Board of Ed. of City of Bridgeport v. Bridgeport Ed. Ass'n

• Decision Date: 19 July 1977
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2567 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF BRIDGEPORT v. BRIDGEPORT EDUCATION ASSOCIATION.

Page 323

377 A.2d 323

173 Conn. 287, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2567

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF BRIDGEPORT v. BRIDGEPORT EDUCATION ASSOCIATION.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 8, 1977.

Decided July 19, 1977.

E. Stanton Kennedy, Bridgeport, for appellant (defendant).

Edgar P. DeVylder, Jr., Stamford, with whom were Warner K. Depuy, Stamford, and, on the brief, Warren W. Eginton, Stamford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before HOUSE, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and SPEZIALE, JJ.

BOGDANSKI, Associate Justice.

John Sparano, a guidance counselor in the Bridgeport school system, applied to the Bridgeport Board of Education for sabbatical leave for the academic year 1975-1976. A collective bargaining agreement, then in effect between the Board of Education and the Bridgeport Education Association, made provision for such leave. On February 28, 1975, Sparano was informed that "(w)hile your proposal has some merit, it was not felt sufficient enough to be granted a sabbatical leave in these most pressing times." Sparano filed a grievance over that denial, claiming that the board of education had improperly taken the financial condition of the city into consideration in denying his application. From the denial of that grievance, the parties took the matter to arbitration.

The parties agreed on the following submission: "(1) Did the Board of Education violate the collective bargaining agreement by denying the request of John Sparano for sabbatical leave? (1) If so, what shall the remedy be?" After a hearing, the arbitrator issued the following award: "(1) The Board of Education violated the collective bargaining agreement by denying the request of John Sparano for sabbatical leave. (2) The Board of Education shall offer John Sparano sabbatical leave for the academic year 1976-77 for the purpose of pursuing substantially the course of study proposed in his request."

Pursuant to § 52-418 of the General Statutes the board moved to vacate the award claiming that the arbitrator exceeded his powers in making the award. The court rendered judgment in favor of the board and the association took this appeal, assigning error in the court's action in vacating the award.

At the outset, the board claims that the failure of the association to request a finding precludes a review of the court's decision. "No finding is necessary where the claim of error is based upon the face of the record. This would be so when all the claims of error arise upon the basis of pleadings or papers forming the record of the case in the trial court." Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc. § 126. In the context of the claims raised in this case, where no evidence was heard by the court, the existing record provides an adequate basis for review. Meyers v. Lakeridge Development Co., 173 Conn. 133, 376 A.2d 1105; Winchester Repeating Arms Co. v. Radcliffe, 134 Conn. 164, 169, 56 A.2d 1.

Courts favor arbitration as a means of settling differences and arbitration awards are generally upheld except where an award clearly falls within the proscriptions of § 52-418 ¹ of the General Statutes. International Union v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 151 Conn. 650, 653, 201 A.2d 656; United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers v. Union Mfg. Co., 145 Conn. 285, 288, 141 A.2d 479.

Arbitration is a creature of contract and the parties themselves, by the agreement of submission, define the powers of the arbitrators. Connecticut Union of Telephone Workers, Inc. v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 148 Conn. 192, 197, 169 A.2d 646; Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Amalgamated Local 405, 140 Conn. 32, 36, 97 A.2d 898. As the parties set the limits on the arbitrators' powers, they are bound by the limits they have fixed. Connecticut Union of Telephone Workers, Inc. v. Southern New England Telephone Co., supra. Thus, in deciding whether arbitrators have "exceeded their powers," as that phrase is used in § 52-418(d), courts need only examine the submission and the award to determine whether the award conforms to the submission. United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers v. Union Mfg. Co., 145 Conn. 285, 289, 141 A.2d 479; New Britain Machine Co. v. Lodge 1021, 143 Conn. 399, 404, 122 A.2d 786.

In this case, an examination of the submission reveals that the parties, in effect, directed the arbitrator to determine whether the board committed error in its interpretation and application of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and in the exercise of its judgment in denying the application for sabbatical leave and, if he found error, to determine what the remedy shall be. The arbitrator found that the board erred in denying the request and remedied that error by his award. On the face of the record, the award conforms to the submission.

The board, nonetheless, contends that the arbitrator was unfaithful to his obligation in that (1) the arbitrator modified a term of the agreement in bypassing the provision calling for the superintendent's recommendation, ² and (2) the arbitrator's award had the effect of usurping the function of the board in its exercise of judgment and discretion in determining whether a sabbatical leave should be granted. ³

"An arbitrator's fidelity to his duty is to be tested by comparing the award with the submission in order to determine its conformity thereto. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation v. Southern New England Contracting Co., 164 Conn. 472, 477, 325 A.2d 274. This court frequently has stated that the award rather than the finding and conclusions of fact controls, and that, ordinarily, the memorandum of the arbitrator is irrelevant. International Union v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 151 Conn. 650, 654, 201 A.2d 656; Von Langendorff v. Riordan, 147 Conn. 524, 527, 163 A.2d 100; American Brass Co. v. Torrington Brass Workers' Union, 141 Conn. 514, 522, 107 A.2d 255. The memorandum, however, may be examined in considering this question of the infidelity of the arbitrator to his obligation. As we stated in International Union v. Fafnir Bearing Co., supra : 'There is no legal doctrine, however, which dictates the exclusion of an arbitrator's opinion or which forbids its examination in the determination . . . whether an arbitrator in his award has demonstrated infidelity to his obligation.' " Costello Construction Corporation v. Teamsters Local 559, 167 Conn. 315, 319, 355 A.2d...