Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities v. Illinois Human Rights Com'n

• Decision Date: 18 October 1982
• Docket Number: No. 482-0224,482-0224
• Citation: 109 Ill.App.3d 946,441 N.E.2d 391,65 Ill.Dec. 478
• Parties: , 65 Ill.Dec. 478 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF STATE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, a State Agency; Linda MacLachlan, James Simpson and James Gerl, in their capacities as Administrative Law Judges, Defendants-Appellees, and John Price, Betty Paden, and Eleonor Prueske, Defendants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 391

441 N.E.2d 391

109 Ill.App.3d 946, 65 Ill.Dec. 478

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF STATE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, a State Agency; Linda MacLachlan, James Simpson and James Gerl, in their capacities as Administrative Law Judges Defendants-Appellees and John Price, Betty Paden, and Eleonor Prueske, Defendants.

No. 482-0224.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fourth District.

Oct. 18, 1982.

Kenneth G. Kombrink, Dunn, Brady, Goebel, Ulbrich, Morel, Kombrink & Hundman, Bloomington, for plaintiff-appellant.

Tyrone C. Fahner, Atty. Gen., Jane Lynk, Asst. Atty. Gen., Springfield, for defendants-appellees.

WEBBER, Justice:

Plaintiff, Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities (Board), filed in the circuit court of Sangamon County a petition for a writ of prohibition, seeking to prevent the defendants, Illinois Human Rights Commission (Commission) and certain of its administrative law judges, from proceeding with charges alleging unfair employment practices which had been filed by several employees of the Board. The circuit court denied the petition and this appeal followed. We affirm the denial.

The proceedings prior to entry into the circuit court straddled a change in the law and this adds some complexity to the case. Therefore, a brief explanation is in order. The Fair Employment Practices Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 48, pars. 851 through 867) remained in effect until July 1, 1980, when the Human Rights Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 68, par. 1-101 et seq.) replaced it and several other laws not involved in this case. The former Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC), the Department of Equal Employment Opportunity, and the Human Relations Commission were supplanted by two new agencies, the Department of Human Rights (DHR) and the Human Rights Commission (HRC). Any matter pending before the former agencies was to be "assumed by the Department or Commission, as provided in this Act, at the same stage, or a parallel stage, of proceeding to which it had progressed prior to the effective date of this Act." Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 68, par. 9-102(A).

The events prior to the circuit court proceedings were submitted on a stipulation of facts. From it, it appears that defendant Price filed an unfair employment practice charge with the FEPC on November 9, 1979. An investigator conducted a factfinding conference and wrote a report recommending that the charge be dismissed for lack of substantial evidence. FEPC sent Price a notice of dismissal of his charge on June 6, 1980. Under FEPC rules he was entitled to reconsideration and he made such a request on June 16, 1980. This request was pending when the Human Rights Act became effective on July 1, 1980. HRC treated it as a request for review as such step is known under the Human Rights Act.

The review process is outlined by statutory provisions and by rules promulgated by HRC. The statute provides:

"8-102. Powers and duties. In addition to other powers and duties prescribed in this Act, the Commission shall have the following powers:

* * *

* * *

(G) Decisions. Through a panel of three members designated by the Chairperson on a random basis, to hear and decide by majority vote requests for review and complaints filed in conformity with this Act and to approve proposed settlements.

* * *

* * *

8-103. Request for Review. (A) Jurisdiction. The Commission, through a panel of three members, shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine requests for review of (1) decisions of the Department to dismiss a charge; and (2) notices of default issued by the Department.

In each instance, the Department shall be the respondent.

(B) Review. When a request for review is properly filed, the Commission may consider the Department's report, any argument and supplemental evidence timely submitted, and the results of any additional investigation conducted by the Department in response to the request. In its discretion, the Commission may designate a hearing officer to conduct a hearing into the factual basis of the matter at issue." Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 68, pars. 8-102, 8-103.

The pertinent portion of the rules of HRC relating to review is:

"Section 4.1. Filing with Commission--A party may request review by the Commission of a decision by the Department to dismiss or default, by filing a request therefor with the Commission at its Chicago office within thirty (30) days of receipt of the Department's notice of its decision. Such request may be accompanied by argument and supporting materials.

