Board of Educ. of Warren Tp. High School Dist. No. 121 v. Warren Tp. High School Federation of Teachers, Local 504, IFT/AFT, AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO
| Decision Date | 20 November 1987 |
| Docket Number | AFL-CIO,2-87-0661,Nos. 2-87-0625,s. 2-87-0625 |
| Citation | 515 N.E.2d 1331,162 Ill.App.3d 676,114 Ill.Dec. 60 |
| Parties | , 114 Ill.Dec. 60, 43 Ed. Law Rep. 305 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF WARREN TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 121, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WARREN TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 504, IFT/AFT,et al., Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Grace Allen Newton, argued, Asst. Atty. Gen., Law Div., Roma Jones-Stewart, Shawn W. Denny, Sol. Gens., Randi C. Hammer, General Counsel, Illinois Educational Labor Relations Bd., Chicago, for Illinois Educational Labor Relations.
Haggerty & Koenig, Mildred F. Haggerty, argued, Haggerty & Koenig, Chicago, for Warren Tp. High School.
Dennis A. Brebner, Robinson, Brebner & Moga, Lake Bluff, for Board of Educ. of Warren T.
Gregory J. Malovance, Winston & Strawn, Chicago, for Illinois Educ. Ass'n.
Defendants, Warren Township High School Federation of Teachers (Union) and the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (IELRB), bring these interlocutory appeals pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (107 Ill.2d R. 307(a)(1)), consolidated in this court, from the order of the circuit court of Lake County granting plaintiff, Board of Education of Warren Township High School District 121 (School Board), a preliminary injunction enjoining the Union from proceeding to arbitration and the IELRB from conducting a hearing on the Union's unfair labor practice claim.
The facts are not in dispute. The School Board is organized to operate the schools in Warren Township High School District 121 in Lake County, Illinois, pursuant to the Illinois School Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 122, par. 10-1 et seq.). The Union is the duly recognized bargaining unit for teachers in District 121. The IELRB is organized pursuant to the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (Act). Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 48, par. 1705.
The Union represented Ms. Judith Frank, a former, nontenured teacher employed by District 121, under a collective bargaining agreement. Ms. Frank was employed for the years 1984-85 and 1985-86, in a probationary status. In April 1986, the superintendent of schools notified Ms. Frank that she would not be rehired for the 1986-87 school year and that her termination would become effective in June 1986.
The Union then filed a grievance on Ms. Frank's behalf claiming a violation of article V, sections A6 through A9 of the collective bargaining agreement in effect for the years 1985-88. Article V, sections A6 through A9 establish certain procedures for the evaluation of probationary teachers.
After denial of the grievance, the Union filed a demand for binding arbitration with the American Arbitration Association in June 1986, pursuant to article IX of the collective bargaining agreement, and requested that Ms. Frank be reinstated to her former position. On February 2, 1987, the School Board notified the Union that it would not submit to binding arbitration because the subject matter of the grievance concerned a discretionary, nondelegable power of the School Board and was, therefore, inarbitrable. The Union, on February 13, 1987, filed an unfair labor practice charge with the IELRB based on the School Board's refusal to submit to arbitration and pursuant to sections 14(a)(1) and (a)(5) of the Educational Labor Relations Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 48, pars. 1714(a)(1), (a)(5)). After investigating the claim, the IELRB issued a complaint and set the matter for hearing on June 4, 1987.
On February 25, 1987, the School Board filed its original complaint in the circuit court of Lake County, seeking a declaratory judgment as to the arbitrability of the grievance and a preliminary injunction to prevent the Union from arbitrating the grievance. It later filed an amended complaint seeking to enjoin the IELRB from conducting its hearing. On June 3, 1987, the circuit court issued the preliminary injunction. The order enjoined the Union and Ms. Frank from proceeding with arbitration before the American Arbitration Association scheduled for June 11, 1987, and also enjoined the IELRB from proceeding with its unfair labor practice hearing until the circuit court could decide the merits of the School Board's claim.
The Union appeals the preliminary injunction preventing it from proceeding with arbitration and preventing the IELRB from conducting the unfair labor practice hearing. The IELRB appeals the preliminary injunction to the extent that it prevents it from conducting the hearing.
