Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools v. Shelby County

• Decision Date: 06 June 1960
• Citation: 339 S.W.2d 569,11 McCanless 330,207 Tenn. 330
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
• Parties: , 207 Tenn. 330 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the MEMPHIS CITY SCHOOLS v. SHELBY COUNTY, Tennessee, et al. CITY OF MEMPHIS v. SHELBY COUNTY, Tennessee, et al.

Page 569

339 S.W.2d 569

11 McCanless 330, 207 Tenn. 330

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the MEMPHIS CITY SCHOOLS v. SHELBY COUNTY, Tennessee, et al.

CITY OF MEMPHIS v. SHELBY COUNTY, Tennessee, et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

June 6, 1960.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 9, 1960.

Order Granting Leave to File Petition Sept. 30, 1960.

Petition to Amend Dismissed Oct. 26, 1960.

Evans, Petree & Cobb, Memphis, for Bd. of Ed. of Memphis City schools.

Larry Creson, Memphis, Edwin F. Hunt, Nashville, Laughlin, Watson & Creson, Memphis, of counsel, for Shelby County Bd. of Ed.

E. W. Hale, Jr., Co. Atty. for Shelby County, Memphis, David Hanover, Hanover, Hanover, Hanover & Walsh, Memphis, of counsel, for Shelby County.

Edward P. Russell, Memphis, for Riley C. Garner, County Trustee.

Frank B. Gianotti, Jr., E. Brady Bartusch, Memphis, for City of Memphis.

George F. McCanless, Atty. Gen., for the State.

S. A. MARABLE, Special Justice.

The Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools, a corporation created and existing under the laws of the State of Tennessee for the purpose of conducting a public educational system within the boundaries of the City of Memphis, filed a bill in the Chancery Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, on May 15, 1959, against Shelby County, Tennessee, Riley C. Garner, County Trustee, Shelby County Board of Education, and George F. McCanless, Attorney General of the State of Tennessee, seeking the relief hereinafter mentioned; and, on June 30, 1959, the City of Memphis, a municipal corporation of the State of Tennessee and of Shelby County, filed a bill in the same court and against the same defendants named above, and seeking substantially the same relief sought by the complainants in said first bill.

Although no formal order of consolidation of said two causes was ever made by the Chancery Court, such right being reserved by that court upon due application of the complainants, the two causes were heard together and one opinion rendered by the Chancellor disposing of both causes, and upon appeal to this Court both causes were argued and heard together; therefore, we shall follow the same pattern established and consider and dispose of the issues presented in both suits by one opinion, especially since the issues are the same in both suits.

The complainants are seeking (1) a declaratory judgment to the effect that Chapter 711 of the Private Acts of 1947, as amended by Chapter 351 of the Private Acts of 1955, and the last sentence of Section 8(1)(c) of the General Education Act for 1959, embodied in Chapter 14 of the Public Acts of 1959, together with Chapter 752 of the Private Acts of 1929 and Chapter 488 of the Private Acts of 1937, be declared invalid and unconstitutional, and that it be declared the duty of the defendants, Shelby County and the Shelby County Trustee, to divide both the School Tax and the County School Bond Funds on an average daily attendance basis between said County and the complainants; and (2) that the complainants have and recover of said defendants their average daily attendance share of the $8,000,000 County School Bond issue sold on March 31, 1959.

The defendant, Honorable George F. McCanless, Attorney General of the State of Tennessee, filed an answer to each of said bills stating that the statute, the constitutionality of which the complainants have attacked, is applicable only to Memphis and Shelby County, and is not of statewide effect, and that the bills contain no averment of fact or prayer for relief which affects generally the public school system of Tennessee, and that said defendant is, therefore, without interest in the matters set forth in the bills, and is not a proper party to said suits. This defendant took no further action in the causes.

The defendant, Shelby County Board of Education, first filed an answer to each of said bills, but subsequently was permitted by the court to withdraw said answers and file demurrers in lieu thereof.

The other defendants, Shelby County and Riley C. Garner, County Trustee, filed demurrers to both of the bills.

The causes were, therefore, heard by the Chancellor on said demurrers filed by the three defendants named, and decrees were entered in the causes sustaining certain grounds of the demurrers, upholding the constitutionality and validity of the statutes attacked by the complainants, and dismissing said two bills

The causes are now before this Court on appeal from the decrees of the Chancery Court, and assignments of error have been duly submitted which will be considered hereinafter.

