Board of Directors of Linden Consol. School Dist. v. Board of Ed. In and For Dallas County

• Decision Date: 14 June 1960
• Docket Number: No. 49859,49859
• Citation: 103 N.W.2d 696,251 Iowa 929
• Parties: BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF LINDEN CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT of Dallas and Guthrie Counties and Board of Directors of Panora Community School District of Dallas and Guthrie Counties, Iowa, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION IN AND FOR DALLAS COUNTY, Lloyd Godfrey, Secretary and Executive Officer; Board of Education in and for Guthrie County; Carol J. Henning, Secretary and Executive Officer, acting as a single board in accordance with Section 275.16, Code of lowa, 1958, and J. C. Wright, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, all of the State of Iowa, Defendants, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF GUTHRIE COUNTY, Iowa, Intervenor, v. REDFIELD COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Intervenor-Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 696

103 N.W.2d 696

251 Iowa 929

BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF LINDEN CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT of Dallas and Guthrie Counties and Board of Directors of Panora Community School District of Dallas and Guthrie Counties, Iowa, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION IN AND FOR DALLAS COUNTY, Lloyd Godfrey, Secretary and Executive Officer; Board of Education in and for Guthrie County; Carol J. Henning, Secretary and Executive Officer, acting as a single board in accordance with Section 275.16, Code of lowa, 1958, and J. C. Wright, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, all of the State of Iowa, Defendants, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF GUTHRIE COUNTY, Iowa, Intervenor, v. REDFIELD COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Intervenor-Appellee.

No. 49859.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 14, 1960.

John Donahey, Panora, for plaintiffs-appellants.

H. S. Hunn, Des Moines, for intervenor-appellee.

John C. McDonald, Dallas Center, for Dallas County Bd. of Ed.

R. Y. Taylor, Guthrie Center, for Guthrie County Bd. of Ed.

LARSON, Chief Justice.

The questions raised in this interlocatory appeal are: (1) the correctness of the ruling of the trial court in overruling plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the petition of intervention filed by the Redfield Community School District in an appeal involving only the Linden and Panora district reorganization; and (2) the jurisdiction of the court to entertain this interlocutory appeal for lack of timely service of appeal notice.

The record facts are simple and undisputed. Pursuant to a petition by the required voters of Guthrie and Dallas Counties for the reorganization of the Panora and Linden School Districts, due notice was given and a hearing was had before the joint board of education of Dallas and Guthrie Counties on April 21, 1958. Various objections were filed, including one by appellee, which was accompanied by a 'Declaration of Interest' signed by 122 people who lived within the 13 section area in Dallas County eventually excluded from the proposed district by the action of the joint board of education. That decision was appealed by plaintiffs to the State Department of Public Instruction, which in turn remanded the matter to the joint county board for further study, consideration, and revision, with further notice and hearings. Plaintiffs appealed this decision to the District Court of Guthrie County asking that the court approve the reorganization as originally proposed which would include the excluded controversial 13 sections in the Linden district.

The Superintendent of Public Instruction and the State Board of Public Instruction filed a disclaimer. Both the county boards of education for Dallas and Guthrie Counties filed answers, and on February 21, 1959, the Redfield Community School District, which had none of its terriotry involved in the proposed new district, filed a petition of intervention in the proceedings. The district court overruled plaintiffs' motion to dismiss that petition although it held that the Redfield Community School District was not an aggrieved party which could appeal a decision of the joint county board under Sections 275.8 and 275.16, Code of 1958, I.C.A. It did, however, find the Redfield district had such an interest in the litigation as to permit it to intervene under Rule 75, R.C.P., 58 I.C.A. We cannot agree with the latter determination.

I. The right of appeal is purely a creature of statute, and the legislature may grant or deny it at pleasure. Van der Burg v. Bailey, 207 Iowa 797, 799, 223 N.W. 515, 516; Everding v. Board of Education, 247 Iowa 743, 747, 76 N.W.2d 205, 206, and many citations; Signer v. Crawford County, Iowa, Board of Education, 247 Iowa 766, 76 N.W.2d 213; Board of Education, etc. v. Board of Education, 250 Iowa 672, 95 N.W.2d 709. We have not departed from that view. In the Everding case we considered Sections 275.8 and 275.16, involved in the case before us, and stated [247 Iowa 743, 747, 76 N.W.2d 209]: 'It is clear the statutes do not provide for an appeal such as this by anyone direct to the district court * * *. The only appeal (by ones designated) from such a determination is first to the state board of public instruction and from its decision to the district court.' The party designated who may appeal to a court of record is 'an aggrieved party to the controversy.' Section 275.8, Code, 1958, I.C.A. states: 'An aggrieved party is hereby defined as the board of directors of a school district whose directors are elected at large, or, if said board is elected from director districts, then that membership of the board of directors whose districts are included in the proposed reorganized area, or a county board of education.' (Emphasis supplied.) It is true that since the Everding case the 57th General Assembly, in Section 11 of Chapter 129, permitted appeals by other representative bodies whose area was affected by the proposed reorganization, but it went no further.

