Blunt v. United States, 20119.

• Decision Date: 12 December 1967
• Docket Number: No. 20119.,20119.
• Citation: 389 F.2d 545,128 US App. DC 375
• Parties: Thomas E. BLUNT, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

128 US App. DC 375, 389 F.2d 545 (1967)

Thomas E. BLUNT, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 20119.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued June 29, 1967.

Decided December 12, 1967.

Mr. Neal E. Krucoff, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court) for appellant.

Mr. Carl S. Rauh, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee. Messrs. Robert S. Brady, Attorney, Department of Justice, and James A. Strazzella, Asst. U. S. Atty., also entered appearances for appellee.

Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and WRIGHT, Circuit Judge, DAVIS,^* Judge, United States Court of Claims.

BAZELON, Chief Judge:

This appeal from a conviction for housebreaking attacks the adequacy of a pretrial competency hearing.¹ Before trial appellant was committed to Saint Elizabeths for a mental examination pursuant to D.C.Code, 1961 ed., § 24-301(a). By letter dated April 2, 1965, the Hospital Superintendent informed the court without elaboration of its inquiry or diagnosis that "Mr. Blunt is mentally competent for trial * * * and is not now or was not * * * suffering from mental disease or defect." At a hearing held on April 15, 1965, 10 months before trial, Dr. Eugene Stanmeyer, Supervisory Clinical Psychologist at Saint Elizabeths, testified that in his opinion Blunt was unable to assist counsel. The court, sua sponte, then interrupted appellant's case by calling staff psychiatrist Dr. Strady H. Economon. However, the court refused to permit cross-examination of Dr. Economon about matters to which the Government later stipulated, Dr. Economon's differences with Dr. Stanmeyer, and the basis for the Hospital's opinion. Although appellant had been found competent to stand trial, he was afterwards given two mental examinations and competency hearings. He was not present at either of these, and the order following the more recent finds him competent because he had previously been found competent.² Appellant now argues that the trial court abused its discretion in the first hearing, that of April 15, 1965.

In providing in § 24-301(a) for a hearing, Congress set no standards, but it had expressed an interest in "speeding up procedures without prejudicing accused."³ We noted in Hansford v. United States that a competency hearing "need not be a lengthy and involved proceeding. However, as a minimum we think the inquiry must be of record and both parties must be given the opportunity to examine all witnesses who testify or report on the accused's competence."⁴ We had already recognized in Holloway v. United States that "The judicial determination must, of course, be an informed one."⁵ Moreover, the Supreme Court has required counsel at the hearing unless meaningfully waived.⁶ These standards are of little value unless full and scrupulous attention is given to evidence concerning competency. Pate v. Robinson⁷ requires such attention at trial whether or not there has been a hearing. No less than the same careful evaluation of an accused's condition is required of the court during a competency hearing.

At the April 15 hearing, which was the only contested investigation of competency, appellant first called Dr. Stanmeyer who supervised the scoring and interpretation of a battery of four psychological tests⁸ prior to their consideration by Dr. Economon and Dr. Maurice Platkin at a staff conference. Based on his review of the tests, Dr. Stanmeyer testified that appellant scored an I.Q. of 81; could not objectively decide whether to challenge a juror or take the stand; and was unlikely to "follow the course of a prolonged trial in terms of postulating questions to * * * witnesses."

In Jenkins v. United States⁹ we said that when a psychologist has the requisite training or experience his testimony should be given consideration with that of other experts in the field of mental disorder.¹⁰ Rather than evaluate Dr. Stanmeyer's qualifications, the court disregarded Jenkins and turned the hearing into an inquiry into any psychologist's competency to make informed observations about Blunt without medical training.¹¹ For example, when Dr. Stanmeyer presented his interpretation of the results of the Bender-Gestalt test the following took place:

THE COURT: What does that particular test relate to from the standpoint of your experiment? What is the nature of the experiment?

THE WITNESS: Basically, the test is a test of organic brain pathology. This is the reason that it was devised.

THE COURT: You do not presume to testify as to whether there is absence or presence of organic brain pathology, do you?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: You have no training in anatomy, have you?

THE WITNESS: I have had training in anatomy.

THE COURT: I mean you have never done any anatomy, so-called, any gross anatomy? You have never dissected a cadaver, have you?

And later when counsel sought Dr. Stanmeyer's evaluation of appellant's competency in light of the diagnosis in 1952 of psychosis and incompetency, referred to in note 1, supra, the court questioned:

THE COURT: Are you familiar with the different types of schizophrenia?

THE WITNESS: I am familiar with diagnostic principles.

THE COURT: I am not trying to give you a bad time but again I am suggesting you are in a field that is not your own. Schizophrenia is definitely something outside your field.

You may deal with results or manifestations symptomatically but, as far as telling me anything about schizophrenia, I don\'t think you\'re qualified.

THE WITNESS: That is our area of specialty in clinical psychology.

The court erred also in calling Dr. Economon out of turn and restricting the scope of his cross-examination.¹² Appellant's counsel had sought to question Dr. Economon about information to which Blunt's mother, appellant's second witness was prepared to testify. This included personal history which was not known by the staff psychiatrists at the conference. Yet the court refused to allow questioning of Dr. Economon about this testimony¹³ which would have been before the court had appellant been permitted to proceed with his case and to which the court later urged the Government to stipulate.¹⁴ Attempts by appellant's counsel to ask Dr. Economon about the basis for the Hospital's conclusions also were blocked when the court refused to let the psychiatrist answer.

Q: You testified he could understand the charges against him and hear testimony. Do you feel that he could participate with counsel in a decision whether he could take the stand or not?

A: Yes, by definition. With respect —

THE COURT: The answer is yes.

Q: Do you feel he could help select a jury in determining whether to challenge a juror?

A: What specifically do you mean by challenging a juror?

THE COURT: I will exclude that. Thank you very much.

Q: Do you feel he could appreciate the evidence given at the trial and its significance?

THE COURT: That is not the question of competency. I will exclude that.

And when counsel sought to identify the areas of difference between the Hospital and Dr. Stanmeyer, the court continued to foreclose meaningful inquiry.

Q. You disagree personally with this the psychologist\'s statement although it is in the report?

A: I neither agree or disagree. I accept it as a psychology test. Like any laboratory test, they are considered when a diagnosis is made by a psychiatrist. This is merely data. It appeared —

THE COURT: You have answered Doctor. Thank you very much.

Q: The statement, I believe, makes a prediction. Do you have an opinion as to whether it is true or false?

THE COURT: The witness has answered the question with respect to that. We won\'t pursue it any further.

Q: Do you believe that this defendant would experience unusual tensions or anxiety —

THE COURT: We have been through that, Mr. Aaronson, and I don\'t want you to become repetitive.

While a court need not hold a lengthy or involved proceeding, it must hold a fair and adequate one. The strictures imposed on counsel's development of relevant evidence so limited the possibility of a full and scrupulous evaluation of appellant's competency as to leave us unable to say that there was a properly informed judicial determination. Since the finding as to competency was based on a hearing held almost 32 months ago (or 10 months before Blunt's trial on February 14, 1966), we think Dusky v. United States requires reversal for a new trial rather than remand for nunc pro tunc proceedings.¹⁵

So ordered.

*

Sitting by designation pursuant to Title 28, Section 293(a), U.S.Code.

1 In 1952 appellant Blunt was indicted for five robberies and a housebreaking and larceny. At his arraignment the court ordered a psychiatric examination which resulted in his certification as of unsound mind and suffering from a psychosis. He was...