Section 4.2. Notice by Commission--The Commission shall notify the Department and other parties to the charge of the filing of a timely request for review. Notice to the Department shall be accompanied by a copy of the request. Only the Department and the party requesting review shall participate in any proceedings under this Article.

Section 4.3. Response by Department--Within thirty (30) days of receipt of the Commission's notice of the filing of a request for review, the Department shall file a response with the Commission, serving a copy at the same time on the party filing the request. If the Department opposes the request, its response shall consist of a copy of the charge and any amendments thereto, the Department's investigation report, the results of any additional investigation conducted by the Department and a statement of the Department's position, including proposed findings to support the dismissal. If the Department does not oppose the request, its response may consist only of a statement of its position.

Section 4.4. Reply to New Matter--Whenever the Department's response relies upon investigative findings or legal reasoning not contained in the original investigation report, the party filing the request may, within fifteen (15) days of service of the response, file a reply with the Commission, with service on the Department at the same time. Only replies which are limited to addressing such new matter will be considered by the Commission."

In accordance with these procedures a lawyer for DHR filed a response on August 27, 1980, setting forth the Department's view that the dismissal was erroneous and that the charge should be reinstated. A three-member panel of the Commission voted to vacate the dismissal on September 3, 1980, and issued an order to that effect, a copy of which was sent to Price and to the Board. DHR then issued a complaint against the Board and scheduled a hearing before an administrative law judge who denied the Board's motion to dismiss the action.

The case of defendant Paden followed substantially the same course. Defendant Prueske has dismissed her charge. Paden filed with FEPC on March 28, 1979; it was dismissed for lack of substantial evidence on February 5, 1980; she requested reconsideration on March 10, 1980; after July 1, 1980, it was treated as a request for review; the Department's response was submitted October 21, 1980, stating that the dismissal was erroneous; three days later an executive assistant of HRC issued an order vacating the dismissal; a copy of the order was sent to Paden and the Board; the Department then issued a complaint and the case was assigned to an administrative law judge.

It was further stipulated that the Board did not receive copies or notices of the investigator's reports, the notices of dismissal, the requests for reconsideration, nor DHR's responses. It was also stipulated that neither the former nor present statutes, nor the rules of the former nor present agencies required that the Board receive such copies or notices.

As previously indicated, the trial court denied the prayer of the petition and refused a writ of prohibition. On appeal the Board makes two principal points: (1) that both the FEPC and the HRC exceeded their statutory authority in promulgating rules for rehearing of dismissals, and (2) that the Board has been denied due process of law in being prevented from participating in the proceedings leading to the vacatur of the dismissals.

The FEPC rule under which the defendant employees requested reconsideration provided:

"Dismissal After Investigation--If after investigation of a charge, the investigative findings indicate that the charge is not supported by substantial evidence or that the Commission lacks jurisdiction of the charge, and this indication is concurred in by the Commission's Executive Director or his designee, the Executive Director shall thereupon cause to be served upon the complainant a Notice of Dismissal. The Notice of Dismissal shall advise the complainant that the charge is recommended for dismissal, and shall be accompanied by a copy of the written investigation report. The Notice shall further advise that the complainant may object to dismissal of the charge and obtain consideration of the matter by the full Commission, by serving a demand therefor upon the Commission within thirty (30) days of the date of the Notice. If no such timely demand is served by the complainant upon the Commission, the charge shall be deemed dismissed as of the expiration of said thirty-day period, and the parties shall be so notified. In the event the complainant files a timely demand for reconsideration as herein provided, the matter shall be reevaluated by the Commission's staff and submitted to the full Commission for determination. A complainant's timely demand for reconsideration under this Section may be accompanied by such statement and/or evidence as the complainant may feel supports the charge."

This was FEPC Rule 4.5 which has been supplanted by HRC Rule 4.1 et seq., which are set out above.

The Board's argument is that the Fair Employment Practices Act did not provide for any such procedure but provided only that the agency's decisions were to be governed by the Administrative Review Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 48, par. 860.

The Board relies primarily on People ex rel. Olin Corp. v. Department of Labor (1981...