BNSF Ry. Co. v. City of Edmond

Decision Date30 November 2020
Docket NumberCase No. CIV-19-769-G
Citation504 F.Supp.3d 1249
Parties BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF EDMOND, OKLAHOMA, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

Bryan R. Lynch, J. Dillon Curran, Conner & Winters, Oklahoma City, OK, R. Richard Love, III, Conner & Winters, Tulsa, OK, for Plaintiff.

Benjamin T. Clark, Richard E. Hornbeek, Hornbeek Vitali & Braun PLLC, Bryan G. Cleveland, Mithun S. Mansinghani, Attorney General's Office, Oklahoma City, OK, Stephen T. Murdock, City Attorney's Ofc., Edmond, OK, for Defendant City of Edmond Oklahoma.

Bryan G. Cleveland, Attorney General's Office, John J. Love, The Love Law Firm, Margaret McMorrow-Love, Law Office of Margaret McMorrow-Love, Mithun S. Mansinghani, Attorney General's Ofc., Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant City of Davis Oklahoma.

Bryan G. Cleveland, Mithun S. Mansinghani, Attorney General's Office, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendants Todd Hiett, Bob Anthony, Dana Murphy.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CHARLES B. GOODWIN, United States District Judge

Plaintiff BNSF Railway Company has filed this lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Oklahoma's recently enacted "Blocked Crossing Statute" (or the "Statute"), Okla. Stat. tit. 66, § 190. Plaintiff's Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and names five Defendants. Two are municipal corporations: (1) City of Edmond, Oklahoma ("Edmond"); and (2) City of Davis, Oklahoma ("Davis"). See Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 1-2. Three are individuals sued in their capacity as officials on the Oklahoma Corporation Commission ("OCC"): (3) Todd Hiett (OCC Chairman); (4) Bob Anthony (OCC Vice-Chairman); and (5) Dana Murphy (OCC Commissioner) (collectively, the "OCC Defendants"). See id. In addition, on October 30, 2019, the Court granted Mike Hunter leave to intervene as a defendant in this lawsuit in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma. See Doc. No. 37.

Now before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 46), as to which several Responses (Doc. Nos. 53, 54, 55, 56), and a Reply (Doc. No. 57) have been filed. In addition, Defendant Hunter has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 48), which is joined by Motions from the OCC Defendants (Doc. No. 49) and Defendant Edmond (Doc. No. 50) and supported by Defendant Davis (Doc. No. 51). Plaintiff has responded (Doc. No. 52), and Defendants Hunter and Edmond have filed Replies (Doc. Nos. 58, 59).1

All motions now being at issue, the Court addresses them below.

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is a means of testing in advance of trial whether the available evidence would permit a reasonable jury to find in favor of the party asserting a claim. The Court must grant summary judgment when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

A party that moves for summary judgment has the burden of showing that the undisputed material facts require judgment as a matter of law in its favor. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To defeat summary judgment, the nonmovant must cite specific evidence sufficient to show that a genuine issue remains for trial. See Ezell v. BNSF Ry. Co. , 949 F.3d 1274, 1278 (10th Cir. 2020) ; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (noting that the court must inquire "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law").

Parties may establish the existence or nonexistence of a material disputed fact by:

• citing to "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" in the record; or
• demonstrating "that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). While the Court views the evidence and the inferences drawn from the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, see Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Pittsburg, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc. , 431 F.3d 1241, 1255 (10th Cir. 2005), "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for the [nonmovant]." Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The Tenth Circuit has explained that

"The filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not necessarily concede the absence of a material issue of fact. This must be so because by the filing of a motion a party concedes that no issue of fact exists under the theory he is advancing, but he does not thereby so concede that no issues remain in the event his adversary's theory is adopted." Nafco Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Appleman , 380 F.2d 323, 324-25 (10th Cir. 1967). Accordingly, "[c]ross motions for summary judgment are to be treated separately; the denial of one does not require the grant of another." Christian Heritage Acad. v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass'n , 483 F.3d 1025, 1030 (10th Cir. 2007). " ‘Even where the parties file cross motions pursuant to Rule 56, summary judgment is inappropriate if disputes remain as to material facts.’ " Id.

