Board of Com'rs of Delaware County v. Lions Delaware County Fair, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 October 1991
• Docket Number: No. 18A04-9104-CV-116,18A04-9104-CV-116
• Citation: 580 N.E.2d 280
• Parties: BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF DELAWARE COUNTY (Appellant-Defendant Below); East Central Indiana Trotting and Pacing Association and Ernest L. Sutton (Appellants-Plaintiffs Below); Everett Jackson, Joe Lewis, Bud Everhart, John Justice, Ernest Sutton, Herb Hoover, Kenneth Snow, Larry Beeman, Gene Oakerson, and Charles Turner (Appellants-Defendants Below). v. LIONS DELAWARE COUNTY FAIR, INC., Appellee-Defendant Below. 1 .
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 280

580 N.E.2d 280

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF DELAWARE COUNTY (Appellant-Defendant Below); East Central Indiana Trotting and Pacing Association and Ernest L. Sutton (Appellants-Plaintiffs Below); Everett Jackson, Joe Lewis Bud Everhart, John Justice, Ernest Sutton, Herb Hoover Kenneth Snow, Larry Beeman, Gene Oakerson, and Charles Turner (Appellants-Defendants Below). v. LIONS DELAWARE COUNTY FAIR, INC., Appellee-Defendant Below.

No. 18A04-9104-CV-116 ¹.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Third District.

Oct. 28, 1991.

Donald H. Dunnuck, Dale E. Hunt, Dunnuck, Teagle & Hunt, Muncie, for Bd. of Com'rs of Delaware County.

Jack Quirk, Muncie, for East Cent. Ind. Trotting & Packing Assoc., Ernest L. Sutton, and Everett Jackson et al.

John M. Feick, Cross, Marshall, Schuck, DeWeese, Cross & Feick, P.C., Muncie, for Lions Delaware County Fair, Inc.

STATON, Judge.

The appellants appeal from a judgment for Lions Delaware County Fair, Inc. ("Lions") raising five issues which may be consolidated into three:

I. Whether the judgment of the trial court was contrary to law.

II. Whether the trial court erred in its treatment of the appellants' motion for summary judgment.

III. Whether the trial court erred in not entering special findings and conclusions in support of the judgment.

We affirm.

The Delaware County Fairgrounds were purchased by the County in 1890 and became the site of the annual Delaware County Fair. In 1961, the Board of Commissioners of Delaware County (Board), looking for an organization to assume the duties of conducting the annual fair, entered into a lease with Lions. Under the terms of the lease, Lions was leased the Fairgrounds, which they agreed to maintain. In addition, Lions, a non-profit service organization, agreed to conduct the annual fair and make the premises available to county 4-H clubs. The lease also provided that all buildings and structures were the property of Lions, and stated that Lions could not assign the lease without consent of the Board. The lease term ended on April 24, 1978, but in 1967, it was extended another thirty years to provide for a long-term improvement program implemented by Lions.

It became the custom for Lions to rent stable space in the barns to horsemen, who trained their horses on the fairgrounds track. The leases provided that "Any authorized volunteered repair, is at lessee's expense and is not a reduction of the lease." Record, p. 24. (Emphasis in original.) At some time during the relationship between the horsemen and Lions, Lions indicated a need to raise the rent in order to provide finances for maintenance, but the horsemen agreed to provide maintenance for the barns if the rental fee would stay the same. At some point, the horsemen formed an association, the East Central Indiana Trotting and Pacing Association (ECITPA), which began to make improvements to the track. Maintenance to the track and barns appears to have been performed in recent years as a result of a sort of loose agreement between ECITPA and Lions, with each organization funding and providing labor for a number of the required tasks.

In the latter part of 1989, Lions began to be concerned about liability, and rewrote the new leases with higher rentals and which required proof of insurance before a horseman could lease a stall. Pursuant to the former leases, notice was given that the horsemen would have to vacate the stalls unless they signed a new lease. The horsemen objected, claiming that the insurance was too expensive and too difficult to get. They attempted to tender their next month's rent pursuant to the original lease, but their checks were returned. Nonetheless, the horsemen stayed in the stalls.

Lions was unable to come to an accord with ECITPA as to a date for the fair, so it was determined that the 1990 fair would not have harness races. Lions also decided that it would not approve the annual "Matinee" on the fairgrounds, which is the annual fund raising event for ECITPA.

