Blumer v. School Bd. of Beresford Independent School Dist. No. 68 of Union County

• Citation: 250 N.W.2d 282
• Decision Date: 10 February 1977
• Docket Number: No. 11615,11615
• Parties: Mae M. BLUMBER, et al., Respondents, v. The SCHOOL BOARD OF BERESFORD INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 68 OF UNION COUNTY, South Dakota, Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of South Dakota

Page 282

250 N.W.2d 282

Mae M. BLUMBER, et al., Respondents, v. The SCHOOL BOARD OF BERESFORD INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT

NO. 68 OF UNION COUNTY, South Dakota, Appellant.

No. 11615.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Feb. 10, 1977.

Charles Lacey, Patrick H. Lacey, Sioux Falls, for respondents.

John E. Simko, Jr. of Woods, Fuller, Schultz & Smith, Sioux Falls, Robert B. Frieberg of Frieberg & Frieberg, Beresford, for appellant.

MORGAN, Justice (on reassignment).

This is another of the many controversies that have reached this court on whether the educational facilities at Beresford, South Dakota should be expanded. Specifically, this action was commenced when plaintiffs-respondents, Mae M. Blumer, Milton Ustad, Edwin O. Thormodsgaard and Leon H. Thompson (taxpayers) appealed from a resoultion passed July 8, 1974 by the Beresford Independent School District No. 68 (school board) of Union County, South Dakota.

The taxpayers alleged in their complaint that 'the decision of the board is arbitrary, characterized by an abuse of discretion, and is a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.' Further, the school board 'has been waging a campaign of harassment and oppression' by continually attempting to expand the school facilities at Beresford.

In part, the resolution provided:

'After more discussion Ambur motioned that the board let bids on an eight stall bus garage and a permanent classroom facility, which was detailed on the last bond issue to be built on the 25 acre site with financing to come from monies on hand in capital outlay, tax monies budgeted, and lease purchase as provided in law SDCL 13--16--6 * * *'

After a two-day trial to the court held September 23, 24, 1974, the trial judge ruled by his findings of fact and conclusions of law that the resolution 'was a result of an abuse of discretion given the Board, and clearly arbitrary' and 'the decision of the School Board should be adjudged to be null and void.' From the judgment entered October 23, 1974 in accordance with the findings of fact and conclusions of law the school board appeals. We reverse on the basis that the taxpayers lack standing to sue.

Under our statutes the means that were afforded for judicial review of school board activities were:

'13--16--25. Action to recover school money unlawfully spent--Schools taught in foreign language.--If any money belonging to any district is unlawfully expended, or if any such money shall be expended for supporting a school in which the English language shall not be used exclusively in teaching except for the teaching of foreign languages, the county superintendent or any taxpayer of the district may recover such money from the officer so expending it.' ¹

'13--46--1. Right to appeal to circuit court from decision by county or school district official--Time of taking appeal.--From a decision made by a county superintendent, by any school board, or by a special committee created under any provision of the school law relative to a school or school district matter or in respect to any act or proceeding in which such officer, board, or committee purports or assumes to act, an appeal may be taken to the circuit court by any person aggrieved, or by any party to the proceedings, or by any school district interested, within ninety days after the rendering of such decision. Provided, however, that all legal actions relative to bond issues must be started within ten days.'

'13--16--6.3. Referendum petition and election on major installment purchase.--Approval to enter into an agreement to which § 13--16--6.2 applies shall be subject to a referendum if ten per cent of the electors as determined by the total number of votes cast for Governor in the district at the last general election, petition, within twenty days thereafter, to have the question of approval or disapproval of the agreement placed upon the ballot at the next regular election or at a special election called for that purpose. The business manager shall give notice of the fact that such question will be on the ballot at a regular or special election as provided by law for school elections and prepare official ballots therefor according to the provisions of this title relating to elections and the issue shall be decided by a majority of those voting thereon.'

Subject to taxpayer suits under 13--16--25 then are: contracts in which a member of the school board is directly or indirectly interested, SDCL 13--20--2; contracts that were not advertised for bids, SDCL 13--20--3; contracts that were not awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, SDCL 13--20--8. Also subject to taxpayer suits are notes that exceed the debt limitation fund in SDCL 13--19--2 and bonds issued in excess of the Constitutional debt limitation, SDCL 13--19--8, South Dakota Constitution Article XIII, section 4.

In the taxpayers' complaint they did not allege that the resolution passed by the school board was unlawful, only that it was the result of abuse of discretion, arbitrary and a product of harassment. Since the taxpayers have not alleged nor shown that the resolution or the construction of the facilities would be unlawful, their right of recourse, if any, must be through SDCL 13--46--1 or 13--16--6.3.

By commencing this appeal the plaintiffs apparently determined that the provisions of 13--16--6.3 were not applicable or they opted to ignore them or were unsuccessful in securing sufficient signatures. We turn then to the provisions of SDCL 13--46--1.

Under SDCL 13--46--1 the taxpayers must demonstrate that they are 'aggrieved parties.' As interpreted by this court in Camp Crook Independent School District No. 1 v. Shevling, 1936, 65 S.D. 14, 26, 270 N.W. 518, an aggrieved party means 'only such persons as might be able affirmatively to show that they were aggrieved in the sense that by the decision of the board they suffered the denial of some claim of right, either of person or property, or the imposition of some burden or obligation in their personal or individual capacity, as distinguished from any grievance they might suffer in their capacities as members of the body public.' This definition of an aggrieved party was implanted into our case law by the decision of Wood et al. v. Bangs et al., 1875, 1 Dak. 172, 46 N.W. 586.

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