Board of Elections v. Democratic Central Committee, 6577.
| Decision Date | 27 February 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 6577.,6577. |
| Citation | 300 A.2d 725 |
| Parties | The BOARD OF ELECTIONS for the District of Columbia, Charles B. Fisher, Chairman, et al., Appellants, v. DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL COMMITTEE for the District of Columbia et al., Appellees. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
J. E. Bindeman, Sp. Counsel to the District of Columbia Board of Elections, with whom C. Francis Murphy, Corp. Counsel, Richard W. Barton and Earl A. Gershenow, Asst. Corp. Counsels, were on the brief, for appellants.
John W. Karr, Washington, D.C., with whom Glenn R. Graves, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellees.
Before PAIR, YEAGLEY and HARRIS, Associate Judges.
Appellees, the Democratic Central Committee for the District of Columbia and its Chairman, Bruce J. Terris, brought this action to obtain injunctive relief from alleged "unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious"1 actions of the Board of Elections. They alleged that the Board was not complying with the statutory mandate of Congress with regard to the certification of nominees for election to public office, and that it was certifying nominees for the ballot without fully satisfying itself as to the lawfulness of the signatures on the nominating petitions. Appellees asked that the court enjoin appellants from certifying any nominee to the ballot in future elections unless it has first been determined that the petitions in support of a particular nominee were subscribed by the requisite number of qualified electors and further that the Board be ordered to entertain challenges to nominating petitions utilizing a mathematical technique of random sampling.
Appellants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court denied that motion and issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the Board from certifying any further candidates to the ballot until it submitted to the trial court, for its approval, a reasonable method of certification that would include some system for checking the authenticity of the signatures on nominating petitions.2
Since we find that appellees have not met the requirement of standing to bring their action, we reverse the judgment below.
Recently this court adopted in Basiliko v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 283 A.2d 816, 818 (1971), the test set forth in Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 98, 433 F.2d 1204 (1970), as to whether a party has standing to challenge the action or inaction of an agency. In the latter case the court said:
First, the party must allege that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, in order to satisfy the Article III requirement that he possess "the personal stake and interest that impart the concrete adverseness" necessary to the existence of a case or controversy. . The plaintiff must further allege that the agency has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in excess of its statutory authority, so as to injure an interest that "is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." . . . Finally, there must be no "clear and convincing" indication of a legislative intent to withhold judicial review. [Citations and footnotes omitted.] [140 U.S.App.D.C. at 101, 433 F.2d at 1207.]
Appellees here have failed to meet the first prong of the three-pronged test in that they have not alleged an injury in fact to themselves. The Democratic Central Committee made no allegation that it was authorized to sue in behalf of its members who are qualified electors, or that its members were injured in fact and that it brought the action in their behalf. Nor was it alleged that appellee Terris was injured or that he sued as one who was a qualified elector at the time the complaint was filed. The only allegation regarding his status is in paragraph 7 of the Complaint where it is alleged "[a]gain in 1971 the plaintiff Terris, acting in his capacity as Committee chairman, renewed plaintiffs' request . . . ."3 Although the issue of standing was not argued below, it was raised necessarily by appellants' motion to dismiss the complaint.
We note that the motion for a preliminary injunction alleges that "immediate and irreparable injury and damage will result to plaintiffs . . . in that the experience of prior elections has demonstrated that unlawful nominating petitions containing the signatures of unregistered electors or forged signatures of registered electors have been certified by the Board . . . ." The intentional use of invalid signatures on a nominating petition may constitute a fraud on the entire democratic process and warrants the strongest possible condemnation. On the other hand, the presence of some invalid signatures does not necessarily make a petition deficient, and there is no allegation that the petitions involved here did not contain the required number of valid signatures to make them acceptable.
The thrust of the complaint is that the Board continues to refuse to check the validity of signatures on nominating petitions in the manner desired by appellees. What appellees are really claiming is that there is an injury to the public at large from the Board of Elections' refusal to check nominating petitions in the manner plaintiffs suggested.
4
[A] mere "interest in a problem," no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" within the meaning of the APA. . . .5
Presumably under certain conditions one suing as an elector could state facts showing an injury in fact, and if unlawful nominating petitions are accepted a real injury could be shown by other candidates on the ballot. Nowhere in the complaint or briefs do appellees claim they represented particular candidates whose injuries they are suing to rectify. Nor do they state they are suing as electors or that they sue as representatives of electors. We must conclude that appellees are suing in their official capacities as the Democratic Central Committee and its Chairman.
We are mindful that the Supreme Court has liberalized standing requirements to the point of allowing certain suits to protect the public interest.6 Such issues may be raised by a representative of the public interest, but that representative must allege his personal stake...
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