Board of Education of Topeka v. Welch

Decision Date08 July 1893
Citation33 P. 654,51 Kan. 792
PartiesTHE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF TOPEKA v. R. B. WELCH
CourtKansas Supreme Court

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Original Proceeding in Mandamus.

ACTION brought in this court for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the defendant, as president of the board of education of the city of Topeka, to sign $ 85,000 of 4-percent. 20-year bonds about to be issued. They have been sold to the commissioners of the state school fund, on condition that the commissioners shall be satisfied of their legality. The election authorizing these bonds was held on March 7, 1893 under chapter 196 of the Laws of 1891. On March 22 1893, an application to enjoin the issuance of these bonds was made to the district court of Shawnee county. The application was heard by the district court on March 29, 1893, and by consent of all parties the hearing was made a final trial of the action. Upon the trial, the injunction was refused. The trial court (HAZEN, J.) handed down the following opinion:

"This action is brought on behalf of the state of Kansas, on the relation of the attorney general, against the board of education of the city of Topeka, to enjoin the issuing of $ 85,000 worth of bonds, which bonds, it is alleged, are to be issued for the purpose of buying a high-school site and erecting a high-school building. It is claimed on behalf of the plaintiff that the board of education has no power to erect a building thereon. It is claimed on behalf of the board of education that it has such power; that it has complied with the law, and that it should now be permitted to go on and issue these bonds. It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff, that the matter of submitting this proposition amounted to a constructive fraud in this: That when the proposition was submitted to the voters as to whether or not they would vote for or against the bonds, certain sites were designated upon the ticket, and the price of each indicated and that it was the understanding that the board should purchase the site receiving the greatest number of votes, and at the price indicated; that is, it would purchase the site receiving the largest number of votes at the price indicated on the ticket. It is claimed that that amounted to a constructive fraud; not actual fraud, but that the effect of it was not to allow a fair and impartial expression of the voters upon the proposition. The case of Lewis v. Comm'rs of Bourbon Co., 12 Kan. 186, is cited to sustain that position. In that case, there were railroad bonds to be issued to two railroads to be voted for, and the proposition was so framed that the voter could not vote for one railroad proposition without voting for both, and the supreme court held in that case that that was not permitting a free and fair expression of the people upon the proposition submitted. But that is not this case. Here the main question was the issuance of the bonds. They were voting for or against the bonds, and the remainder of the ticket was simply taking an expression of the voters as to which one of the sites, in their opinion, was the proper one for the board to purchase. Now, it seems to me that this was a proper matter to be submitted to the people. The voters had a right, or ought to have a right, as far as they can, to say where the school shall be located -- in what part of the city. It is claimed that this induced persons to come out and work for the bonds and possibly brought out a larger vote than otherwise would have been brought out. I think that is true. But the expression of the voter at the time he cast his vote was his expression either for or against the bonds. There is nothing to show in this case that the voter was influenced in any way by the fact that certain sites were selected, and would be built upon if the bonds carried. The court is of the opinion that that position is not well taken.

"Again, it is claimed that the election law under which this election was held is imperfect, in this: That there is no provision for canvassing the vote and declaring the result. This is substantially true; but the courts will be slow to interfere with the will of the people, where it is shown that there was a fair election, and that the only question is the question of canvassing the vote and declaring the result. There is no claim that there was any fraud on account of the manner in which the vote was canvassed. There is no claim but that there was a true and correct canvass of the vote, as in fact taken on the day of the election. This being true, the court is of the opinion that it should not interfere where there has been a fair expression of the people upon the proposition. When the polls close at night, the proposition is either won or lost, and the only thing that remains to be done is to declare the result; and, if that result is declared, and correctly, too, it makes but little difference as to the manner of arriving at the result, if a fair canvass of the vote is had. In this case, the council canvassed the vote. But it is claimed that they should have canvassed the vote at the first meeting after the election. There was a meeting of the council, but at the first meeting there was not a quorum present, and they adjourned sine die. It is claimed that after that they could not canvass the vote; and, while nothing had been said on the discussion of this question, yet a good deal had been said one way and another in reference to the Rosenthal case (50 Kan. 129), decided by our supreme court, applying to this case upon this proposition; but there is this distinction between that case and this: There, the canvassing board had met, and, after performing its whole duty, had adjourned; here, the canvassing board had met, but for want of a quorum had adjourned. Now, it is a settled proposition, that if it is the duty of a body of men to canvass the vote, and they meet and adjourn without doing that which they are required to do by law, the court will by mandamus compel them to meet and act. The court will not control their action, but will compel them to act. In this case no action had been taken, and if the city council had refused to canvass the votes, and adjourned without canvassing them, upon proper showing, the court would by mandamus compel them to meet and canvass the vote, without attempting to control the result. If the courts could do this, then the council could certainly come together after that, and canvass the vote; because that which they could be compelled to do by mandamus they could voluntarily do. The court is of opinion that that position is not well taken.

