Board of Education v. Naugatuck

• Citation: 800 A.2d 517,70 Conn. App. 358
• Decision Date: 11 June 2002
• Docket Number: (AC 18902)
• Court: Appellate Court of Connecticut
• Parties: BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWN AND BOROUGH OF NAUGATUCK v. TOWN AND BOROUGH OF NAUGATUCK ET AL.

70 Conn. App. 358

800 A.2d 517

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWN AND BOROUGH OF NAUGATUCK v. TOWN AND BOROUGH OF NAUGATUCK ET AL.

(AC 18902)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 20, 2002.

Officially released June 11, 2002.

Lavery, C. J., and Schaller and Spear, Js. N. Warren Hess III, for the appellants (defendants).

Mark J. Sommaruga, with whom, on the brief, was Thomas N. Sullivan, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Mary-Michelle U. Hirschoff Filed a brief for the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities as amicus curiae.

Joan G. Libby filed a brief for the Connecticut Association of Boards of Education as amicus curiae.

Opinion

LAVERY, C. J.

The defendants¹ in this declaratory judgment action appeal from the trial court's rendering of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the board of education of the town and borough of Naugatuck (board of education), following the court's determination that two recent amendments to the borough's municipal charter were invalid. The defendants claim that the court's rendering of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was improper because (1) the charter amendment providing for separate referenda on the borough's education budget and operating budget (budget amendment) is authorized by the General Statutes and is otherwise lawful and (2) the charter amendment providing that the mayor-elect shall be a member of the board of education (membership amendment) is authorized by the General Statutes and not precluded by the common-law doctrine of incompatible offices. We affirm the portion of the trial court's judgment concluding that the budget amendment is invalid and reverse the portion concluding that the membership amendment is invalid.²

The facts underlying this case are not in dispute. The case was presented to the court as a series of stipulations accompanied by cross motions for summary judgment. The stipulated facts included the following. The plaintiff is a board of education established and organized under state law. See General Statutes § 10-218 et seq.; General Statutes §§ 9-203 to 9-206a. Pursuant to General Statutes § 10-220, the plaintiff is vested with the responsibility of implementing the educational policies of the state in the borough's public schools. The defendants are a consolidated municipality; General Statutes §§ 7-148 (a), 7-187 (d); and various members of its government. See footnote 1. The board of mayor and burgesses is the borough's legislative body. General Statutes § 7-193 (a) (1).

The borough operates under a charter that is its organic law. Section 3.18 of the charter prescribes the number of members of the board of education and the length of their terms. Prior to November, 1996, that section provided for nine elected members to serve six year terms. Section 14 of the charter sets forth the process by which the borough's electors can seek a referendum on a proposed borough budget. Prior to November, 1996, that section provided for a referendum on the budget as a whole. In November, 1996, the defendants submitted to borough electors two proposed amendments to the charter. The first proposal was to amend § 3.18 "to provide for a nine member Board of Education, one of whose members shall be the Mayor... effective at the May 1997 election." (Emphasis added.) The second proposal was to amend § 14 "to allow up to (3) three separate budget referendums for both the Town Operating Budget and the Board of Education Budget." (Emphasis added.) The borough's electors approved both proposals by substantial margins.³

The plaintiff thereafter commenced this action seeking to have both charter amendments declared invalid and void ab initio. The plaintiff alleged that the amendments affected its responsibility pursuant to § 10-220 to manage the public schools. It claimed that the amendments improperly altered the composition of the board of education by placing thereon a member who was not elected, namely, the mayor, and impaired the board's ability to obtain a budget appropriate to meet minimum educational requirements.⁴

Subsequently, the parties filed a stipulation of facts with the court and, because the issues in the case presented only questions of law, each moved for summary judgment. See Practice Book § 17-49. The court, after considering the arguments presented by the parties, concluded that the budget amendment conflicted with § 10-220 and other general laws furthering the statewide interest in education and, therefore, was invalid. It also concluded that the membership amendment was invalid because the offices of mayor and board of education member were inherently incompatible. Accordingly, the court rendered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Additional facts will be set forth where necessary.

"Our standard of review of a trial court's granting of summary judgment is well established. Pursuant to Practice Book § 17-49, summary judgment `shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Mytych v. May Dept. Stores Co., 260 Conn. 152, 158-59, 793 A.2d 1068 (2002). Because the parties in this case stipulated to the facts, the only issues before the court were those of statutory interpretation, questions of law for which our review is plenary. State v. Russo, 259 Conn. 436, 447, 790 A.2d 1132 (2002).

"Our resolution of [these claims] is governed by well established principles. [I]t is axiomatic that the process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature.... In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 447-48.

We also proceed mindful of and sensitive to the fact that the charter revisions represent the popular will of the Naugatuck electorate, thus implicating the political and legislative process. Board of Education v. Naugatuck, supra, 257 Conn. 425. We recognize further the legislative purpose and rationale behind Connecticut's Home Rule Act, General Statutes §§ 7-187 to 7-201, which provides the parameters within which the borough may govern its affairs. "The rationale of the act, simply stated, is that issues of local concern are most logically answered locally, pursuant to a home rule charter, exclusive of the provisions of the General Statutes.... Moreover, home rule legislation was enacted to enable municipalities to conduct their own business and control their own affairs to the fullest possible extent in their own way ... upon the principle that the municipality itself knew better what it wanted and needed than did the state at large, and to give that municipality the exclusive privilege and right to enact direct legislation which would carry out and satisfy its wants and needs." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Caulfield v. Noble, 178 Conn. 81, 86-87, 420 A.2d 1160 (1979).

Nonetheless, "it has been held that when a charter provision and a statute of general application both enter a field of statewide concern, the local charter power must yield to the superior power of the state." Id., 86 n.3. "[A] general law, in order to prevail over a conflicting charter provision of a city having a home rule charter, must pertain to those things of general concern to the people of the state, and it cannot deprive cities of the right to legislate on purely local affairs germane to city purposes." Id., 87; see also General Statutes 7-188.⁵ With these principles in mind, we address the issues on appeal.

I

The defendants claim that the court's rendering of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was improper because the budget amendment is authorized by the General Statutes and is otherwise lawful. We disagree.

The trial court described the change resulting from the budget amendment as follows. "Both before and after the amendment, § 14 set forth the procedure by which the board of finance and the board of mayor and burgesses adopt a budget for the town, including the holding of a public hearing on the budget as recommended by the boards, its publication in a newspaper prior to the public hearing and a procedure for the voters to petition for a referendum on the budget. The significant change effected by the November, 1996 amendment was to permit the electors to petition for separate votes on the town's `operating budget' (the `non-board of education budget') and/or the board of education budget. Under the charter, prior to the amendment the electors could vote only on the town's budget as a unit, including the board's budget. [After the amendment,] the electors can petition for a vote separately on each of the two budgets, the `operating budget' and the board's budget, or on only one of them. Obviously, the electors can, therefore, reject both budgets or reject only one of them, e.g., the board's budget, while leaving the other budget intact.

"In language retained without amendment, § 14 provides that if 'the total votes to reject exceeds the vote[s] to accept, the budget shall be deemed rejected.' The board of finance and the board of mayor and burgesses must then present a `revised budget' at a public hearing and adopt such a revised budget within fourteen days from the date of the referendum in which 'the budget' was rejected. A total of three such referenda may be held on either or both budgets."

The defendants argue that under the broad powers granted to municipalities by the Home Rule Act, the budget amendment is valid. They claim that authority for a bifurcated referendum on the borough budget is found in General Statutes § 7-194, which grants...