Board of Ed. of Ft. Madison Community School Dist. v. Youel
| Decision Date | 29 August 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 61234,61234 |
| Parties | BOARD OF EDUCATION OF FORT MADISON COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT and Max E. Redmond, Appellees, v. James YOUEL, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
James L. Sayre, of Dreher, Wilson, Adams & Jensen, Des Moines, for appellant.
R. L. Fehseke, of Fehseke & Fehseke, Fort Madison, and Terry D. Loeschen, of Cray, Walter, Cray & Loeschen, Burlington, for appellees.
Considered by LeGRAND, P. J., and UHLENHOPP, HARRIS, McCORMICK, and ALLBEE, JJ.
This is the first case arising under § 279.13 et seq., The Code, 1977, which completely revised the procedure for terminating school teachers' contracts. The teacher, James Youel, appeals from a decree affirming the decision of the Board of Education of Fort Madison Community School District terminating his contract. We affirm the trial court. We refer herein to the appellant teacher as Youel and to the appellees as the Board. All statutory references, unless otherwise noted, are to the Code of 1977.
Youel was in his twenty-fifth year of continuous employment with the Board at the time his contract was terminated. He was thus a nonprobationary teacher. § 279.19. Our discussion is restricted to such teachers and does not concern the more limited rights of probationers under that section.
During his tenure, Youel served as football coach, athletic director and mathematics teacher. At the time of the termination, he was no longer athletic director but was still acting as football coach and mathematics teacher.
The procedural steps required for termination of Youel's contract are set forth in §§ 279.15-279.18. It is conceded all of these conditions were met. We set out briefly the manner in which the case reaches us.
The superintendent of the Fort Madison Community School District notified Youel he would recommend to the Board that Youel's contract be terminated at the end of the 1976-77 school year. § 279.15.
Youel then requested a private hearing with the Board and such a hearing was held under the provisions of § 279.16. Following the hearing, the Board filed a written decision, setting out its findings of fact and conclusions of law and terminating the contract. The secretary of the Board immediately notified Youel of the Board's action. § 279.16.
Youel appealed to an adjudicator selected by the process described in § 279.17. The case was submitted to him on the record made before the Board, and he subsequently filed an opinion reversing the Board and ordering Youel's reinstatement.
The Board rejected the adjudicator's decision and appealed to the district court. § 279.18. The district court reversed the adjudicator and reinstated the original decision of the Board. That decision led to this appeal.
Although the Board, the adjudicator, and the district court all hold hearings, only the Board takes testimony. Both the adjudicator and the district court act on the record made before the Board. The adjudicator may remand to the Board for "further proceedings" (§ 279.17) and the district court may remand to the adjudicator or the Board for "further proceedings." (§ 279.18).
Although chapter 279 covers the termination of both Teacher contracts and Administrative contracts, several significant differences appear. It is important to remember we deal here only with §§ 279.15-.18 under which the Board may terminate teachers' contracts. Thus the quantum of proof required is a preponderance of the competent evidence (§ 279.18(6)). In terminating administrators' contracts the standard is substantial evidence to support the Board. § 279.24(6).
While this does not come to us under Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, the language of chapter 279 and that of the IAPA is quite similar and indeed, in some respects, identical. Cases under the IAPA are therefore helpful in reaching our conclusions here. This is particularly true in considering the scope of review, a matter we now discuss.
Appeal to this court is authorized by this provision in § 279.18:
An aggrieved or adversely affected party to the judicial review proceeding may obtain a review of any final judgment of the district court by appeal to the supreme court. The appeal shall be taken as in other civil cases, although the appeal may be taken regardless of the amount involved.
This is almost identical with the provisions of § 17A.20, The Code, 1977, which delineates the right of appeal under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, under which we have discussed the scope of review on a number of occasions. Jackson County Public Hospital v. Public Employment Relations Board, 280 N.W.2d 426, 429-30 (Iowa 1979); Iowa Public Service Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 263 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Iowa 1978); Taylor v. Department of Transportation, 260 N.W.2d 521, 522 (Iowa 1978); Hoffman v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 257 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 1977). See also Davenport Community School District v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 277 N.W.2d 907 (Iowa 1979) and Davoren v. Iowa Employment Security Comm'n, 277 N.W.2d 602, 603-04 (Iowa 1979).
