Board of Educ. of Glynn County v. Mayor of Brunswick

• Decision Date: 15 April 1884
• Citation: Board of Educ. of Glynn County v. Mayor of Brunswick, 72 Ga. 353 (Ga. 1884)
• Parties: THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF GLYNN COUNTY v. THE MAYOR, ETC., OF BRUNSWICK et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

72 Ga. 353

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF GLYNN COUNTY v. THE MAYOR, ETC., OF BRUNSWICK et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

April 15, 1884

February Term, 1884.

1. Comity to a co-ordinate department of the government requires of courts that cases shall not be disposed of on constitutional grounds, when it is possible to avoid such questions, without a sacrifice of the rights of parties.

( a. ) This court has no jurisdiction to review judgments of lower courts, unless the judgment complained of together with the error alleged therein, shall be plainly specified.

2. Under the act of 1873, the powers of the board of education are not more restricted in the distribution of the fund derived from what was formerly the endowment of the Glynn County Academy than of other funds entrusted to their care and management. The fund received from such sources goes into, and forms a part of, the general educational fund of the county, and is not required to be kept separate and distinct, or to be apportioned by a different rule.

( a. ) The legislature changed its system of public education in Glynn county, and in consequence thereof, has made a different appropriation of the fund from that which formerly prevailed, and has called into existence a new agency, which it has invested with such powers as were deemed appropriate to carry into effect the object it had in view.

( b. ) That the academy is a school of higher grade than other public schools of the county makes no difference. The board of education is invested with power to establish schools of higher grade.

( c. ) The mayor and council of Brunswick and certain citizens of the town have no right to interfere, either as a corporation or as citizens of the county, with the management of the board of education. It is responsible to the public authorities for its management of the trust confided to its care.

Comity. Constitutional Law. Practice in Supreme Court. Education. Glynn County. Before Judge MERSHON. Glynn Superior Court. May Term, 1883.

Reported in the decision.

GOODYEAR & KAY, for plaintiffs in error.

HARRIS & SMITH; BOLLING WHITFIELD for defendants.

HALL Justice.

The Board of Education of Glynn county was perpetually enjoined by the decree rendered on a bill exhibited and prosecuted at the suit of the mayor and council of the city of Brunswick and certain citizens, residents of said municipality, from distributing among the various schools of the county any portion of the income arising from what was once the exclusive endowment of the Glynn County Academy, located in that city. Looking alone to the statements contained in the record, we should be at a loss to find reasons to sustain this decree, as we are satisfied, from a careful scrutiny of the several acts of the legislature creating this board and defining its powers and duties, that its action in this respect was warranted by the provisions of such laws. The endowment of this academy, even from colonial days, seems to have been exclusively from the public treasury. Much of the fund had been lost or squandered, and the school had ceased to be maintained, when the act creating the board of education for the county was passed, and an effort was made to augment what remained of the endowment by supplementing it with the county's quota from the fund provided by the state for the support of common schools.

1. It was insisted in argument by the complainants in the bill that the endowment of the academy by the state was a contract between the public authorities and the citizens of Brunswick who were attracted to that city, and became residents thereof by reason of the educational advantages thus offered; that such citizens acquired vested rights in this alleged contract, and that an act of the general assembly, making another and different disposition of any portion of the academy endowment, divested these rights to the extent of this diversion, and thereby impaired the obligation of the contract. We do not know that the presiding judge was at all influenced by this view, and are not inclined to attribute it to him. Comity to a co-ordinate department of the government requires, according to many decisions of this and other courts, that causes shall not be disposed of upon constitutional grounds when it is possible to avoid such questions, without a sacrifice of the rights of parties; besides, this court has no jurisdiction to review judgments of lower courts, unless the judgment complained of, together with the alleged error therein, shall be plainly specified. So that we do not pass upon this point, which, to say the least, appears to have the merit of novelty or originality, if no other, if either of these can be deemed meritorious.

2. It was contended here with earnestness and plausibility, and not without considerable force, that the distribution made of the academy fund was not in accordance with the...