Brown v. Perez , 835 F.3d 1223, 1230 n.3 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal citation omitted).

II. The Challenged Statute

On July 1, 2019, the Blocked Crossing Statute took effect. The Statute provides:

A. As it is immediately necessary for the safety and welfare of the people, no railcar shall be brought to rest in a position which blocks vehicular traffic at a railroad intersection with a public highway or street for longer than ten (10) minutes.
B. Municipalities, county sheriffs and the Oklahoma Highway Patrol shall have the authority to issue a citation to any person or corporation that violates a provision of this section. Such person or corporation shall be subject to a fine of up to One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) for each violation. Seventy-five percent (75%) of the collected fine shall be deposited to the credit of the general fund of the entity that issued the citation and the remaining twenty-five percent (25%) shall be credited to the Corporation Commission Revolving Fund established in Section 180.7 of Title 17 of the Oklahoma Statutes. A copy of the citation, along with any information regarding train identification, shall be sent to the Corporation Commission for enforcement of the penalty at a hearing before an administrative law judge of the Commission. The violating entity or individual may appeal the administrative law judge's decision to the Commission en banc. The Commission shall annually deliver an electronic report detailing the number of violations, number of rulings, number of appeals and amount of fines assessed under this section. Commission reports shall be delivered to the Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, the President Pro Tempore of the Oklahoma State Senate and the Governor. The Commission shall promulgate rules and procedures to effectuate the provisions of this section.
C. 1. Railroads or other persons, firms or corporations operating over tracks within the State of Oklahoma shall not block vehicle traffic at any railroad grade crossing for a period of time in excess of ten (10) minutes except if the train is moving in a continuous forward or backward direction, or if the train is stopped for an emergency condition, including an accident, derailment, critical mechanical failure, track or bridge washout, storm, flood or other emergency situation.
2. A one-time exception of up to, but not exceeding, ten (10) additional minutes shall be authorized under the following conditions:
a. when a train and its crew, operating under the rules of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), are unable to complete a switching maneuver while setting out or picking up railcars within the ten (10) minutes as set forth in paragraph 1 of this subsection,
b. when a train is stopped to allow the passage of a second train and the stopped train has exhausted the ten (10) minutes as set forth in paragraph 1 of this subsection, or if the arrival of the second train is imminent and separation and coupling of the stopped train would result in further unnecessary blocking of motor vehicle or pedestrian traffic, and
c. when a train is stopped for a red train signal.
3. When a train is cut or separated to prevent blocking of motor vehicle traffic at a public crossing, and a working charging station exists, the time required for recoupling a train and performing air tests as required by the FRA shall not be considered a violation of this section.
4. Every railroad shall be operated in such a manner as to minimize obstruction of emergency vehicles at public highway grade crossings.

Okla. Stat. tit. 66, § 190 ; see also Okla. Admin. Code § 165:32-1-13 (2019) (specifying the procedure for the OCC's enforcement of blocked crossing citations).

On August 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, alleging that the Blocked Crossing Statute is preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act ("ICCTA"), 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101 et seq., and by the Federal Railroad Safety Act ("FRSA"), 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101 et seq. See Compl. ¶¶ 13, 15-19, 22-27. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. See id. ¶¶ 28-29. On October 30, 2019, the Court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Blocked Crossing Statute pending a final determination in this matter. See Doc. No. 40.

III. Undisputed Material Facts

Plaintiff is a railroad company that operates interstate trains throughout the United States for compensation, including 952 route miles in the State of...

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  • State v. CSX Transp., Inc.
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • 17 Agosto 2022
    ...followed the Fifth Circuit's approach to this issue when not according full consideration to the FRSA. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Edmond , 504 F.Supp.3d 1249, 1258-1260 (W.D.Okla.2020) (collecting cases). The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio expressly joined the Fifth......

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