The Union contends that the circuit court improperly enjoined the arbitration because under the Act the IELRB has jurisdiction to decide labor disputes between educational employers and employees. Specifically, the Union argues that the legislature, in passing the Act, intended the IELRB to be the exclusive forum for the resolution of educational labor disputes. The Union further asserts that because the IELRB has jurisdiction to decide labor disputes pursuant to section 14 of the Act, and as there is a pending unfair labor practice charge before the IELRB, the IELRB, therefore, has primary jurisdiction which the circuit court cannot enjoin. The School Board responds that the Act does not divest the circuit court of its jurisdiction to initially determine the arbitrability of a grievance and, therefore, the circuit court properly enjoined the arbitration as well as the IELRB hearing.
In analyzing this first issue, we initially note the applicability of this court's prior decision in Board of Education v. Rockford Education Association (1986), 150 Ill.App.3d 198, 103 Ill.Dec. 317, 501 N.E.2d 338. The Union attempts to distinguish the Rockford decision on the ground that, in that case, the appellate court held that there was no unfair labor practice charge based on a union's attempt to submit an allegedly inarbitrable grievance to arbitration and, therefore, the IELRB was without jurisdiction. The Union argues that the present case is different because, here, there is an unfair labor practice charge pending based on the School Board's refusal to arbitrate and, therefore, the IELRB does have jurisdiction. We do not find that distinction to be crucial to the disposition of this case.
The ultimate issue to be decided here, as it was in Rockford, is whether the Act divests the circuit court of its traditional jurisdiction to decide whether a particular grievance is arbitrable. If the circuit court retains its jurisdiction under the Act, it is the appropriate forum to decide questions of arbitrability.
We begin by noting that, traditionally, circuit courts have made the initial determination of whether a particular matter falls within an arbitration agreement and is, therefore, arbitrable as a matter of law. (CAC Graphics, Inc. v. Taylor Corp. (1987), 154 Ill.App.3d 283, 286, 107 Ill.Dec. 507, 507 N.E.2d 171; Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Futures, Inc. v. Barr (1987), 151 Ill.App.3d 597, 600-01, 104 Ill.Dec. 924, 503 N.E.2d 786, appeal allowed (1987), 114 Ill.2d 544, 108 Ill.Dec. 416, 508 N.E.2d 727.) Parties are only bound to arbitrate those issues which they have expressly agreed to arbitrate, and a general provision for arbitration of all disputes arising out of a contract does not require arbitration of all disputes which might arise between the parties. (CAC Graphics Inc. v. Taylor Corp. (1987), 154 Ill.App.3d at 286, 107 Ill.Dec. 507, 507 N.E.2d 171.) As the circuit court traditionally decides the threshold issue of a particular grievance's arbitrability, the crucial question here is whether the Act divests the circuit court of its jurisdiction.
We begin by looking to the language of the Act. Nowhere does the Act specifically address the circuit court's jurisdiction to decide issues of arbitrability. Moreover, none of the unfair labor practices set forth in section 14 of the Act include a union's attempt to arbitrate an allegedly inarbitrable matter, nor do they include a school board's refusal to submit to arbitration an allegedly inarbitrable matter. Although the Union argues that the School Board's refusal to submit to arbitration is an unfair labor practice, we do not interpret the provisions of section 14(a) as including a school board's refusal to arbitrate an allegedly inarbitrable grievance. Therefore, whether the dispute over arbitrability arises in the situation where a union attempts to arbitrate an allegedly inarbitrable question or in the situation of a school board's refusal to submit to arbitration an allegedly inarbitrable matter is irrelevant since the Act makes neither circumstance an unfair labor practice. Moreover, even if section 14(a) does make it an unfair labor practice to refuse to submit to arbitration, it is arguable whether a school board's challenge to the arbitrability of a grievance could be considered a refusal to arbitrate.
Additionally, we recognize the similarity between this Act and the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1973)) to the extent that they both designate certain unfair labor practices. (See Board of Education v. Rockford Education Association (1986), 150 Ill.App.3d 198, 202, 103 Ill.Dec. 317, 501 N.E.2d 338; see also Malin, Implementing the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act, 61 Chi. [-]Kent L.Rev. 101 (1985).) We note that case law, decided under the NLRA, has determined that it is the court which should decide the arbitrability of a particular grievance. (See United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co. (1960), 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403; United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. (1960), 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409.) Essential to this determination is the recognition that an arbitrator's authority arises under a collective bargaining agreement and is necessarily limited by the terms of that agreement. (See United Steelworkers of America v....
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