Board of Educ. of Town of Stafford v. State Bd. of Educ., 15656

• Decision Date: 03 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 15656,15656
• Citation: 243 Conn. 772,709 A.2d 510
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 125 Ed. Law Rep. 1248 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF STAFFORD v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al.

Page 510

709 A.2d 510

243 Conn. 772, 125 Ed. Law Rep. 1248

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF STAFFORD v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al.

No. 15656.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 31, 1997.

Decided March 3, 1998.

Michael P. McKeon, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Edward Muska, Stafford, for appellees (defendant Anthony Armelin et al.).

Joan G. Libby, Wethersfield, filed a brief for the Connecticut Association of Boards of Education as Amicus Curiae.

Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, PALMER and McDONALD, JJ.

McDONALD, Associate Justice.

The principal issue in this administrative appeal is whether the defendant, the state board of education (state board), ¹ properly decided that the plaintiff, the board of education of the town of Stafford (Stafford board), improperly had denied transportation to students of the St. Edward School, a private, nonprofit, parochial school, for four days when the Stafford public schools were closed. The Stafford board appealed from the state board's decision to the Superior Court, which affirmed the decision of the state board that, pursuant to General Statutes § 10-281, ² the Stafford board must provide transportation for St. Edward School students on days St. Edward School is in session. The Stafford board appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The facts are not in dispute. Saint Edward School has followed the same school calendar as the Stafford public schools since at least 1984. The Stafford board provides school bus transportation for children attending both public and private schools. Saint Edward School students ride on the same buses as the public school students and are subject to the same distance regulations as set forth by the Stafford board.

The Stafford board normally announces its public school calendar before St. Edward School, and St. Edward School generally follows the public school calendar. After releasing the 1992-93 school year calendar, the Stafford board amended it to delay the opening day of school from August 31, 1992, to September 8, 1992, due to building construction problems at several Stafford schools. Saint Edward School was scheduled to open, however, on August 31, 1992, and objected to the denial of bus transportation for its students. A temporary injunction requiring the Stafford board to provide transportation services for September 1 through September 8, 1992, was obtained in Superior Court by the parents. The Stafford board did not provide transportation for St. Edward School students on August 31, 1992, but did so for the remaining days.

In the 1993-94 school year, both the Stafford public schools and the St. Edward School planned a spring vacation for April 18 through April 22, 1994. In order to make up school days cancelled due to snow, however, St. Edward School later rescheduled classes for April 18 through April 20. The Stafford public schools remained closed for the entire spring vacation and the Stafford board denied transportation to St. Edward School students during that three day period.

Thereafter, on September 30, 1994, the parents requested a hearing, alleging a failure to provide school accommodations as required by General Statutes § 10-186 ³ and transportation services as required by § 10-281. At the October 25, 1994 hearing, the Stafford board dismissed the complaints as moot because the dates under dispute already had passed. The parents appealed to the state board, ⁴ which held a hearing before an impartial hearing board. The hearing officer found that the Stafford board is required to provide transportation services to St. Edward School students on all days when the private school is in session, regardless of whether the Stafford public schools are closed. The state board issued a decision in accordance with the hearing officer's findings.

The Stafford board makes several arguments on appeal. It claims that, in affirming the state board's decision, the trial court ruled improperly because: (1) the underlying request for transportation was moot; (2) the state board exceeded its authority in considering the merits of the case rather than limiting its review to the mootness question; (3) the state board's decision constituted a declaratory ruling, which it lacked the authority to issue absent compliance with the applicable statutory procedures; and (4) the plain language of § 10-281 does not support the state board's interpretation. The Stafford board also argues that the state board's interpretation of § 10-281 constitutes a violation of both the first amendment to the United States constitution and article seventh of the Connecticut constitution. We disagree with these claims and, consequently, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I

We first address the Stafford board's argument that the trial court improperly determined that the dispute over the denial of transportation was not moot or, alternatively, that even if it was moot, it nonetheless was entitled to review under the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine. We conclude that this case involved an active controversy and, therefore, was not moot.

A

We first consider whether this case was moot at the time of the October 25, 1994 hearing before the Stafford board. Our mootness law is well settled. "Justiciability requires ... that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute: Courts exist for determination of actual and existing controversies.... [W]here the question presented is purely academic, we must refuse to entertain the appeal." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hallas v. Windsor, 212 Conn. 338, 347, 562 A.2d 499 (1989). "A case becomes moot when due to intervening circumstances a controversy between the parties no longer exists." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 347-48, 562 A.2d 499.

We conclude that an actual controversy existed in this case. For two consecutive school years, the Stafford board denied transportation to St. Edward School students on days when Stafford public schools were closed. Members of the Stafford board indicated a disposition to continue denying transportation to St. Edward School students when the public schools were not in session. The counsel for the Stafford public school administration argued at all levels that the Stafford board was not obligated to provide transportation to St. Edward School students on those days when Stafford public schools are closed. The parents repeatedly have contended that the Stafford board does have an obligation to provide transportation, regardless of whether Stafford public schools are open. The state board thus addressed an active controversy between the parties. We conclude that the trial court properly affirmed the state board's decision that the case was not moot.

We conclude that this case also meets the requirements of the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine. "[F]or an otherwise moot question to qualify for review under the 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' exception, it must meet three requirements. First, the challenged action, or the effect of the challenged action, by its very nature must be of a limited duration so that there is a strong likelihood that the substantial majority of cases raising a question about its validity will become moot before appellate litigation can be concluded. Second, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the question presented in the pending case will arise again in the future, and that it will affect either the same complaining party or a reasonably identifiable group for whom that party can be said to act as surrogate. Third, the question must have some public importance." Loisel v. Rowe, 233 Conn. 370, 382, 660 A.2d 323 (1995).

Here, although the parents successfully obtained a temporary injunction requiring the Stafford board to provide transportation for all days except August 31, 1992, there was no time to do so for that date. Saint Edward School's request for transportation services for April 18, 19 and 20, 1994, was not denied by the Stafford board until March 16, 1994. One month was too short a time for the issues raised by the denial to have been fully litigated in the courts. Because the Stafford board contends that it is not obligated to provide such transportation in the future, this controversy is likely to arise again. Because one of the parents, Anthony Armelin, has children who still attend St. Edward School, he may be affected by the denial of transportation in the future, and the parents are reasonable surrogates for other parents who might be so affected in the future. Finally, children are required by law to attend school and whether they have transportation is a matter of public importance. See Snyder v. Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770, appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 299, 81 S.Ct. 692, 5 L.Ed.2d 688 (1961). For these reasons, we conclude that this case meets the requirements of the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine.

B

We next turn to the question of whether, because the Stafford board found that the case was moot, the state board was limited to reviewing only the mootness decision, and thus was precluded from addressing the merits. We conclude that the state board properly ruled on the merits of the case.

The Stafford board argues that the state board, as an administrative agency conducting an appellate review, was limited to reviewing only the matters in the record and the questions specifically ruled upon by the Stafford board, the initial administrative fact finder. The Stafford board argues that because it found that the case was moot and therefore had failed to rule on the merits, the state board...