Board of Com'rs of Wood Dale Public Library Dist. v. Du Page County

• Decision Date: 03 October 1984
• Docket Number: No. 59581,59581
• Citation: 469 N.E.2d 1370,83 Ill.Dec. 224,103 Ill.2d 422
• Parties: , 83 Ill.Dec. 224 The BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF the WOOD DALE PUBLIC LIBRARY DISTRICT et al., Appellees, v. The COUNTY OF DU PAGE et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1370

469 N.E.2d 1370

103 Ill.2d 422, 83 Ill.Dec. 224

The BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF the WOOD DALE PUBLIC LIBRARY DISTRICT et al., Appellees, v. The COUNTY OF DU PAGE et al., Appellants.

No. 59581.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 3, 1984.

James R. Schirott, Schirott & Elsner, Itasca, for appellants.

Barry L. Moss and George A. Marchetti, Moss & Bloomberg, Ltd., Bolingbrook, for appellees.

CLARK, Justice:

This is the second time these parties have been before this court. Since our earlier opinion (96 Ill.2d 378, 70 Ill.Dec. 859, 450 N.E.2d 332) and the appellate court's decisions (107 Ill.App.3d 409, 63 Ill.Dec. 274, 437 N.E.2d 923; 119 Ill.App.3d 1085, 75 Ill.Dec. 732, 457 N.E.2d 1291) set forth the facts of this case, we will not discuss its lengthy history. Rather, we will briefly set forth the facts pertinent to this appeal.

The Du Page County treasurer collects tax moneys for and on behalf of the county's local governmental units. For some time, the treasurer has invested these moneys and has earned interest on the investments. The county has not distributed the interest to the local governmental units. Instead, the county has deposited the interest moneys in the county corporate fund. The county relied on section 6.1 of "An Act concerning county treasurers * * * " (the County Treasurer's Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 36, par. 22.1) as authority to retain the interest moneys. The district is challenging this practice.

In the first appeal, we affirmed the appellate court's holding that the county's practice of retaining the interest was unconstitutional in that it violated section 9(a) of article VII of our 1970 Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. VII, sec. 9(a)). We remanded the cause to the trial court for that court to consider the effect, if any, of a recent amendment to section 280 of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 120, par. 761) on the issues presented; the amendment became effective after the trial court had dismissed the case. Board of Commissioners v. County of Du Page (1983), 96 Ill.2d 378, 70 Ill.Dec. 859, 450 N.E.2d 332.

On remand, the trial court found that section 280 prospectively barred the district's claim and that the district was not entitled to retroactive relief. The district appealed from the trial court's order which granted the county's motion for summary judgment and which denied the district's motions for a preliminary injunction, class certification and summary judgment. The district prayed that the appellate court enjoin the defendants from keeping the interest earned on the collected tax moneys and that the moneys be placed in a separate fund pending a full accounting by the county.

The appellate court reversed the trial court and held that section 280 did not prospectively bar the district's claim and that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the county. (Board of Commissioners v. County of Du Page (1983), 119 Ill.App.3d 1085, 1093, 75 Ill.Dec. 732, 457 N.E.2d 1291.) The appellate court also held that retroactive relief was proper from the date of this court's opinion in City of Joliet v. Bosworth (1976), 64 Ill.2d 516, 1 Ill.Dec. 355, 356 N.E.2d 543, which was filed on October 1, 1976. The appellate court remanded the issues of class certification and preliminary injunctive relief to the trial court. The trial court had originally denied the district's motions for a preliminary injunction and class certification on the basis that the summary judgment decision for the county rendered these issues moot. The county petitioned this court for leave to appeal. The petition was denied. The county petitioned for reconsideration, and we vacated our earlier denial.

The only issue before this court is whether relief should be awarded retroactively to October 1, 1976, the date this court's opinion was filed in City of Joliet v. Bosworth (1976), 64 Ill.2d 516, 1 Ill.Dec. 355, 356 N.E.2d 543, or prospectively from the date of our ruling in Wood Dale I, May 27, 1983. (Since this case has been to the appellate court and to this court twice, we will refer to the first appeal to the appellate court and this court as Wood Dale I (107 Ill.App.3d 409, 63 Ill.Dec. 274, 437 N.E.2d 923; 96 Ill.2d 378, 70 Ill.Dec. 859, 450 N.E.2d 332) and to the second appeal to the appellate court and this court as Wood Dale II (119 Ill.App.3d 1085, 75 Ill.Dec. 732, 457 N.E.2d 1291).)

