Board of Com'rs of Howard County v. Kokomo City Plan Commission

Decision Date23 June 1975
Docket NumberNo. 675S153,675S153
Citation330 N.E.2d 92,263 Ind. 282
PartiesBOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF HOWARD COUNTY, Indiana, Appellant, v. KOKOMO CITY PLAN COMMISSION, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Daniel J. Gamble, Fred G. Osborne, Howard County Attys., Kokomo, Karl J. Stipher, Robert J., Bremer, Baker & Daniels, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Kenneth L. Andrews, Kokomo City Atty., Robert S. Whitehead, Kokomo, for appellee.

E. Alonzo Deckard, Danville, for Ass'n of Indiana Counties, Inc., amicus curiae.

DE BRULER, Justice.

The complaint of the Board of Commissioners of Howard County, Indiana (hereinafter referred to as the County) challenged the statute upon which the defendant, Kokomo City Plan Commission (hereinafter referred to as the City) relied in seeking to exercise planning and zoning authority outside its physical boundaries for a distance of two miles. I.C.1971, 18--7--5--34, being Burns § 53--734. The complaint contained the legal allegation that the statute, properly construed, required the County to give its consent to an exercise of such jurisdiction in the two mile fringe area and the County had not given consent. It contained constitutional allegations that the statute was void in that it:

(1) authorized exercise of jurisdiction over residents of Howard County in contravention 'of the equal protection and due process guaranteed by the 5th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States', and

(2) discriminated against residents of Howard County 'as respects notice, public hearing, due process and equal protection as opposed to those citizens of the State of Indiana residing in counties of a population of excess of 84,000', and

(3) was 'an attempt to delegate legislative authority to an administrative appointive body.'

The City filed a cross-complaint to enforce the terms of the statute. A stipulation of fact was filed by the parties, and both parties filed motions for summary judgment with legal memoranda.

The trial court denied the County's motion and granted the City's motion, thereby simply enforcing the terms of the statute. In its judgment no mention is made of the County's constitutional claims. The trial court simply refused to consider the County's claim that the statute was invalid.

The County's motion to correct errors posited that the terms of the statute with reference to consent had been erroneously construed and that the statute was,

'unconstitutional for the following reasons:

(a) Said statute does not provide for notice or public hearing;

(b) Said statute is uncertain, vague and indefinite; and

(c) Said statute amounts of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative functions to an administrative body.'

The motion was overruled.

The Second District Court of Appeals reversed, with one judge dissenting, holding the statute unconstitutional upon application of Art. 4, § 23, of the Indiana Constitution. (310 N.E.2d 877.) We grant transfer and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

As recognized by the opinion of the Court of Appeals, courts, vested with the authority to adjudge the constitutional validity of statutes, have an affirmative duty to decide the merits of such constitutional claims when they are properly presented and supported. This is so whether the court addressed is a trial court or an appellate court. However, when the constitutional validity of an enactment of the Legislature is properly raised, it simultaneously invokes many rules which restrict and canalize the consideration of the issue. These rules cast a higher and more difficult duty upon the court and the parties. Such rules are intended to insure that the courts will nullify a statute on constitutional grounds only where such result is clearly rational and necessary. When confronted with what appears to be a constitutional claim, a tribunal must first determine for itself that it has the judicial authority to litigate it. Board of Zoning Appeals v. Waintrup (1934), 99 Ind.App. 576, 193 N.E. 701. Likewise as the threshold the court must determine that the party seeking to raise a constitutional claim or defense has shown that he has the requisite standing to do so. Darnell v. Indiana (1912), 226 U.S. 390, 33 S.Ct. 120, 57 L.Ed 267; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. (1911), 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369; Cheaney v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 138, 285 N.E.2d 265, cert. den'd, 410 U.S. 991, 93 S.Ct. 1516, 36 L.Ed.2d 189 (1973) (for want of standing of the petitioner); Knight & Jillson Co. v. Miller (1909), 172 Ind. 27, 87 N.E. 823; Schmidt v. City of Indianapolis (1907), 168 Ind. 631, 80 N.E. 632; Shigley v. Whitlock (1974), Ind.App.,310 N.E.2d 93.

