Board of Com'rs of Sarasota County v. Gustafson

• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: CAMPBELL
• Citation: Board of Com'rs of Sarasota County v. Gustafson, 616 So.2d 1165 (Fla. App. 1993)
• Decision Date: 16 April 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-02073,92-02073
• Parties: 18 Fla. L. Week. D1001 BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF SARASOTA COUNTY, Florida, and Joanne E. Koester, as Supervisor of Elections of Sarasota County, Appellants, v. Stephen B. GUSTAFSON, Appellee.

Page 1165

616 So.2d 1165

18 Fla. L. Week. D1001

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF SARASOTA COUNTY, Florida, and Joanne E. Koester, as Supervisor of Elections of Sarasota County, Appellants, v. Stephen B. GUSTAFSON, Appellee.

No. 92-02073.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Second District.

April 16, 1993.

Jorge L. Fernandez, County Atty., and H. Ray Allen and Maria D. Korn, Asst. County Attys., Sarasota, for appellants.

Robert E. Turffs of Kanetsky, Moore & DeBoer, P.A., Venice, for appellee.

CAMPBELL, Acting Chief Judge.

In this case, we are asked to determine whether a county may require candidates for elected county office to be residents of that county for two years immediately prior to qualifying for the election. The trial court found that the two-year period was not shown to be necessary to the county's stated goal of ensuring an informed electorate and informed candidates, and that, consequently, the requirement violated the equal protection clause. We agree.

Apparently, there had been some public concern in Sarasota County that, due to the mobile nature of the community, not only were voters not able to adequately familiarize themselves with the candidates, but some candidates did not have sufficient knowledge of or commitment to Sarasota County to properly serve the county. In response, the Sarasota County Charter Review Board placed Ordinance 90-69, containing the two-year durational residency requirement at issue here, before the voters. Eighty-three percent of those who voted did so in favor of the amendment, which then became section 6.6 of the Sarasota County Charter. The adopted charter amendment read, in pertinent part, as follows: "Anyone who wishes to qualify for a position that does not require residency within a specific district must have been a Sarasota County resident for two (2) years immediately prior to qualification."

Appellee, a declared candidate for the office of Sheriff of Sarasota County, challenged the amendment by filing a three-count complaint, naming as defendants the appellants here and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief.

The trial court denied appellee's request for injunctive relief, but in a subsequent order, declared the ordinance unconstitutional, finding the right to run for public office "inextricably entwined" with the fundamental right to travel. The court, using an equal protection analysis, applied the rational basis test and found that although the county had shown that the residency restriction was based on reasonable and legitimate governmental interests, the county had failed to "show the inadequacy of alternative and less restrictive methods of achieving its goal."

On appeal, appellants, the Sarasota Board of County Commissioners and the Supervisor of Elections, argue that the two-year candidate durational residency requirement did not violate the equal protection clause. It is their position that the traditional equal protection analysis should be applied to such requirements. Under the traditional approach, the legislation may be upheld unless it is "patently arbitrary" and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1768, 36 L.Ed.2d 583, 589 (1973). Appellants argue that the ordinance here had a legitimate legislative purpose: To protect the integrity of the political process. Appellants contend that once a residency requirement is found justified, the precise time period selected need only fall within a reasonable range. Appellee takes the opposite position, arguing that candidate durational residency provisions should be given strict scrutiny. Under the strict scrutiny standard, any legislation that seriously affects fundamental rights or a suspect class must be shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest in order to be upheld. ¹ If neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is involved, however, the traditional analysis is applied. Appellee takes the position that candidate durational residency requirements seriously affect the fundamental right to travel. Alternatively, appellee argues that even if the traditional rational basis test is applied, the provision at issue in this case still violates the equal protection clause.

While this provision, a two-year durational residency requirement for candidates for elected office, does not affect a suspect class (United States v. Carolene Products Co. 304 U.S. 144, 152-153, n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783-784, 82 L.Ed. 1234, 1242 (1938) [suspect class described as "discrete and insular minority"]; Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677, 686, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1770, 36 L.Ed.2d 583, 591 (1973) [suspect class said to bear an "immutable characteristic determined solely by...