"It is within our inherent power as the highest court of this State to give a decision prospective or retrospective application * * *." (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill.2d 11, 28, 163 N.E.2d 89.) This court may apply its decisions prospectively (Great Northern R.R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. (1932), 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L.Ed. 360), when retroactive application would be inequitable (Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson (1971), 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296; Flynn v. Kucharski (1971), 49 Ill.2d 7, 273 N.E.2d 3).

Chevron Oil listed three factors the United States Supreme Court has used for determining when a decision in a civil case should be applied prospectively only. The court said:

"First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied [citation], or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed [citation]. Second, it has been stressed that 'we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.' Linkletter v. Walker [ (1965), 381 U.S. 618, 629, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1738, 14 L.Ed.2d 601, 608]. Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application for '[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the "injustice or hardship" by a holding of nonretroactivity.' [Citation.]" 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355, 30 L.Ed.2d 296, 306.

In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1973), 411 U.S. 192, 93 S.Ct. 1463, 36 L.Ed.2d 151, the court emphasized the first factor in Chevron Oil; namely, reliance on existing law. In Lemon, the court denied retroactive application to an earlier decision, involving the same parties, which held that a State program of contracting with church-affiliated schools to provide secular classes was unconstitutional. In denying retroactive application to its earlier holding, the court stressed the fact that State authorities had relied on a State statutory scheme which provided for the program.

In Lemon, the court said that it has recognized "that statutory or even judge-made rules of law are hard facts on which people must rely in making decisions and in shaping their conduct. This fact of legal life underpins our modern decisions recognizing a doctrine of nonretroactivity." 411 U.S. 192, 199, 93 S.Ct. 1463, 1468, 36 L.Ed.2d 151, 160.

This court, like the United States Supreme Court, has emphasized a party's reliance on existing law when deciding whether to apply a decision prospectively or retroactively. See e.g., Bassi v. Langloss (1961), 22 Ill.2d 190, 174 N.E.2d 682, and Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89.

In the case at bar, the treasurer of Du Page County relied on section 6.1 of the County Treasurer's Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 36, par. 22.1) to retain the interest moneys earned and to deposit those moneys in the county corporate fund. Section 6.1 of the County Treasurer's Act provides:

"All earnings accruing on any investments or deposits made by the County Treasurer whether acting as such or as County Collector, of county monies as in this Act is defined, shall be credited to and paid into the County Treasury for the benefit of the county corporate fund to be used for county purposes, except where by specific statutory provisions such earnings are directed to be credited to and paid to a particular fund." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 36, par. 22.1.)

Section 1 of the Act defines county moneys as follows:

"The term 'county moneys' shall include all moneys to whomsoever belonging, received by or in possession or control of the incumbent of the office of county treasurer when acting as such or in any other official capacity incident to his incumbency of the office of county treasurer." Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 36, par. 17.

Wood Dale I was the first case that indicated the county treasurer's reliance on section 6.1 was misplaced. In Wood Dale I, we agreed with the appellate court "that to hold that section 6.1 of the County Treasurers' Act included the interest earned on funds owned by other units of local government would render it unconstitutional." (96 Ill.2d 378, 383, 70 Ill.Dec. 859, 450 N.E.2d 332.) Prior to Wood Dale I, there was no indication that this section could not be relied on for the treasurer's practice of retaining the interest moneys.

The county's reliance on this statute was also reflected by the fact that the district failed to bring any court action to call into question the county's practice. Counsel for the county stated during oral argument that since 1976, the year City of Joliet v. Bosworth (1976), 64 Ill.2d 516, 1 Ill.Dec. 355, 356 N.E.2d 543, was decided, the State's 6,700 local taxing units collecting taxes twice a year, together collected taxes on 80,400 occasions, and that during that time no local government made a claim against a county for the interest retained. The treasurer and the county continued their practice of retaining the interest moneys relying on the fact that their's was an accepted practice Statewide, unquestioned by any local government.

"[G]overnments must act if they are to fulfill their high responsibilities." (Lemon v. Kurtzman (1973), 411 U.S. 192, 207, 93 S.Ct. 1463, 1472, 36 L.Ed.2d...