Lions filed suit against the horsemen for ejectment and back rent. ECITPA in turn sued Lions and the Board on a third-party beneficiary theory, alleging that Lions had not properly maintained the fairgrounds that Lions had assigned portions of the lease, and that the lease was void as against public policy. The complaint also alleged that the Board had failed to enforce the lease.

ECITPA then dismissed its third-party beneficiary claim and amended its complaint, alleging in its new claim that it was told it could conduct the money-making event on the fairgrounds, had expended money in reliance, and then was told it could not have the event. The complaint requested $5000 in compensatory and $10,000 in punitive damages. The county cross-claimed, alleging that the lease was void as violative of statutes in effect at the time of the signing of the lease which limited the length of time a county could lease county property, and requested that the lease be cancelled and Lions be ejected.

The lawsuits were consolidated, and the Board filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion for summary judgment was denied, and after a bench trial, judgment was entered in favor of Lions on all claims. ECITPA, the individual horsemen, and the Board bring this appeal.

I. Whether the Judgment was Contrary to Law

ECITPA appeals a negative judgment on its complaint, the horsemen appeal an adverse judgment on the actions on the stable leases, and Board appeals a negative judgment on its counterclaim. ² When reviewing an appeal from a negative judgment we must determine whether the judgment is contrary to law. In re Marriage of Wooten (1990), Ind.App., 563 N.E.2d 636, 638. A judgment is contrary to law when the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion which is contrary to that reached by the trial court. Id. In addressing the question of whether a negative judgment is contrary to law, we consider only the evidence on the record most favorable to the prevailing party without reweighing the evidence or judging the credibility of the witnesses. Id.

When a party seeks to reverse an adverse judgment on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment, we will not reweigh the evidence. In re Paternity of Tomkins (1989), Ind.App., 542 N.E.2d 1009, 1013. Rather, we will look to the evidence most favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, and will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value. Id.

In addition, the judgment entered in this case is a general judgment, which may be affirmed upon any theory supported by the evidence. Hollars v. Randall (1990), Ind.App., 554 N.E.2d 1177, 1178.

Appellants mount a two-pronged attack on the judgment: 1) the lease between the county and Lions is void and against public policy; and 2) the judgment was against the weight of the evidence. With respect to the first prong, they argue that the original Board of Commissioners was not statutorily permitted to enter into the lease, and to permit counties to enter into such leases would deprive the county and the public from retaining a meaningful role in decisions made about the property.

Appellants cite an amalgam of statutes and caselaw from which they extrapolate a rule that the Board did not have the statutory authority to enter into the lease in question. However, neither party cites the statutes which are dispositive of the issue. ³ In 1961, when the original lease was executed, title 26, chapter 15 of Burns' statutes dealt with fairgrounds. It authorized the County Board of Commissioners to purchase real estate to be used for fairgrounds, ⁴ to resell the fairgrounds, ⁵ to convey the fairgrounds to a city within the county, ⁶ and to turn over the land to an agricultural society or association for conducting agricultural fairs thereon. ⁷ It contained no prohibition against leasing property to a nonprofit organization to run the fairs. More telling is section 26-620, outlining the powers and duties conferred upon the commissioners, which provides inter alia that "[s]uch commissioners in their respective counties shall have power at their meetings ... to lease real estate belonging to the county, and not being used for the benefit of the public, to any nonprofit organization formed for the purpose of promoting the commercial, industrial, or civic interest of the county, for any period not exceeding ninety-nine (99) years...." We conclude the Board had authority to lease the fairgrounds to the Lions Club.

The Appellants' second prong attacks the weight of the evidence in support of the judgment. This is simply a request that we reweigh the evidence. They argue at length that the evidence showed that the Lions failed to keep up the fairgrounds as required by the lease. It is unclear how this evidence has any bearing on any relevant issue in the case. ⁸ However, at least one witness testified that the grounds were in satisfactory condition, Lions introduced evidence that money was spent on the maintenance of the facilities, and the trial judge personally viewed the fairgrounds at the request of the parties. It is the trial court's task to weigh the evidence.

Appellants also argue that Lions violated the lease by subleasing without...