BNSF Ry. Co. v. City of Edmond
Decision Date | 30 November 2020 |
Docket Number | Case No. CIV-19-769-G |
Citation | 504 F.Supp.3d 1249 |
Parties | BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF EDMOND, OKLAHOMA, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma |
Bryan R. Lynch, J. Dillon Curran, Conner & Winters, Oklahoma City, OK, R. Richard Love, III, Conner & Winters, Tulsa, OK, for Plaintiff.
Benjamin T. Clark, Richard E. Hornbeek, Hornbeek Vitali & Braun PLLC, Bryan G. Cleveland, Mithun S. Mansinghani, Attorney General's Office, Oklahoma City, OK, Stephen T. Murdock, City Attorney's Ofc., Edmond, OK, for Defendant City of Edmond Oklahoma.
Bryan G. Cleveland, Attorney General's Office, John J. Love, The Love Law Firm, Margaret McMorrow-Love, Law Office of Margaret McMorrow-Love, Mithun S. Mansinghani, Attorney General's Ofc., Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant City of Davis Oklahoma.
Bryan G. Cleveland, Mithun S. Mansinghani, Attorney General's Office, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendants Todd Hiett, Bob Anthony, Dana Murphy.
Plaintiff BNSF Railway Company has filed this lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Oklahoma's recently enacted "Blocked Crossing Statute" (or the "Statute"), Okla. Stat. tit. 66, § 190. Plaintiff's Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and names five Defendants. Two are municipal corporations: (1) City of Edmond, Oklahoma ("Edmond"); and (2) City of Davis, Oklahoma ("Davis"). See Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 1-2. Three are individuals sued in their capacity as officials on the Oklahoma Corporation Commission ("OCC"): (3) Todd Hiett (OCC Chairman); (4) Bob Anthony (OCC Vice-Chairman); and (5) Dana Murphy (OCC Commissioner) (collectively, the "OCC Defendants"). See id. In addition, on October 30, 2019, the Court granted Mike Hunter leave to intervene as a defendant in this lawsuit in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma. See Doc. No. 37.
Now before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 46), as to which several Responses (Doc. Nos. 53, 54, 55, 56), and a Reply (Doc. No. 57) have been filed. In addition, Defendant Hunter has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 48), which is joined by Motions from the OCC Defendants (Doc. No. 49) and Defendant Edmond (Doc. No. 50) and supported by Defendant Davis (Doc. No. 51). Plaintiff has responded (Doc. No. 52), and Defendants Hunter and Edmond have filed Replies (Doc. Nos. 58, 59).1
All motions now being at issue, the Court addresses them below.
Summary judgment is a means of testing in advance of trial whether the available evidence would permit a reasonable jury to find in favor of the party asserting a claim. The Court must grant summary judgment when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A party that moves for summary judgment has the burden of showing that the undisputed material facts require judgment as a matter of law in its favor. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To defeat summary judgment, the nonmovant must cite specific evidence sufficient to show that a genuine issue remains for trial. See Ezell v. BNSF Ry. Co. , 949 F.3d 1274, 1278 (10th Cir. 2020) ; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ( ).
Parties may establish the existence or nonexistence of a material disputed fact by:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). While the Court views the evidence and the inferences drawn from the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, see Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Pittsburg, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc. , 431 F.3d 1241, 1255 (10th Cir. 2005), "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for the [nonmovant]." Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Brown v. Perez , 835 F.3d 1223, 1230 n.3 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal citation omitted).
On July 1, 2019, the Blocked Crossing Statute took effect. The Statute provides:
Okla. Stat. tit. 66, § 190 ; see also Okla. Admin. Code § 165:32-1-13 (2019) ( ).
On August 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, alleging that the Blocked Crossing Statute is preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act ("ICCTA"), 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101 et seq., and by the Federal Railroad Safety Act ("FRSA"), 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101 et seq. See Compl. ¶¶ 13, 15-19, 22-27. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. See id. ¶¶ 28-29. On October 30, 2019, the Court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Blocked Crossing Statute pending a final determination in this matter. See Doc. No. 40.
Plaintiff is a railroad company that operates interstate trains throughout the United States for compensation, including 952 route miles in the State of...
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...followed the Fifth Circuit's approach to this issue when not according full consideration to the FRSA. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Edmond , 504 F.Supp.3d 1249, 1258-1260 (W.D.Okla.2020) (collecting cases). The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio expressly joined the Fifth......