These cases establish the rule that a review under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act is at law. Jackson County quotes from Hoffman that this court's task is "to review the record in the manner specified in 17A.19(7) and make anew the judicial determinations specified in § 17A.19(8)." 280 N.W.2d at 429. Keeping in mind the analogous language of the IAPA and chapter 279, we paraphrase what was said in these cases to announce the rule that, on appeals in teachers' termination cases, we review the record in the manner specified in § 279.18 and make anew the judicial determinations specified in that section.
One difficulty immediately presents itself. In IAPA appeals of contested cases, the agency's findings need only be supported by substantial evidence. On the contrary, § 279.18 makes it our duty on review to determine if the findings of the Board are supported by a preponderance of the competent evidence. This is De novo talk. However, as we pointed out in Buda v. Fulton, 261 Iowa 981, 984, 157 N.W.2d 336, 338 (1968), this alone does not make a review De novo. A De novo review as applied to administrative hearings usually involves the right to introduce additional testimony and to try the case as though it had not been tried originally before the first body to hear it. Here, however, the statute precludes that by mandating the district court shall review the case on the record made before the Board.
Section 279.18 establishes seven grounds upon which the district court and this court may grant relief. We set out the applicable part of the statute:
In proceedings for judicial review of the adjudicator's decision, the court shall not hear any further evidence but shall hear the case upon the certified record. . . . The court shall reverse, modify, or grant any other appropriate relief from the board decision or the adjudicator's decision equitable or legal and including declaratory relief if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the action is:
1. In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; or 2. In excess of the statutory authority of the board or the adjudicator; or
3. In violation of a board rule or policy or contract; or
4. Made upon unlawful procedure; or
5. Affected by other error of law; or
6. Unsupported by a preponderance of the competent evidence in the record made before the board and the adjudicator when that record is reviewed as a whole; or
7. Unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
We have already discussed the only one relied on here that the result is unsupported by a preponderance of the competent evidence. We confine ourselves to this single complaint, noting, however, that these are the criteria for our review.
We now hold an appeal to this court under § 279.18 is at law for the correction of errors under the seven standards there set out.
The parties differ sharply on the burden of proof. We are unable to see any serious problem.
The superintendent, of course, had the burden to establish the case against Youel in the first instance. Thereafter Youel, like any other appellant, must demonstrate error. This does not change the burden of proof. It merely places on the one saying the burden was not met the task of pointing out Why it wasn't.
We should discuss one other matter before getting to the record. It concerns the term "just cause" as used in § 279.15, which provides the notification by the superintendent that he intends to recommend termination of the teacher's contract "shall contain a short and plain statement of the reasons, which shall be for just cause," why the recommendation is given to the board.
The later hearing before the Board is "limited to the specific reasons stated in the superintendent's notice" of recommended termination. § 279.16. The question of the meaning of "just cause" thus becomes of paramount importance.
The statute does not define the term. The predecessor statute (§ 279.24, The Code, 1975) uses "good cause" instead of "just cause." In Hartman v. Merged Area VI Community College, 270 N.W.2d 822, 826-27 (Iowa 1978), we discussed good cause as a basis for termination under the 1973 Code. We took special pains Not to equate good cause under the 1973 Code with just cause under the 1977 Code, reserving that question for another day.
Unlike "good cause" limited by Hartman v. Merged Area VI Community College, 270 N.W.2d 822, 826-27 (Iowa 1978) and Johnston v. Marion Independent School District, 275 N.W.2d 215, 216 (Iowa 1979), two reasons attributable to the teacher's conduct, "just cause" under section 279.15 encompasses other grounds as well. We pointed this out in Briggs v. Board of Directors of the Hinton Community School District et al., 282 N.W.2d 740,...
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