A brief history of prior legislation leading up to the questions involved in these suits may be summarized as follows:

The first General Education Act in Tennessee was Chapter 115, Public Acts of 1925, entitled 'An Act to establish and maintain a uniform system of Public Education'. A substantial part of this enactment is still contained in the official Tennessee Code Annotated and forms a part of the general law pertaining to education in this State. This Act, by Section 10 thereof, directed the County Trustee to distribute all State and County elementary school funds between the County and incorporated city or cities of said County on the basis of average daily attendance of pupils of the respective school systems. No different or special provision was made for the distribution of said school funds with respect to Shelby County, or any other county in the State, but such distribution was uniform throughout the State, as contemplated by the caption of said Act and provided in the body thereof. Section 10 of Chapter 115, Public Acts of 1925, later became Section 2348 of the Code of Tennessee, and is now a part of Section 49-206, Tennessee Code Annotated.

In 1929, Chapter 752 of the Private Acts for that year was enacted. This Act purported to amend Chapter 115, Public Acts of 1925, but limits the amendment by population to Shelby County only. This Act provided for the distribution of school funds between Shelby County and the City of Memphis on a fifty-fifty basis, that is, one-half of said funds to go to the County Board of Education and one-half thereof to go to the incorporated Board of Education of the City. The Act applied to all local school funds raised by the County and authorized local school boards to vary the division of said funds by contract.

There was no General Education Bill enacted in 1927, 1929, 1931, 1933, or 1935. In these years, State appropriations for schools were covered by the General Appropriation Bills.

In 1937 there was enacted an Education Appropriation Bill, separate and distinct from the General Appropriation Bill. Such Education Appropriation Bill was Chapter 127, Public Acts of 1937, but same did not purport to provide for the distribution of local school funds.

Also in 1937, there was enacted Chapter 488, Private Acts of 1937, applicable to Shelby County only, by population classification, which, among other things, provided for a distribution of local school funds equally between the County and the City, that is, one-half of such funds to the County Board of Education and one-half thereof to the Board of Education of the City. Section 2 of this Act is substantially the same as the second paragraph of Section 1 of Chapter 752, Private Acts of 1929.

In 1939, 1941, 1943 and 1945, there were Education Appropriation Acts, but none purported to provide for distribution of local school funds between County and City.

In 1947, the General Education Bill, for the first time since 1925, contained any reference to the distribution of local school funds between County and City. This Act, Chapter 8, Public Acts of 1947, has embodied in Section 16 thereof, the following provision:

'All local elementary school funds raised or collected by any non-equalizing county shall be apportioned by the county trustee among the county, and the cities and special school districts therein, in the manner provided by paragraph five of Section 2348 of the Code of Tennessee, unless otherwise provided by Private Act. This paragraph shall not be construed to affect Chapter 752, Private Acts of 1929, but said Act shall continue in full force and effect.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Paragraph five of Section 2348 of the Code of Tennessee provided for the distribution of all state and county elementary school funds between a county and incorporated city or cities of said county on the basis of average daily attendance.

Also in 1947, subsequent to the enactment of Chapter 8, Public Acts of that year, there was enacted Chapter 711 of the Private Acts of 1947, applying to Shelby County only by population. This Act purported to provide for a division of State and Federal school funds between the County and the City on the basis of average daily attendance, but provided for the distribution of local school funds raised by the County on a different basis of forty per cent to the County and sixty per cent to the City. This Private Act was later amended by Chapter 351 of the Private Acts of 1955 so as to change the division of such local school funds to fifty per cent to the County and fifty per cent to the City.

Chapter 351, Private Acts of 1955, was enacted subsequent to the constitutional amendments adopted in 1953, including the amendment to Article 11, Section 9, requiring that local Acts affecting a county or city shall receive approval by a two-thirds vote of the legislative body of the county or the city. It appears that the passage of this Act was opposed by the Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools, but apparently the legislative bodies of the City of Memphis and of Shelby County approved the same subsequently. See page 1174 of the Private Acts of 1955.

By Chapter 9, Public Acts of 1949, there was enacted a General Education Act, which contained the following provision under Section 16 thereof:

'All local elementary school funds raised or collected by any non-equalizing county shall be apportioned by the county tru...