Blumenthal v. Cairo Hotel Corporation

• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Kern
• Citation: Blumenthal v. Cairo Hotel Corporation, 256 A.2d 400 (D.C. 1969)
• Decision Date: 07 August 1969
• Docket Number: No. 4455.,4455.
• Parties: Florence BLUMENTHAL, Appellant, v. CAIRO HOTEL CORPORATION, Appellee,

Page 400

256 A.2d 400

Florence BLUMENTHAL, Appellant, v. CAIRO HOTEL CORPORATION, Appellee,

No. 4455.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued January 7, 1969.

Decided August 7, 1969.

Allan J. Topol, Washington, D. C., with whom James C. McKay, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.

Denver H. Graham, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before KELLY, FICKLING and KERN, Associate Judges.

KERN, Associate Judge.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered by the court below in favor of appellee upon appellant's complaint that she suffered personal injuries and loss of property as a result of appellee's negligence.

The depositions of appellant and appellee's resident manager established the following: Appellant, a 63-year-old woman, rented from appellee by the month a single room without bath on the eighth floor. She awoke before dawn to find an unknown intruder rifling her purse beside her bed and when she screamed he struck her in the face several times. Then, he disengaged the chain lock on the inside of the door of her room and fled into the hall with money from her purse. Shortly thereafter, a strange man walked through the lobby on the first floor and disappeared into the night. He was never apprehended.

Appellant's room contained two double sash windows, one of which was over a fire escape extending down the side of appellee's building to a point about 14 feet above the ground where it was suspended when not in use. Appellee had iron bars, some horizontal and some vertical, on the outside of its ground floor windows. The bars on those particular windows beneath the fire-escape were horizontal.

After the incident described above, the window onto the fire escape was found open, the screen covering that window had been removed, and potted plants which were ordinarily on the windowsill were lying on the fire escape. Appellant stated that before going to bed that night she had not checked whether the window on the fire escape was open or closed but that she thought it was closed since she kept the window closed and did not touch it most of the time. She further stated that she did not check the lock that night and she could not remember when she had last checked the lock.

Appellant deposed that approximately one year before the incident she told appellee's manager that the regular lock¹ on the fire escape window was broken and that appellee installed a side lock on the lower half of this window as a replacement for the broken lock. The side lock was operated by pushing in on a button and then tightening or loosening a screw either to lock in place or unlock the lower half of the window. Appellant described the side lock as "rusty and old", "loose", and "hard to work". She testified that before this incident she had mentioned to appellee's resident manager that she had had difficulty tightening and loosening the side lock.

Appellee's resident manager testified in his deposition that the regular window lock was operable, that the side lock had been installed not as a substitute for the regular lock but as a convenience to and at the request of appellant to enable her to keep the lower half of that window open but locked into place in order that she might keep fruit and other food cool on the window ledge. He denied that she had ever complained about the condition of the side lock.

Appellant's theory of the case is summarized in her brief as follows:

[T]here is * * * evidence of facts which tend to establish appellee's negligence * * * (a) * * * appellee's failure to install an adequate lock on appellant's window leading to the fire escape despite her complaints, and (b) evidence of the condition maintained by appellee which facilitated ease of reaching the fire escape from the ground by means of horizontal bars across the ground floor window below the fire escape.

Appellant contends that a jury might reasonably infer from the evidence that appellee was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of her injuries. She argues that even if the jury could also have drawn an inference from the evidence that appellee was not negligent the choice between conflicting inferences should have been left to the jury and the trial court erred in summarily entering a judgment for appellee. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Postom, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 207, 177 F.2d 53 (1949); ...