in the letters written by the appellant. Upon the basis of the coherency and consistency of these letters, the omission of everything fantastic or absurd, their apparent adherence to the facts of the situation of the writer, the quality and regularity of the handwriting, and other features pointed out by the witness, he expressed the opinion that at the time they were written the appellant was of sound mind. That this evidence was competent we entertain no doubt. The foundation on which the opinion rested was fully

[56 N.E. 774]

made known to the jury, and they had the means of estimating its weight and value. The objection that there were other letters in the possession of the state, written by appellant, and that all should be read or none, was not deserving of serious consideration. The state had the right to...