Board of County Comm'rs of Meeker County v. Butler

• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Berry, J.
• Citation: Board of County Comm'rs of Meeker County v. Butler, 25 Minn. 363 (Minn. 1879)
• Decision Date: 10 January 1879
• Parties: Board of County Commissioners of Meeker County v. Chauncey Butler and others

25 Minn. 363

Board of County Commissioners of Meeker County v. Chauncey Butler and others

Supreme Court of Minnesota

January 10, 1879

Appeal by defendants from an order of the district court for Meeker county, Brown, J., presiding, overruling a demurrer to the complaint.

Order affirmed.

Campbell & Spooner and I. V. D. Heard, for appellants.

Strobeck & Plumley, for respondent.

OPINION

Berry J.

This is an action upon a bond dated October 16, 1877, and claimed by the plaintiff to have been executed by defendant Butler as principal, and the other defendants as sureties, under and in accordance with Laws 1873, c. 38; Gen. St. 1878 c. 8, § 150 (131.) The bond is conditioned as follows, viz.: "That whereas the board of auditors of said Meeker county have designated the Bank of Litchfield which is owned, operated and controlled by said Chauncey Butler, as the depositary in which the funds of said Meeker county shall be deposited by the treasurer thereof; and whereas the said Chauncey Butler is about to accept said trust: Now, therefore, if the said Chauncey Butler shall pay over and deliver unto the treasurer of said Meeker county, or to his order, or to any other duly authorized officer or agent of said county, all moneys which are, or may have been deposited with him, the said Chauncey Butler, by or on account of said Meeker county, on demand therefor, and in the manner required by law, then this obligation to be null and void; otherwise to be and remain in full force and effect." It is objected that the bond is not authorized by the statute, because the recital shows that the Bank of Litchfield, which is evidently only a business name of defendant Butler, was designated as the depositary before the bond was executed, whereas subdivision 3 of section 1, of chapter 38 aforesaid, provides that before any such designation, a bond shall be executed, etc. This objection rests upon a misconception of the statute. The second subdivision of section 1, chapter 38, clearly authorizes a designation i. e. a selection, of a depositary by the board of county auditors, before the execution of the required bond; but by subdivision 3, this designation is not to become operative, so as to authorize the deposit of funds with the proposed depositary, until the required bond is furnished, and approved by the board of county commissioners. The effect is that while the designation is made by the selection by the board of auditors, it does not become completely effectual as a designation, until the furnishing and approval of the bond. When the bond is furnished, and when it is approved by the board of county...