Board of Ed. of Community Unit School Dist. No. 2 v. Redding

• Decision Date: 20 May 1965
• Docket Number: No. 39032,39032
• Citation: 207 N.E.2d 427,32 Ill.2d 567
• Parties: , 51 Lab.Cas. P 51,321 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2, Appellant, v. Doris REDDING et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 427

207 N.E.2d 427

32 Ill.2d 567, 51 Lab.Cas. P 51,321

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2, Appellant, v. Doris REDDING et al., Appellees.

No. 39032.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 20, 1965.

Wagner, Connor, Ferguson, Bertrand & Baker, East St. Louis, for appellant.

William K. Cavanagh, Springfield, for appellees.

DAILY, Justice.

This action in chancery was brought in the circuit court of Bond County by plaintiff, the Board of Education of Community Unit School District No. 2 of said county, to enjoin defendants from conducting a strike against the board and from picketing its schools in support of such strike. The named defendants were a national union, its local counterpart, officials of the local, and thirteen members of the union who had been custodial employees of the board. After a hearing, the trial court denied injunctive relief and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff has appealed directly to this court since questions arising under the State and Federal constitutions are involved. More specifically, it is the contention of plaintiff that the strike and picketing interfere with the constitutional duty of our General Assembly to 'provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools,' (const. of 1870, art. VIII, sec. 1, S.H.A.,) whereas defendants assert the picketing complained of is a valid exercise of free speech under the State and Federal constitutions.

Although the legal issues presented are narrow and well defined, we believe a consideration of those issues requires a statement in some detail of the facts surrounding the controversy. The plaintiff, duly and lawfully organized under the laws of Illinois, operates seven attendance centers, consisting of three grade schools, a junior high school and a senior high school in Greenville, and grade schools in Pocahontas and Sorento. It has approximately 2500 students enrolled at the seven centers, and employs 153 teachers and other personnel. Prior to September 2, 1964, its custodial force consisted of 13 employees, all of whom are defendants in this suit. The latter employees had joined or became affiliated with a local and national 'Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers' union and, on August 3, 1964, union officers presented to the plaintiff-board a proposed collective bargaining agreement on behalf of the thirteen employees. Plaintiff refused to sign the agreement for various reasons, the validity or propriety of which form no part of the issues in this proceeding.

On September 2, 1964, a regularly scheduled school day, the thirteen custodial employees did not report for work, but, with the help and financial support of the union, set up picket lines at each of the seven attendance centers. These lines have been maintained at all times pertinent to the case, and it appears that the picketing has been peaceful. In addition, there is no showing in the record that any of the defendants coerced or advised any persons not to cross the picket lines. The pickets carried and paraded with signs, the exact wording of which does not appear in the record; however, as recalled by witnesses, the placards stated in substance that members of 'Teamsters Local No. 525' were 'on strike' against 'Bond County Unit District No. 2.'

During the next eight days, except for nonschool days, normal school operations were disrupted as follows: (1) attendance figures were abnormally low, a circumstance which could indirectly affect State aid plaintiff would get on the basis of daily attendance averages; (2) milk and bread deliveries, as well as the deliveries of surplus foods, were not made to the school cafeterias when deliverymen would not cross the picket lines; (3) schools were not cleaned and no personnel were available for such cleaning; (4) the employees of a roofing contractor refused to cross the picket line to complete repairs on a leak in a school roof; (5) the transportation of pupils to schools was affected; and (6) the board closed the schools completely from September 8 through 10.

The complaint for injunctive relief was filed September 8 and, on such date, it appears that local union officials dispatched a telegram to plaintiff stating that the striking employees would 'maintain essential sanitary services' upon request, but no such request was made. On September 10, a hearing was had on a motion by plaintiff for a preliminary injunction but such relief was not granted. Instead, the court issued a statement 'for full circulation and publicity,' the gist of which was that it was the desire of both sides to the litigation that the schools reopen on September 11 and remain open until the case was heard; that both parties and the court encouraged the full attendance of students and teachers; that the plaintiff would order school buses to operate and that defendants had agreed not to interfere with their operation; that defendants could, in the meantime, continue peaceful picketing; and that the court recommended 'efforts at friendly solution.' Hearing on the complaint was set for September 24.

Between September 11 and 24 the picketing continued and the schools operated, but with the following deviations from normal: (1) cleaning was done by volunteers and temporary replacements but the cleanliness of the buildings was below standard; (2) no personnel were available to fire furnaces or operate hot water systems; (3) physical education classes had to be curtailed in the junior high school due to lack of hot water; (4) it became necessary to buy a new type water heater for one of the cafeterias in order for dishes to be washed; and (5) principals and other supervisory personnel were forced to perform many duties aside from their regular educational duties. As we interpret the record, union officials advised deliverymen they could cross the picket line if they chose and the delivery of milk and bread was resumed. Some drivers delivering other supplies, however, chose to honor the picket lines, and school personnel used their own cars to go to warehouses for essential supplies. The employees of the roofing contractor continued their refusal to cross the line and, during and after rains, the leak in the roof became worse and plaster fell from the ceiling. Vandalism occurred in one of the schools over a weekend, but there is no showing that it occurred at a time when the regular custodial personnel would have been present.

The trial court refused to enjoin either the strike or the picketing, and its order dismissing the complaint found that plaintiff had failed to show irreparable injury, that the picketing was peaceful and a valid exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech, and that there was no danger of interference with the operations of the schools. And while there is some effort to divert us to a determination of whether public school employes may lawfully organize into unions at all, (see: People ex rel. Fursman v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. 318, 116 N.E. 158, L.R.A.1917E, 1069,) that issue was not raised or passed upon below. Rather, the scope of our review is limited to a consideration of whether such employees may strike against their school board employer, and whether they may picket to support their strike.

Although this is a case of first impression in a reviewing court of this jurisdiction, it is, so far as we can ascertain, the universal view that there is no inherent right in municipal employees to strike against their governmental employer, whether Federal, State, or a political subdivision thereof, and that a strike of municipal employees for any purpose is illegal. (E. g. City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 131 A.2d 59; City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624; Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Education, 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482, 31 A.L.R.2d 1133; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, etc. v. Grand River Dam Authority, Okl., 292 P.2d 1018; City of Alcoa v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 203 Tenn. 12, 308 S.W.2d 476; Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 52 Wash.2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099; Donevero v. Jersey City Incinerator Authority, 75 N.J. Super. 217, 182 A.2d 596; South Atlantic & Gulf District of International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Independent et al. v. Harris County-Houston Ship, etc., Tex.Civ.App., 358 S.W.2d 658; Petrucci v. Hogan, 5 Misc.2d 480, 27 N.Y.S.2d 718; City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council, 94 Cal.App.2d 36, 210 P.2d 305; City of Detroit v. Division 26 of the Amalgamated Ass'n, etc., 332 Mich. 237, 51 N.W.2d 228; 31 A.L.R.2d 1141; U. of Ill. Law Forum, Fall 1961, p. 377, Strayhorn, 'Municipal Employees and...