BOARD OF COM'RS OF RIO ARRIBA COUNTY v. Greacen, 25,384.
Decision Date | 24 April 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 25,384.,25,384. |
Citation | 2000 NMSC 16,3 P.3d 672,129 N.M. 177 |
Parties | BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF RIO ARRIBA COUNTY, Petitioners-Appellants, v. John M. GREACEN, in his individual and official capacities, Administrative Office of the Courts, Administration Human Resources, Fiscal Service Department, and State of New Mexico, Respondents-Appellees. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Butkus & Reimer, P.C., R. Galen Reimer, Albuquerque, for Appellants.
Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Steven L. Bunch, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for Appellees.
Douglas W. Decker, Gallup, for Amicus Curiae Board of Commissioners of McKinley County.
Paul L. Biderman, Paul S. Nathanson, Pamela Lambert, Albuquerque, for Amici Curiae Judicial Education Center Institute of Public Law University of New Mexico School of Law.
Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., Peter Franklin, Santa Fe, for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Finance Authority.
{1} Petitioners, the Board of Commissioners of Rio Arriba County (collectively referred to as Rio Arriba), appeal an adverse trial court ruling granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents (collectively referred to as Greacen). The Court of Appeals, recognizing that this case presents significant questions of law under the New Mexico Constitution and issues of substantial public interest, certified the case to this Court. See NMSA 1978, § 34-5-14(C) (1972) ( ). We accepted certification and now address whether Rio Arriba has the authority to enact local traffic ordinances and retain collected penalty assessments for violations of those traffic ordinances. We conclude that Rio Arriba does have the authority to enact county traffic ordinances. However, Rio Arriba does not have the authority to alter the comprehensive funding and allocation system of the Española Magistrate Court and therefore does not have the ability to retain any penalty assessments. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
{2} On September 25, 1997, Rio Arriba enacted the Rio Arriba Uniform Traffic Ordinances. See Rio Arriba County, N.M., Ordinances §§ RA-1-2 to -8-138 (1997). Both parties agree that the Rio Arriba Traffic Ordinances are substantially similar to the provisions of the State Motor Vehicle Code. See NMSA 1978, §§ 66-1-1 to -8-141 (1978, as amended through 2000). After the enactment of the Rio Arriba Traffic Ordinances, county sheriff deputies issued citations to enforce the county traffic ordinances until they were enjoined from doing so by the district court on January 29, 1998. Rio Arriba then sought to enforce the citations that had been issued based on its county ordinances in the Española Magistrate Court. Believing the county ordinances to be unenforceable, the Administrative Office of the Courts directed the Española Magistrate Court not to enforce the citations. Rio Arriba then filed a petition seeking a writ of mandamus, or in the alternative, a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to order enforcement of their county traffic ordinances in the Española Magistrate Court. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district judge ruled in favor of Greacen, holding that Rio Arriba did not have the authority to enact the local motor vehicle ordinances and that the County had no authority to retain the penalty assessments derived from the county traffic ordinances. Rio Arriba filed a timely appeal, and the Court of Appeals properly certified the matter to this Court. We now address: (1) whether Rio Arriba has the authority to enact a local motor vehicle code; and (2) whether Rio Arriba has the authority to retain the penalty assessments collected by the Española Magistrate Court.
{3} This case was decided on a motion for summary judgment under Rule 1-056 NMRA 2000. Summary judgment is appropriate when the parties do not dispute the facts, but only the legal effect of those facts. See Gardner-Zemke Co. v. State, 109 N.M. 729, 732, 790 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1990). We review de novo the trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment to determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 1-056(C); Gallegos v. State Bd. of Educ., 1997-NMCA-040, ¶ 9, 123 N.M. 362, 940 P.2d 468. We find that no material issues of fact exist in this case, and since the disposition of this case turns solely on the resolution of legal issues, we conclude that the trial court's resolution of this matter on summary judgment was procedurally correct.