In the Everding case we said the meaning of this section as to the 'aggrieved party to the controversy' means only 'an aggrieved county board.' From a reading of Section 275.8 as now constituted, it is clear the 57th General Assembly desired to include therein an aggrieved board of directors of a school district whose area is involved, or the membership of a board of directors whose districts are involved in the proposed plan. That does not mean all boards of directors throughout the state, as suggested by appellee. The real purpose of this legislation is clear and controlling here. Dingman v. City of Council Bluffs, 249 Iowa 1121, 1127, 90 N.W.2d 742, 744. During the pendency of such a reorganization, outsiders have no interest or right to interfere therein. State ex rel. Harberts v. Klemme Community School Dist., 247 Iowa 48, 72 N.W.2d 512, and citations. A district with no territory involved is clearly an outsider, under Sections 275.8 and 275.16, Code of 1958, I.C.A.

Obviously the legislature desired to limit the right to appeal by parties legally interested through certain representative bodies whose territory was involved in the proposed reorganization, and by no others. The evident intention was to permit interested parties to prosecute or engage in an appeal in that and only in that manner. The 'aggrieved party' in the case before us which could appeal under Sections 275.8 and 275.16 included the Dallas and Guthrie County boards of education, and the directors of the Linden or Panora school districts, and no others. In other words, the Redfield Community School District, having no territory included in the proposed reorganization of the Linden and Panora districts, was given no right to participate in an appeal from either the action of the joint county board of education or the action of the State Department of Education to a court of record, either for itself or as a representative of residents within the territory involved.

There is no merit to the contention that, as the representative of some 122 persons residing in the controversial 13 sections, the Redfield district had the status in this appeal of an aggrieved party. The interest of those persons can only be protected by the bodies specifically designated in Section 275.8, i. e. those whose territory is involved in the proposed reorganization. Ones personally aggrieved by legal determinations, as pointed out in the Everding v. Board of Education case, supra, must persuade, look to, and depend upon their county board or their school district as their representative. Obviously the legislature had the right and the purpose to avoid vexatious or delaying procedures to hinder prompt and desirable reorganizations, and yet provide for appeals on wellfounded grievances, by only the most directly concerned and interested bodies.

We are satisfied under the provisions of Chapter 275, Code of 1958, I.C.A., that the Redfield Community School District had no right to participate in this action, either in its own behalf or in behalf of the residents of the controversial 13 sections in the Linden district.

II. Appellee further contends that even though it may not be an aggrieved party which is permitted the right to appeal under Sections 275.8 and 275.16, Code of 1958, I.C.A., yet it has such an interest in upholding the action of the joint county board of excluding the Linden 13 sections as will permit it to intervene in the appeal under the provisions of Rule 75, R.C.P.

It argues that its objection on its own behalf and on behalf of 122 residents within the included territory, based upon a preference that these sections should be included in a proposed Dexfield reorganization plan in which the Redfield district was interested, was upheld by the joint county board, thus establishing in it a real interest to sustain. Without passing on the right of appellee to file objections before the joint county board, there is no merit to the contention that, as a result of the board determination, appellee had acquired a legal right or interest in the pending reorganization.

Rule 75, R.C.P., provides: 'Any person interested in the subject matter of the litigation, or the success of either party to the action, or against both parties, may intervene at any time before trial begins, by joining with plaintiff or defendant or claiming adversely to both.'

In Cook, Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, Revised Edition, Vol. 1, page 505, the author expresses the opinion that this rule makes no change in the existing law as to when an intervention is permitted. Therefore, prior decisions are applicable. In re Smith's Estate, 240 Iowa 499, 36 N.W.2d 815, 8 A.L.R.2d 640; Edgington v. Nichols, 242 Iowa 1091, 49 N.W.2d 555.

While it is true we said in In re Town of Waconia, 248 Iowa 863, 82 N.W.2d 762, 765, that 'Intervention is remedial and should be liberally construed to the end that litigation may be reduced and more expeditiously determined,' we also said therein: '* * * it is clearly the law that an intervenor must...