Board of Educ. v. Leininger

• Decision Date: 29 March 1993
• Docket Number: No. 85 C 8349.
• Citation: 822 F. Supp. 516
• Parties: BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 205, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Robert LEININGER, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

822 F. Supp. 516

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 205, et al., Plaintiffs, v.Robert LEININGER, et al., Defendants.

No. 85 C 8349.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

March 29, 1993.

John H. Hager, Elaine K.B. Siegel, Michael Franklin Smith, Hager & Siegel, P.C., John M. Collins, Chicago, IL, for plaintiffs.

Colleen M. McLaughlin, IL Atty. Gen. Office, Chicago, IL, for defendantsTheodore Sanders, Roland W. Burris.

Randolph Mitchell Johnston, Mark Edward Repp, Cook County State's Attys.Office, Chicago, IL, for defendantRichard J. Martwick.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

NORDBERG, District Judge.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiffs, four individual school districts in Cook County, Illinois, have filed suit against Illinois' treasurer, comptroller, superintendent of education, and their regional superintendent over the regional superintendent's alleged mishandling of federal funds earmarked for their use.Plaintiffs allege that the regional superintendent has failed to immediately disburse to them funds distributed to the state pursuant to several federal educational funding statutes, and failed to invest the funds in interest-bearing vehicles while they were in his care.Plaintiffs contended these actions violated rights accorded them under the funding statutes¹, constituting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.Plaintiffs also alleged a number of state law claims against the regional superintendent.

The court has already ruled that plaintiffs do not have a cause of action under any of the statutes in question for interest on advance payments.Defendants' present motion to dismiss contends plaintiffs do not have a cause of action for interest on payments made under any of the federal statutes as a reimbursement, or for immediate payment of either advances or reimbursements upon disbursement of funds to the state.The court referred this matter to Magistrate Judge Pallmeyer, and has received her report and recommendation.Before the court are plaintiffs' objections to the report and recommendation.

ANALYSIS

In the case of pretrial matters dispositive of a claim or defense of a party, once a timely objection has been filed to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the district judge shall conduct a de novo review upon the record.The court may accept, reject or modify the magistrate judge's recommended decision.Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).The court need not conduct a new hearing on the entire matter, but must give "fresh consideration to those issues to which specific objections have been made."12 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3076.8, at p. 56(1992 Pocket Part).

The court agrees with the magistrate judge's conclusion that the funding statutes at issue do not provide plaintiffs with a cause of action under § 1983.A plaintiff may sue for a violation of a federal statute under § 1983 provided the statute creates an enforceable right, privilege or immunity within the meaning of § 1983, and Congress has not foreclosed such enforcement in enacting the statute.Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association,496 U.S. 498, 509, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 2517, 110 L.Ed.2d 455(1990).Whether the statute creates an enforceable right turns on whether its provisions at issue were intended to benefit the putative plaintiff.If so, the provisions create an enforceable right unless they merely reflect a congressional preference for a certain kind of conduct, rather than a binding obligation, or they are too vague and amorphous to be judicially enforceable.Id.

First, the court agrees with the magistrate judge's conclusion that plaintiffs were not the intended beneficiaries of the funding statutes at issue.A direct declaration of intent is not necessary.In Wilder,the court found health care providers to be intended beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act based on language requiring state plans for medical assistance to provide for "payment ... of hospital services, nursing facility services, and services in an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded provided under the plan."Id., at 510, 110 S.Ct. at 2518(emphasis in original);42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A).A review of the language of the funding statutesplaintiff relies on indicates that where local governments such as plaintiffs are mentioned at all, it is only incidental to the statutes' declared purpose.

The statements of purpose of the National School Lunch ActandChild Nutrition Act declare they are intended "to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's children," indicating that children in general are the statutes' intended beneficiaries.42 U.S.C. § 1751;42 U.S.C. § 1771.Each statement of purpose also declares that Congress will "assist the States," but only as a means to accomplishing the end of aiding the statutes' true beneficiaries.Any benefit to the states is purely incidental, and no mention of local government is made at all.