In Indiana the standing requirement is stated in terms of the requirement of a party to show injury. When appearing in pleadings, constitutional claims must be made in 'simple, concise and direct' language. TR. Rule 8(E)(1); TR. Rule 16. Such a claim would necessarily include language which would permit a reasonably competent judge or attorney to identify the constitutional provision allegedly infranted. Prunk v. Indianapolis Redevelopment Commission of the Department of Redevelopment of the City of Indianapolis (1950), 228 Ind. 579, 93 N.E.2d 171.

Upon challenge in court, all statutes are presumptively rational and constitutional, and the party opposing the statute has the burden of overcoming this presumption and making the constitutional defects in the statute clearly apparent. Hanley v. State of Indiana, Indiana Department of Conservation, et al. (1954), 234 Ind. 326, 126 N.E.2d 879; Marion County Election Board v. O'Brien (1960), 241 Ind. 36, 169 N.E.2d 287. Years of usage and acquiescence in a statutory plan or proceeding fortify the presumption of validity. Department of Revenue, Inheritance Tax Division v. Estate of Callaway, Deceased (1953), 232 Ind. 1, 110 N.E.2d 903. Where the constitutional validity of a statute is drawn in issue, it is essential that the party bearing the burden on the issue produce a record before the court which justifies deciding the constitutional issue. Such a record provides the court with the necessary tools to make a rational determination. It includes a statement of the legal test to be applied in determining whether a particular constitutional provision has been violated, or citations of authorities which state that test. And it also includes any factual matter necessary to a proper application of the test. Without essential legal argument and factual matter, the court, particularly in a civil case, is justified in refusing to adjudge whether the statute complies with the commands of the constitutions, for in such case it does not 'appear from the record that there is a substantial foundation for the allegation.' Ex parte Sweeney (1890), 126 Ind. 583, 587, 27 N.E. 127; Stout v. Hendricks, 228 F.Supp. 568 (S.D.Ind.1964). In the ordinary case, the party will carry this burden by formally requesting the court to consider relevant facts of which the court may take judicial notice. State v. Griffin (1948), 226 Ind. 279, 79 N.E.2d 537. If the court may not take judicial notice of the necessary factual determinations, such facts must be presented and fully developed in a suitable adversary atmosphere. Whitcomb v. Chavis (1971), 403 U.S. 124, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 29 L.Ed.2d 363; Tinder v. Clarke Auto Co. (1958), 238 Ind. 302, 149 N.E.2d 808; Hardin v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 56, 257 N.E.2d 671; Note, Admission of Extrinsic Evidence in Cases Involving the Validity of Statutes and Ordinances in Indiana, 35 Ind.L.J. 100 (1959). Even if the quality of the litigation is sufficient to support a constitutional determination, such determination will not be made if the case can be disposed of justly on non-constitutional grounds. Passwater v. Winn (1967), 248 Ind. 404, 229 N.E.2d 622; State ex rel. Codding v. Eby, Judge (1944), 223 Ind. 302, 60 N.E.2d 527; Roth v. Local Union #1460 of Retail Clerks Union (1939), 216 Ind. 363, 24 N.E.2d 280. And in the event an overbroad statute might be found to be unconstitutional as applied to the particular situation at issue, it may be so declared, and in such event the statute is left in effect. Department of Insurance v. Schoonover (1947), 225 Ind. 187, 72 N.E.2d 747; Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. den'd, 393 U.S. 847, 89 S.Ct. 132, 21 L.Ed.2d 118 (1968).

These rules, as they apply to cases which call the constitutional validity of statutes in issue, create a system of adjudication which places a heavy burden on the party making the claim and are intended to insure that any court judgment nullifying a statute on constitutional grounds will be made by a tribunal fully qualified to make such a decision and that that decision will be grounded upon the fullest effort of which a court is capable. By this system, the interests of the State, as determined and concretized in the legislative enactment, will be maximally protected. When the party who is cast in the role in the litigation of defending the statute does not invoke these rules, the court, upon its own responsibility, must use them as its guide in determining a constitutional claim because of the strong public interest in preserving the enactment.

When a claim arises which raises the constitutional validity of a statutory classification under the Equal Protection Clause, or under similar provisions of our State Constitution, the court, after jurisdiction and standing have been established, must decide whether the traditional test or the higher test of equal protection is to be applied. This decision is made upon consideration of three elements: 'the character of the classification in question; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification.' Dunn v. Blumstein (1972), 405 U.S. 330, 335, 92 S.Ct. 995, 999, 31 L.Ed.2d 274; Williams v. Rhodes (1968), 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24. If the traditional test...

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