{4} This is primarily a matter of statutory construction and thereby concerns a pure question of law, subject to de novo review. State v. Rowell, 121 N.M. 111, 114, 908 P.2d 1379, 1382 (1995). In this statutory review, we recognize that "it is part of the essence of judicial responsibility to search for and effectuate the legislative intent—the purpose or object—underlying the statute." State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 353, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1994). In deriving this legislative objective we must "give a statute its literal reading if the words used are plain and unambiguous, provided such a construction would not lead to an injustice, absurdity or contradiction." Atencio v. Board of Educ., 99 N.M. 168, 171, 655 P.2d 1012, 1015 (1982) (citing State v. Nance, 77 N.M. 39, 419 P.2d 242 (1966)). "Unless the context suggests some specialized meaning, we interpret a statute in accordance with the common meaning of the statutory language." Welch v. Sandoval County Valuation Protests Bd., 1997-NMCA-086, ¶ 5, 123 N.M. 722, 945 P.2d 452.
{5} Rio Arriba County was recognized by the Territorial Government of New Mexico in 1852, and was later organized as a corporate and political body. 1876 N.M. Laws, ch. 1, § 1. This organization continued after New Mexico became a State on January 6, 1912. See NMSA 1978, § 4-38-1 (1876) (). Counties are recognized in Article X of the New Mexico Constitution; however, that Article does not define the existence or extent of county powers. Therefore, we must look to statutory and case law limitations placed on county powers. We have previously held, "A county is but a political subdivision of the State, and it possesses only such powers as are expressly granted to it by the Legislature, together with those necessarily implied to implement those express powers." El Dorado at Santa Fe, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 89 N.M. 313, 317, 551 P.2d 1360, 1364 (1976) (citing Dow v. Irwin, 21 N.M. 576, 157 P. 490 (1916)); see also 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corporations § 194, at 246-47 (1971) (). Therefore, we look for powers that were expressly granted to Rio Arriba by the Legislature or necessarily implied in the performance of an express power to justify the enactment of Rio Arriba's traffic ordinances.
{6} Rio Arriba argues that it has the express statutory authority to enact county traffic ordinances, despite the existence of the comprehensive State Motor Vehicle Code. See §§ 66-1-1 to -8-141. In support of this contention Rio Arriba advances three statutorily based justifications. The first two arguments are derived from the powers expressly granted to counties as provided in NMSA 1978, § 4-37-1 (1975):
All counties are granted the same powers that are granted municipalities except for those powers that are inconsistent with statutory or constitutional limitations placed on countles. Included in this grant of powers to the counties are those powers necessary and proper to provide for the safety, preserve the health, promote the prosperity and improve the morals, order, comfort and convenience of any county or its inhabitants. The board of county commissioners may make and publish any ordinance to discharge these powers not inconsistent with statutory or constitutional limitations placed on counties.
(Emphasis added.) First, Rio Arriba highlights the language, "All counties are granted the same powers that are granted municipalities," to assert that it has the same powers as those granted to municipalities, and specifically the powers granted in the State Motor Vehicle Code in NMSA 1978, § 66-8-130(B) (1990) (). Second, Rio Arriba justifies its enactment of the local ordinances by citing to the "police powers" invoked by the language, "necessary and proper to provide for the safety, preserve the health, promote the prosperity and improve the morals, order, comfort and convenience of any county or its inhabitants." Section 4-37-1; see also Brazos Land, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 115 N.M. 168, 174,848 P.2d 1095, 1101 (Ct.App.1993) ( ). Finally, Rio Arriba asserts that because counties are included in the definition of "local authorities" as defined by NMSA 1978, § 66-1-4.10(E) (1990), it should have all of the powers afforded local authorities. These powers include the specific authorization contained in NMSA 1978, § 66-7-8 (1978), to "adopt additional traffic regulations which are not in conflict with such provisions [of the Motor Vehicle Code]." We review each of these claims.
{7} Rio Arriba argues that the Legislature has expressly granted counties all the powers granted to municipalities,...
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