Board of Park Com'rs of City of Louisville v. Prinz

• Decision Date: 06 December 1907
• Citation: 127 Ky. 460,105 S.W. 948
• Parties: BOARD OF PARK COM'RS OF CITY OF LOUISVILLE v. PRINZ.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

105 S.W. 948

127 Ky. 460

BOARD OF PARK COM'RS OF CITY OF LOUISVILLE v. PRINZ.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

December 6, 1907

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Common Pleas Branch Second Division.

"To be officially reported."

Action by Henry Prinz against the board of park commissioners of the city of Louisville. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed, with directions to dismiss petition.

Kohn Baird & Spindle, S.E. Sloss, and Robert L. Greene, for appellant.

Bennett H. Young, for appellee.

CARROLL J.

Appellee brought suit against appellant to recover damages for injuries sustained by the negligence of its employés in the operation of a steam roller used by it. There is no dispute about the facts. The single question presented is whether or not appellant, in the absence of a statute imposing such liability, is responsible for the negligence of its employés.

The board of park commissioners are elected by the voters of the city to manage and control the public parks of the city, and have the right to contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued. The powers of the board are confined exclusively to the care and maintenance of the parks, and the duties incident thereto. The parks of the city are public places, established either by gift or purchase, and maintained by taxation. No gain or profit, either to the individual or the city, is derived from them. It is the contention of appellant that, in the absence of statutory authority, an action will not lie by an individual against a public corporation or body charged solely with the performance of public duties to recover damages for the personal misconduct or negligence of its agents or servants. Appellee's position is that the board of park commissioners being a mere adjunct of the city created by statute for the purpose of performing duties that the city might exercise through other agencies, or in other ways, the city would be liable for the tort complained of, and so may an action be maintained against the board of park commissioners who are vested with the authority to sue and be sued as an independent corporation. The question involved and kindred ones have been the subject of much discussion by courts and text-writers, and it is difficult to reconcile the adjudged cases or reach a satisfactory conclusion from the authorities that have treated of the subject; but we will endeavor to solve the problem presented by the application of a few principles that seem to be generally recognized as correct and that have been applied in more than one case by this court. In disposing of the case we will treat it as if the parks were managed and controlled by the city without the intervention of the subsidiary corporation styled the board of park commissioners, because, if the city would be liable, so would the board of park commissioners, as it is merely an agency of the city created by law to exercise supervision and control over the parks.

The property held in trust by the board of park commissioners for the use of the public generally is not the subject of taxation. This was expressly decided by this court in the case of City of Owensboro v. Com., 105 Ky. 344, 49 S.W. 320, 44 L. R. A. 202, and that parks may be acquired by cities, and taxes imposed for their purchase and care, was decided in City of Lexington v. Kentucky Chautauqua Assembly, 114 Ky. 781, 71 S.W. 943. It may therefore be regarded as settled in this jurisdiction that public parks maintained and managed without corporate or individual gain or profit, are not only exempt from taxation, but may be created and maintained by taxation. Hence they are essentially public places established for purely public purposes. The right of the city to support public parks by taxation is rested upon the ground that the municipal authorities are charged with the duty of maintaining the public health, and that parks where exercises and recreation can be indulged in, and pure and clean air breathed, contribute largely to the health of the community. Viewing the matter from this standpoint, the parks of the city occupy towards it and its inhabitants the same relation as do hospitals and other public institutions useful and necessary in the preservation of the health, safety, and morals of the people. And although there is conflict in the authorities, the decided weight of the adjudged cases favors the view that neither municipal corporations nor bodies such as appellant, when exercising exclusively public functions enjoined by law for the benefit of the general public, are liable to suit for the personal tort or negligence of an agent, servant, or employé. Some of these cases put the exemption upon the ground stated in Williamson v. Louisville Industrial School of Reform, 95 Ky. 251, 24 S.W. 1065, 23 L. R. A. 200, 44 Am. St. Rep. 243, where, in an action for tort by a person injured by one of its employés, the court said it was a charity, its purpose being the reformation and training of youths committed to its care, and as such it was an agency of the state exercising, although in a limited degree, governmental functions, and its funds could not be diverted from their intended beneficent purposes by judgments for damages, and this was approved in Leavell v. Western Ky. Asylum, 91 S.W. 671, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1129, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 269. Other cases are rested upon the broader ground that public corporations are not responsible for the personal torts or negligence of their officers, agents, or employés committed in the exercise of acts or duties the corporation is required to discharge, or while performing some service necessary to the fulfillment of its obligations to the public. And so, in Having v. City of Covington, 78 S.W. 431, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1617, where it was sought to recover damages against the city for the wrongful acts of its agents in assaulting Having, who was afflicted with a contageous disease, and incarcerating him by violence and against his consent in a house that was totally unfit for human habitation, the court, in denying the right of recovery, said: "There are two general principles underlying the administration of government of municipal corporations. The one is that a municipal corporation in the preservation of the...