Board of Review of Assessments for Lake County v. Kranz

• Decision Date: 07 June 1946
• Docket Number: 28161.
• Citation: 66 N.E.2d 896,224 Ind. 358
• Parties: COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW OF ASSESSMENTS FOR LAKE COUNTY et al. v. KRANZ et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

66 N.E.2d 896

224 Ind. 358

COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW OF ASSESSMENTS FOR LAKE COUNTY et al. v. KRANZ et al.

No. 28161.

Supreme Court of Indiana

June 7, 1946

Appeal from Lake Circuit Court; Felix Kaul Judge.

George E. Hershman, of Crown Point, for appellants.

Stiles & Bayor, of Gary, for appellees.

RICHMAN Judge.

In 1945 upon petition of taxpayers in Hobart township, Lake County pursuant to § 64-1019, subsection (a), Burns' 1943 Repl. the State Board of Tax Commissioners, after notice and hearing, ordered a reassessment of all real estate in the township. The township assessor made the reassessment and filed his return with the Auditor of Lake County as required by § 64-1017. At this juncture appellees procured a permanent injunction blocking review of the assessor's valuations by the county board of review under §§ 64-1201, 64-1205. If this board had been permitted to act, its action would have been subject to review by the State Board of Tax Commissioners on appeal of interested taxpayers. §§ 64-1303, 64-1321.

The Auditor and the Board of Review, sold defendants, have appealed and assigned error on the overruling of their demurrer to appellees' complaint. It is filed as a class action, but if the named plaintiffs, hereinafter called appellees, have no cause of action, neither has the class of which they are a part and for whom they sue.

Appellees allege the 'probably less than four (4) per cent of the resident owners of taxable real estate' signed the initial petition. The Auditor certified that the required four per cent had signed and the State Board, whose duty it was to determine if the requisite number of signatures had been procured, so found and acted on the petition. Even if their action in this respect could now be reviewed, a sufficient petition was not jurisdictional for in the absence of a petition the State Board could have ordered the re-assessment 'in its own discretion' upon such notice and hearing as was given. § 64-1019, subsection (b).

The motives of those who circulated the petition are immaterial. So also the representations made by them to procure the signatures. The language of the petition was in substantial conformity with the statute.

The complaint also alleges that the assessor did not take into consideration the elements of value mentioned in § 64-1019, subd. (b) but 'wrongfully, unlawfully and arbitrarily raised the assessed valuation of all the real property and improvements thereon in aforesaid Hobart Township, and in most instances placed on the real estate and improvements thereon, an unfair, unequal and unequitable valuation.' This valuation was not final. Appeellees still had their remedy before the Board of Review and, if it should also act arbitrarily, an appeal to the State Board of Tax Commissioners. We shall not assume that either board would fail in the performance of its duty under the Constitution and statutes. Courts should be slow to interfere with the legislative process of taxation. Where arbitrary action of a ministerial officer is not final but may be corrected by reviewing agencies provided in the statute under which he is proceeding, ordinarily those agencies ought to be given an opportunity to act before resort to the courts.

Appellees say they have been denied due process. But the complaint shows that the notices and hearing provided by the statutes were given pursuant thereto. It is not charged that the statutes provided for insufficient notice and hearing. If in any other respect the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is involved, it is not disclosed by the briefs.

From the facts alleged in the complaint it appears that the proceeding is intended to and will accomplish re-assessment of real estate only in Hobart township. Appellees contend that as a result taxpayers of that township will pay state taxes on a valuation made at 1945 price levels while taxpayers in other taxing districts of the state will pay on the basis of price levels entering into the last general or...