Board of School Trustees of Salem Community Schools v. Robertson
Decision Date | 30 June 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 88A05-9308-CV-296,88A05-9308-CV-296 |
Citation | 637 N.E.2d 181 |
Parties | 92 Ed. Law Rep. 962 BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES OF SALEM COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, Appellant-Defendant, v. Roberta J. ROBERTSON, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Peter G. Tamulonis, Kightlinger & Gray, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Richard J. Darko, Mary Jane LaPointe, Lowe Gray Steele & Hoffman, Indianapolis, for appellee.
The Board of School Trustees of Salem Community Schools ("the Board") appeals from a partial summary judgment in favor of Roberta J. Robertson in Robertson's suit seeking, inter alia, reinstatement to her teaching position, back pay, and damages. We affirm. The Board raises three issues for our review which we rephrase as:
1. whether the trial court misconstrued Ind.Code § 20-6.1-6-4 when it concluded that the Board had violated the statute by denying Robertson's request for an extension of her maternity leave;
2. whether Robertson quit or abandoned her teaching position, thereby waiving any claims; and,
3. whether there is a genuine issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment in favor of Robertson.
Robertson was employed as a teacher at Salem High School. On September 9, 1987, Robertson gave written notice of her pregnancy, expected due date of March, 1988, and intention to take a maternity leave to school principal Max Bedwell and school superintendent Morris J. Rosenbaum. Robertson indicated her desire to continue working until the birth of her child, so long as it was medically possible to do so.
On March 4, 1988, Robertson's child was born. On March 14, 1988, Robertson sent a correspondence to Rosenbaum which stated, in pertinent part, Record, p. 77. On March 15, 1988, Rosenbaum informed Robertson that her maternity leave had been approved:
"The Board of Education granted your maternity leave, last evening, to begin on March 4, 1988, a little after the fact due to the early arrival. Bobbi you have a total of 23 days sick [sic] and personal days, with a Doctor's statement of your being unable to work, you will be compensated for all 23 days. After these days are used, the remainder of the semester will be uncompensated.
If your intentions are to resign at the end of this school year, I would appreciate a letter as early as possible. I promise it will not affect your pay from the above accumulated sick leave.
We will be most happy if you decide to return, but I understand the importance of being at home with a new baby."
Record, p. 78. Robertson responded March 17, 1988:
Record, p. 79. By letter dated June 6, 1988, Robertson requested an extension of her maternity leave:
Record, p. 80. On July 8, 1988, Rosenbaum informed Robertson of the Board's decision:
Record, p. 81. On July 24, 1988, Robertson wrote a letter to Bedwell, indicating that her situation required her to stay at home with her daughter for the first year and that she planned to file a grievance. On August 8, 1988, Robertson submitted her written grievance and on the accompanying cover letter hand-wrote the following note:
"Mr. Rosenbaum--
By signing this form, I am indicating that pending the Board's decision I am willing to return to school on 3/4/89 or 8/89 but not in 8/88. This should give Mr. Bedwell authorization to hire someone for the 88/89 school year or permanently depending on the Board's decision. I consider myself to be on maternity leave until the grievance procedure is complete and I am aware of the final decision.
* * * * * *
R. Robertson"
Record, p. 84. On August 18, 1988, the Board heard Robertson's appeal for reconsideration of her request and decided not to reverse its previous decision. The Board also voted to hire a replacement teacher for the 1988-89 school year. Rosenbaum informed Robertson of the Board's decision by letter dated August 22, 1988. In July, 1989, Robertson informed the Board of her continued interest in resuming her position, and Rosenbaum informed her that there were no openings in her teaching department.
On June 22, 1990, Robertson filed a four-count complaint against the Board seeking, inter alia, reinstatement to her teaching position, back pay, and damages. Count I of Robertson's complaint alleged that by refusing to extend her maternity leave, the Board had violated I.C. § 20-6.1-6-4, which provides for pregnancy-related leaves for teachers.
On November 8, 1990, Robertson filed a motion for summary judgment on all four counts of her complaint. On December 17, 1990, the Board filed its brief in opposition to Robertson's motion for summary judgment on all counts. On April 29, 1993, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Robertson on count I of her complaint and denied the Board's cross-motion for summary judgment on that same count, concluding that by refusing to extend Robertson's maternity leave, the Board violated Indiana's teacher pregnancy-related leave statute, I.C. § 20-6.1-6-4.
In our review of a trial court's entry of summary judgment, we are bound by the same standard as the trial court: we must consider all of the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, answers to interrogatories, and, where applicable, testimony in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party in order to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for resolution by the trier of fact. 1 Ayres v. Indian Heights Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc. (1986), Ind., 493 N.E.2d 1229, 1234. A genuine issue of material fact exists where facts concerning an issue that would dispose of the litigation are in dispute or where the undisputed facts are capable of supporting conflicting inferences on such an issue. If we have any doubts concerning the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, we must resolve those doubts in favor of the nonmoving party and reverse the entry of summary judgment. Woodward Ins., Inc. v. White (1982), Ind., 437 N.E.2d 59, 62. If no genuine issue of material fact exists, and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we must affirm the summary judgment. Id. The fact that both parties to an appeal requested summary judgment does not alter our standard of review. We consider each motion separately to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fischer v. Kaylor (1969), 145 Ind.App. 148, 250 N.E.2d 19.
The Board contends first that the trial court misconstrued I.C. § 20-6.1-6-4. The Board argues that the trial court's construction is erroneous because it conflicts with the plain meaning of the statute, renders the notice requirement superfluous, effectively adds language to the statute which allows a teacher to extend a leave unilaterally, and violates public policy. We disagree with each of these arguments.
Indiana Code § 20-6.1-6-1 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny teacher who is pregnant shall be granted a leave of absence for the period provided in and subject to the provisions of section 4 [IC 20-6.1-6-4]...." I.C. § 20-6.1-6-1. Indiana Code § 20-6.1-6-4, provides, in pertinent part:
I.C. § 20-6.1-6-4(1) (emphasis added). This case presents us with an issue of first impression involving the interplay of the...
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