"We come next to the real question in this case, and that is, whether any power exists in the board of education to maintain a high school. Our constitution is not like any other constitution that the court or the attorneys on either side in this case have been able to find. It provides for a uniform system of common schools and other schools of a higher grade. It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff in this case that the title of the act authorizing the issuing of these bonds is, 'An act pertaining to common schools,' and that the school building the board of education proposes to build in this case is a high school, and that there is a distinction between a common school and a high school, and that the title of an act applying 'to common schools' has no application to high schools, and therefore, the board has no authority to act in the premises. It is contended on behalf of the board of education that the building of this school is simply a part of the general system of common schools. While the expression 'high school' is used, where the building is separate from the other buildings, and different branches are taught, yet it is claimed that it is a part of the general system of common schools. The question is not an easy one. It is a question that might be decided either way, and good reasons given for the decision. But the serious question is, where shall the courts draw the line between 'common schools' and 'high schools' and say this branch belongs to the common, and this to the high school? We all know as a matter of experience that all of the different branches now taught in the common schools were not taught years ago. We know that algebra was a thing unknown in the common school when most of us went to school; that physiology, bookkeeping, physical geography, music, and quite a number of other branches that could be named, were never taught in our school days in the common schools. Yet, they are now the most ordinary branches, taught in almost all of the common schools, and recognized by the public as a proper and legitimate exercise of the control of the board of education and district boards. As we advance, our school systems advance; and what is taught now possibly in a few years will not be taught in our common schools, and other branches will take their places. And the question arises, does it lie in the power of the courts to say where the dividing line shall be between the common school and the higher branches?

"According to the evidence in this case, the board of education of the city of Topeka has divided the schools of this city into 12 branches or years. These different branches are taught in different school buildings; some in one, some in another. In the same school building, in different rooms, different branches are taught; and when they have reached the eighth grade, then they go into what is denominated the 'high school,' and are there taught the four grades covering that department. Does it lie within the power of the courts to say that the dividing line between the common and high school is between the eighth and ninth grades, and say up to this grade is 'common,' beyond this is 'high'? If the court...

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16 cases
  • Mebas v. Werkmeister
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • November 8, 1927
    ... ... Mo.App. 335; Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174; City ... v. Welch, 51 Kan. 792; Dailey v. Maxwell, 152 ... Mo.App. 145; Lleywehn v. Lowe, ... grows out of the former. Under our compulsory education ... statute the duty is on the father not only to support and ... ...
  • Graham v. Board of Education of City of Topeka
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • June 13, 1941
    ... ... shall be classified or graded, or what departments shall be ... used, or what classes or grades shall constitute the high ... school, if one is maintained. All these matters were left to ... the board of education. See Board of Education v ... Welch, 51 Kan. 792, 804, 33 P. 654, decided in 1893. At ... that time defendant was maintaining four departments--a ... primary department, an intermediate department, a grammar ... school department, and a high school department. This last ... started at what defendant had classified as the ninth ... ...
  • Woodson v. School District No. 28 In Kingman County
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • February 9, 1929
    ... ... About ... 1911 the school board added courses of study to include two ... years of what is commonly ... of education and the school became a duly accredited high ... school. In 1926 the ... recognized in decisions of this court. (Board of ... Education v. Welch, 51 Kan. 792, 33 P. 654; Board of ... Education v. Dick, 70 Kan. 434, 78 ... ...
  • The State ex rel. Muns v. Hackmann
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • June 26, 1920
    ... ... erection of a school building," said school board had no ... authority to issue bonds or expend money derived from the ... Phoenix ... Bank, 4 Conn. 172; Board of Education v. Hyatt, ... 152 Cal. 515.] All these schools are under the authority ... district. In Board of Education v. Welch, 51 Kan ... 792, 807, the Supreme Court of Kansas said: ... branches prescribed by the board of education of the City of ... Topeka may not in its discretion be taught in the public ... schools, and no ... ...
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