Board of Police Com'rs of City of Warwick v. Reynolds, 1194
| Decision Date | 23 July 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 1194,1194 |
| Citation | 86 R.I. 172,133 A.2d 737 |
| Parties | BOARD OF POLICE COM'RS OF the CITY OF WARWICK v. Charles F. REYNOLDS, Liquor Control Adm'r. M. P. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Ralph T. Lewis, Jr., City Sol. of Warwick, for petitioner.
William E. Powers, Atty. Gen., Frank O. Lind, Jr., Woonsocket, Special Counsel, for respondent.
This is a petition for certiorari to review the action of the state liquor control administrator in ordering the board of police commissioners of the city of Warwick to issue a class A liquor license to Charles C. Piantadosi. We issued the writ and thereupon the administrator made due return of his records pertaining to such action for our inspection.
It appears from the return that Piantadosi, hereinafter referred to as the applicant, applied to the board for a class A liquor license and his application was duly advertised according to law. Thereafter the board apparently did not consider the application but merely filed it along with a large number of other similar applications. Finally after repeated attempts on his part to get the board to act on his application the applicant filed a petition in the superior court for a writ of mandamus to compel the board to take action. As a result of that proceeding the board met and denied the application apparently on the ground that there was a sufficient number of class A licenses in the city and therefore no more would be issued.
The applicant thereupon appealed to the administrator pursuant to General Laws 1938, chapter 164, § 9. At the hearing before the administrator two members of the board testified that, upon consideration of the application, the board concluded there were sufficient class A licenses in the city at the present time and therefore there was no other alternative but to deny it. However, neither member testified that any formal action was taken by the board definitely fixing the maximum number of class A licenses. They apparently felt that the reason they gave for denying the application was tantamount to adopting a rule or regulation to that effect pursuant to the authority vested in them by the provisions of Public Laws 1941, chap. 1038, sec. 3.
On the basis of their testimony the administrator concluded that the board had made no formal determination of record of the maximum number of class A licenses, that they were holding in abeyance any action on the other pending applications, which led him to conclude that the reason they gave for denying a license to the applicant would not be applied generally; and that the possibility of issuing such licenses was still open. The administrator points out in his brief that one member of the board indicated that the reason for denying the application was the issuance of the mandamus to the board. On the basis of the evidence and the inferences he drew therefrom the administrator concluded that the board had not fixed a maximum number of class A licenses in accordance with the reasonable intendment of P.L.1941, chap. 1038, sec. 3. He therefore ordered that the application be granted, there being no other reason advanced by the board in support of their denial thereof.
The board contend that such order is null and void because the issuance of another class A liquor license would exceed the maximum number fixed by them. They claim that the reason which they gave in their decision denying the application was in law and fact a fixing by them of the maximum number of class A liquor licenses in the city of Warwick. On the basis of that claim they argue that the administrator's order violates the provisions of P.L.1941, chap. 1038, see. 3, which expressly provides that the maximum number of any class of license fixed by local licensing board shall not be exceeded. Hence, they ask us to quash the administrator's order as one beyond his power and therefore without jurisdiction.
The administrator on his part moved to quash the writ of certiorari on the ground that the board was not a party in interest or aggrieved by his decision and therefore was without legal standing to ask this court to issue certiorari to review such decision. We ordered the motion assigned for hearing on the same day as the hearing on the merits. They were thereafter briefed and argued together.
In support of his motion to quash, the administrator contends that after a local board denies an application for a liquor license and later, on an appeal from such denial, the administrator reverses the board, they are not thereby aggrieved. In such a case he claims that the board exercise quasi judicial power and therefore have no interest in whether their decision is upheld on appeal. For this position he relies principally upon Bowles v. Dannin, 62 R.I. 36, 2 A.2d 892.
On the other hand the board contend that in administering the liquor laws they are the representatives of the public in the city of Warwick and as such are interested in the correct interpretation and application of those laws. They argue that the people of Warwick will be aggrieved if their local board are compelled to issue a liquor license by reason of an erroneous decision of the administrator in contravention of the local law. They also rely upon Bowles v. Dannin, supra, to justify their petition for certiorari. They quote the following language of the opinion in that case with reference to the qualifications of an appellant: 'He must be a party aggrieved, either personally or in an official capacity as a representative of the public.' (Emphasis supplied by petitioners.)
We do not agree with either party in the assumption which both make, namely, that the board act in a quasi judicial capacity when they deny an application for a liquor license. The granting or denying of such licenses is in no sense an exercise of the judicial process. On the contrary it is purely administrative. In performing that function the board act as agents of the...
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...to insure protection of that public interest, we applied an exception that was first alluded to in Board of Police Commissioners v. Reynolds, 86 R.I. 172, 178, 133 A.2d 737, 741 (1957), and we held that the Tillinghast "like most rules of general application, has its exceptions. One permits......
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State v. Yashar, No. PC 06-1866 (R.I. Super 3/21/2007)
...at 294-295, 308 A.2d at 792 (citing Tedford v. Reynolds, 87 R.I. 335, 343, 141 A.2d 264, 268 (1958); Board of Police Commissioners v. Reynolds, 86 R.I. 172, 178, 133 A.2d 737, 741 (1957); Irish v. Collins, 82 R.I. 348, 357-58, 107 A.2d 455, 459-60 Here, the public has a profound interest in......
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...writ which will not issue unless the applicant has been aggrieved by the judgment to be reviewed. Board of Police Comm'rs v. Reynolds, 86 R.I. 172, 177, 133 A.2d 737, 741; Champlin v. Probate Court, 37 R.I. 349, 92 A. 982, either personally or in an official capacity as a representative of ......
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Ramsay v. Sarkas
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