Similarly, the Education of Individuals with Disabilities Act declares its purpose to provide an education to handicapped children and assure that their rights, and those of their parents, are protected.20 U.S.C. § 1400(c).While the statute mentions both state and local governments, once again they are positioned as merely conduits of federal aid to the statute's true beneficiaries.Unlike the Boren Amendment, there is no language separating providers of services to the public apart from the state government and obligating the state to repay them.

Finally, plaintiffs point to language in the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee Report for the Perkins Act stating that the Act sends funds directly to local school districts or area vocational schools.However, it also states that the goal of this assistance is to provide quality vocational programs to needy populations.S.Rep. No. 221, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2(1990), U.S.CodeCong. & Admin.News 1990, pp. 1182, 1183.Funds are clearly sent directly to local school districts to benefit the public in general, not the districts themselves.

Plaintiffs also direct the court to the holding in Dennis v. Higgins,498 U.S. 439, 111 S.Ct. 865, 112 L.Ed.2d 969(1991) for the proposition that the intended beneficiaries of a federal statute may include more than ultimate recipients of services.Dennis does not address this issue at all, instead holding that the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution was not merely intended to promote economic and political union, but to benefit all individual engaging in interstate commerce.Id., at 449-51, 111 S.Ct. at 872.Nevertheless, the court does not disagree with the propositionplaintiffs seek to document.Certainly health care providers are not the ultimate recipients of services under the Boren Amendment.However, plaintiffs still cannot be considered beneficiaries of any of the funding statutes without language to that effect.

Second, the court agrees with the magistrate judge's conclusion that any provisions of the funding statutes directed toward plaintiffs are too vague and amorphous to be judicially enforceable, and do not create binding obligations on defendants either to immediately disburse funds or to pay interest on reimbursements.Plaintiffs have not presented any statutory or regulatory authority demonstrating any obligation to disburse funds immediately, and no timetables or schedules for payment exist under any of the statutes in question.Similarly, there is a noticeable dearth of authority obligating the state to pay interest to their local governments on federal funds intended for their use.

Plaintiffs have managed to construct an ingenuous argument for the existence of an enforceable obligation by relying on each statute's requirement that funds be spent for program purposes.Plaintiffs contend that, if funds disbursed to the defendants are not immediately distributed to them, then during that interim period they are being used for non-program purposes, unless the interest accrued during that period is distributed to them as well.Another variation of this argument was tried, and rejected by the Seventh Circuit in Illinois Council on Long Term Care v. Bradley,957 F.2d 305(7th Cir.), cert. denied,___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 55, 121 L.Ed.2d 24(1992).There, the plaintiffs argued that any delay in payment of federal funds disbursed to the state under the Boren Amendment violated the Amendment's requirement that payments be "adequate" for reimbursement.The Seventh Circuit rejected this logical construct, pointing to the Amendment's total lack of language or references to time limits, and the lack of any references in the supporting regulations.Id., at 307-08.As the Bradley court put it, "the question is not what reimbursement scheme might make sense but whether the Boren Amendment requires timely payment."Id., at 308.Plaintiffs' claim here must be similarly rejected, for the same reasons.

Plaintiffs also contend that the requirements of each funding statute that payment be made "promptly" is not so vague or ambiguous as to be unenforceable, attempting to distinguish these statutes from the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, considered in Suter v. Artist M,___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1(1992).To begin with, only the National School Lunch Act contains even this minimal allusion to timely payments.None of the statutes in question use more binding language, such as "immediately," or contain timetables for payment.Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, the lack of any further statutory guidance makes this case exactly like Suter.Suter,at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1368.

The court also agrees with the magistrate judge's conclusion that the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act overrides plaintiffs' claim for interest on reimbursements.31 U.S.C. § 6501, et seq.Section 6503(c)(1) of the Act requires the states to pay interest on federal funds deposited with them from the time such funds are deposited until they...