Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist

Citation453 N.Y.S.2d 643,57 N.Y.2d 27
Parties, 439 N.E.2d 359, 6 Ed. Law Rep. 147 BOARD OF EDUCATION, LEVITTOWN UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Respondents- Appellants, and Board of Education, City School District, Rochester et al., Intervenors- Respondents-Appellants, v. Ewald B. NYQUIST, as Commissioner of Education, et al., Appellants-Respondents.
Decision Date23 June 1982
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. (Amy Juviler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Shirley Adelson Siegel, Sol. Gen., Clement H. Berne and Evelyn Tenenbaum, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for appellants-respondents
OPINION OF THE COURT

JONES, Judge.

The present amalgam of statutory prescriptions for State aid to local school districts for the maintenance and support of public elementary and secondary education does not violate the equal protection clause of either the Federal or the State Constitution nor is it unconstitutional under the education article of our State Constitution.

This declaratory judgment action challenging the State's provisions for financing our public schools is prosecuted by two groups, representing different constituencies and mounting attacks based on different predicates. The original plaintiffs by which the action was instituted in 1974 are the boards of education of 27 school districts located at various sites in the State and 12 students of public schools located in some of those districts. The intervenors, whose participation in the action was agreed to by the original parties, are the boards of education, officials, resident taxpayers, and students of the Cities of New York, Buffalo, Rochester and Syracuse, together with a federation of parent and parent-teacher associations in the City of New York. Defendants are the Commissioner of Education, the University of the State of New York, the State Comptroller and the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance of the State of New York. 1

It is the contention of the original plaintiffs (who are "property-poor" school districts) that the system for financing public schools presently in effect in this State (as principally set forth in Education Law, § 2022 and § 3602 ) by which funds raised by locally imposed taxes are augmented by allocations of State moneys in accordance with a variety of formulas and grants, violates the equal protection clauses of both the State and the Federal Constitutions and the education article of our State Constitution because that system results in grossly disparate financial support (and thus grossly disparate educational opportunities) in the school districts of the State. The intervenors, representing interests in school districts located in four of the largest cities in the State, also assert violations of the same State and Federal constitutional provisions as the result of circumstances said to be peculiar to cities which they contend place them in a position comparable to that of property-poor districts. Included in these circumstances, they assert, are special financial burdens borne by cities in four categories: (1) demands on municipal budgets (from which local funds for education are secured) for noneducation needs peculiar to cities ("municipal overburden"), (2) diminished purchasing power of the municipal education dollar, (3) significantly greater student absenteeism (with a resulting adverse effect both because of added operational costs and because State aid is largely allocated on the basis of average daily attendance), and (4) larger concentrations in cities of pupils with special educational needs, all four of which may be comprehended within the term "metropolitan overburden". These factors are said to result in greatly disparate educational opportunities available to children in the cities' public schools when compared to the offerings of some of the school districts not located within cities.

Succinctly stated, it is the gravamen of the complaint of the original plaintiffs (and the findings of the courts below provide factual support for their argument) that property-rich districts have an ability to raise greater local tax revenue enabling them to provide enriched educational programs beyond the fiscal ability of the property-poor districts. The intervenors argue that although they are not disadvantaged in their ability to raise gross revenue from local sources, in consequence of the economic factors of metropolitan overburden the net effective economic ability of the city districts falls well below that of noncity districts (and the factual determinations made below support their argument). Both then assert that State aid as presently granted serves to perpetuate, and even to exacerbate, these disparities. Both courts through which this litigation has progressed have granted declarations favorable to the original plaintiffs and to the intervenors, although not on all the claims asserted. Each court made careful and detailed factual determinations with respect to the financing of the State's educational system, the operation of the various State aid statutory provisions, and their practical impact on various school districts, individually and comparatively. In the case of the Appellate Division there was consideration not only of the public school finance system as it existed at the time the action was commenced in 1974 but also of the effect of alterations accomplished by legislation up to and through chapters 53 and 148 of the Laws of 1981. In reaching our disposition we proceed on these factual determinations made by both courts below as to the details of the various school district programs and operations and their comparison with one another, as well as the impact on them of the present State aid programs.

After an extended nonjury trial which produced 23,000 pages of transcript and 400 exhibits, the Justice presiding issued a judgment declaring that the State's public school finance system violates both the equal protection clause (art. I, § 11) and the education article (art. XI, § 1) of the State Constitution and, as to the cities whose interests are represented by the intervenors, the equal protection clause (14th Amdt., § 1) of the Federal Constitution as well, 94 Misc.2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606. The Appellate Division, by a divided court, modified the judgment of the trial court; while concurring in the determination that the provisions of the State Constitution had been violated, the appellate court rejected the conclusion that the intervenors had also established a violation of the Federal Constitution. Justice Hopkins, concurring in part and dissenting in part, rejected all claims of denial of equal protection, but concluded that the present "maze of convoluted intricacies and provisos" of State aid fails to constitute a "basic State-wide fiscal system for education" as required in his view by the education article of the State Constitution (83 A.D.2d 217, 267-268, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843). We now modify the order of the Appellate Division and direct that judgment be entered declaring that the present admixture of statutory provisions for State aid to local school districts, considered in connection with the existing system for local financing, is constitutional under the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution and under both the equal protection clause and the education article of the State Constitution.

At the outset it is appropriate to comment briefly on the context in which the legal issues before us arise. Although New York State has long been acknowledged to be a leader in its provision of public elementary and secondary educational facilities and services, and notwithstanding that its per pupil expenditures for such purposes each year are very nearly the highest in the Nation, 2 it must be recognized that there are nonetheless significant inequalities in the availability of financial support for local school districts, ranging from minor discrepancies to major differences, resulting in significant unevenness in the educational opportunities offered. 3 These disparities may properly be ascribed in some respects to the wide variances between the property assessment bases on which local district taxes are imposed. Similarly, it may be accepted that the four major cities represented by the intervenors, by reason of the factors encompassed in metropolitan overburden, are forced to provide instructional services and facilities of a lesser quantity, variety, and quality than those provided in some other school districts. No claim is advanced in this case, however, by either the original plaintiffs or the intervenors that the educational facilities or services provided in the school districts that they represent fall below the State-wide minimum standard of educational quality and quantity fixed by the Board of Regents; their attack is directed at the existing disparities...

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