Board of Education v. Spradlin
Decision Date | 31 January 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 0320 September Term, 2004.,0320 September Term, 2004. |
Parties | BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Maryland v. Joannie M. SPRADLIN. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
John T. Beamer (Charles W. Thompson, Jr., Karen L. Federman Henry, on the brief), Rockville, for Appellant.
Jonathan S. Beiser, Rockville, for Appellee.
JAMES R. EYLER, BARBERA, and CHARLES E. MOYLAN, JR. (retired, specially assigned), JJ.
CHARLES E. MOYLAN, JR., Judge (Retired, Specially Assigned).
There is first the administrative appeal; and, then, there is the administrative appeal plus. An appeal to the circuit court from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission is, not invariably but more frequently than not, by way of the administrative appeal plus. The statutory provision for circuit court review offers the appellant not one but two reviewing options. The first is that of a generic and routine administrative appeal, a familiar process with familiar constraints. "Did the agency fall into legal error?" The "plus" option, by intriguing contrast, is more wide-ranging. It permits revisiting the facts, supplementing the facts, or simply appraising the facts afresh, even in the total absence of any antecedent error. "The decision of the Commission appears to have been impeccably correct; but we nonetheless arrive at a diametrically different result." Our consideration of this appeal requires an in-depth examination of some of the procedural nuances attendant on that "plus" option. When a proceeding is "essentially," but not totally, de novo, to what extent, if any, is the past prologue?
The appellee, Joannie M. Spradlin ("the claimant"), filed a claim with the Workers' Compensation Commission, requesting compensation benefits for injuries sustained by her after being assaulted by a co-employee. Before the Commission, the appellant employer, the Board of Education for Montgomery County, claimed, inter alia, that the claimant's own wilful misconduct, in instigating the fight with the co-employee, barred her recovery. It also claimed, as an alternative defense, that the injury to the claimant did not 1) occur in the course of the claimant's employment or 2) arise out of that employment. Without meaningful elaboration, the Commission ruled against the claimant and denied her claim.
The claimant appealed the Commission's decision to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. She opted for a de novo trial before Judge William J. Rowan, III, sitting without a jury. Judge Rowan, as the fact finder, was persuaded that the claimant had "sustained an accidental personal injury in the course of employment" and accordingly reversed the decision of the Commission. On this appeal, Montgomery County poses the question:
Once the circuit court determined that the claimant and the employer's witness were equally credible, should the court have given due weight to the presumption of correctness of the Commission's decision?
(Emphasis supplied).
What Was "The Commission's Decision?"
That is not a simple question. It is a generative question that begets not an answer, but only other questions. Putting aside, for the moment, the intricate problem of what it is that a de novo fact finder may, or must, do with the presumption of antecedent correctness of the Commission's decision, what actually was "the Commission's decision?" It was, at the very least, the Commission's ultimate ruling disallowing the claim, but was it anything more than that? If, in arriving at its "decision" on a claim, the Commission arguably resolved ("decided") one or a series of factually disputed sub-issues, did each such resolution of an intermediate sub-issue, ipso facto, become a part of "the Commission's decision" to which the presumption of correctness applies? Is the Commission's putative reasoning process inextricably wrapped into "the Commission's decision?" How finely do we parse the concept of "the Commission's decision" before we pay it due obeisance?
In terms of what officially was the Commission's decision in this case, we have only the bare bones. Two issues were before the Commission, only one of which was ultimately decided. It was:
1. Did the employee sustain an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment?
On that issue, the Commission answered:
The Commission finds on the issues presented that the claimant did not sustain an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment as alleged to have occurred on November 22, 2002; and finds that the remaining issue is moot, and the Commission will disallow the claim filed herein.
(Emphasis supplied). It is on that spare foundation that Montgomery County constructs an elaborate argument.
At the June 18, 2003, hearing before the Workers' Compensation Commission, only two witnesses were called: 1) the claimant and 2) her co-worker and alleged assailant, Angela Harris. The assault that precipitated the claim in this case occurred on November 22, 2002, at the West Farm Depot of the Montgomery County Board of Education, where both the claimant and Angela Harris were employed. The West Farm Depot provides a kitchen area and a break room for bus attendants before they board the school busses. The claimant and Ms. Harris gave diametrically opposite accounts of a verbal confrontation between them that occurred, initially over the changing of a television channel, in the break room.
According to the testimony of the claimant, she was the innocent victim of an unprovoked attack. She was in the lounge provided by Montgomery County for its bus attendants moments before leaving to go on her bus run. She had, shortly before, been watching channel 7 on the television set; had left the room briefly; and then returned to find that the set had been switched to channel 9. The claimant described what then occurred, both inside the lounge and outside at the bus-boarding area.
The claimant promptly reported the incident to her supervisor, Peggy Proctor. She also filed a report with the police. She was subsequently taken by her bus driver to the Holy Cross Hospital, where she received a chest x-ray and some medication. The only wrinkle pursued by Montgomery County during its cross-examination seemed to go to the question of whether, when the claimant was in the lounge, she was "in the course of her employment."
Angela Harris, the ultimate assailant, testified to a diametrically different version of the conversation that became the apparent casus belli.
On cross-examination, Ms. Harris acknowledged having kicked the claimant.
In brief argument before the Commission, Montgomery County urged two unrelated propositions, either one of which might have sufficed to defeat the claim. It argued that the claimant was guilty of wilful misconduct in uttering the words that instigated the fight, thereby barring her recovery.2 It also...
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