Board of Sup'rs of Prince William County v. Wood

• Decision Date: 15 January 1973
• Citation: 213 Va. 545,193 S.E.2d 671
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: The BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY et al. v. T. Clay WOOD et al.

Page 671

193 S.E.2d 671

213 Va. 545

The BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY et al. v. T. Clay WOOD et al.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

Jan. 15, 1973.

Charles S. Perry, Manassas R. Terrence Ney, Fairfax (Floyd Caldwell Bagley, County Atty., for Prince William County, Boothe, Prichard & Dudley, Alexandria, on brief), for appellants.

Thomas G. Underwood, Manassas (Owens, Underwood & Beane, Manassas, on brief), for appellees.

Before SNEAD, C.J., and CARRICO, HARRISON, COCHRAN, HARMAN and POFF, JJ.

COCHRAN, Justice.

Prince William County adopted the county executive form of government, effective January 1, 1972. The newly elected board of supervisors thereupon appointed six new members of the county school board and one member who was serving on December 31, 1971. All seven qualified by taking the oath of office. The six members serving on December 31, 1971, who were not reappointed filed their petition for a temporary injunction and motion for a declaratory judgment against the board of supervisors and the new appointees to the school board. They sought to have the trial court restrain the new appointees from acting and declare that the board of supervisors was required to reappoint all members of the school board in office on December 31, 1971.

No ruling on the petition for a temporary injunction was made after the parties stipulated that neither the old school board nor the new school board would act until the trial court, after hearing the motion for declaratory judgment, determined which group was entitled to serve.

By final order entered February 28, 1972, the trial court ruled that Code § 15.1--609.1 ¹ required the board of supervisors to appoint the members of the school board in office on December 31, 1971, for terms of four years each beginning January 1, 1972, or at the option of the supervisors, for staggered terms. We granted the board of supervisors and the new appointees an appeal.

To ascertain the legislative intent we first consider the wording of Code § 15.1--609.1, enacted as a part of chapter 624, Acts of Assembly 1966, an Act which became effective on June 27, 1966. (Acts of Assembly 1966, p. 1590).

The 'preceding sections' referred to in the first clause are §§ 15.1--599 and 15.1--609, both relating to school board appointments in counties operating under the county executive form of government. Section 15.1--599 provides that certain appointments by the board of supervisors required by § 15.1--598, including those of school board trustees, shall be 'without definite term' and that persons so appointed may be removed from office by the board of supervisors. And § 15.1--609 provides that the school board shall be composed of trustees chosen by the board of supervisors to serve 'at the pleasure of the appointing board'. So the first clause of § 15.1--609.1 must be construed to mean 'In spite of the provisions of §§ 15.1--599 and 15.1--609'.

The second clause, 'in any county which hereafter adopts the county executive form of organization and government under this article', clearly connotes prospective application. Since the statute speaks as of its effective date, the word 'hereafter' means 'after June 27, 1966'. The effect of this language is to exclude from the Act any counties operating under the county executive plan prior to June 27, 1966. Such counties remain subject to the provisions of §§ 15.1--598, 15.1--599 and 15.1--609.

Section 15.1--609.1, as it appears in chapter 624, Acts of Assembly 1966, further provides that 'the trustees of the county school boards in office on the effective date of this act and those hereafter appointed shall be appointed or reappointed, as the case may be, . . ..' A comparison reveals that in codifying this portion of the Act as § 15.1--609.1 the words 'the effective date of this act' were changed to 'June twenty-seven, nineteen hundred sixty-six', the actual effective date of the Act. So the language must be construed to refer to trustees of the county school boards in office on June 27, 1966, and those appointed after June 27, 1966.

The statute concludes by setting terms of four years each for school board trustees with provision for initial appointments for one to four years, respectively, if the board of supervisors so elects.

Appellants attempt without success to reconcile the provisions of §§ 15.1--599, 15.1--609 and 15.1--609.1. These sections, they argue, when read together mean that school board trustees will serve for four years each, unless it is the pleasure of the supervisors sooner to remove them without cause. This construction is untenable. The sections cannot and were not intended to be reconciled. Section 15.1--609.1 was clearly intended to make an exception to §§ 15.1--599 and 15.1--609, as shown by use of the phrase 'notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding sections.' It was intended to require fixed four year terms for school board trustees after initial appointments for either staggered or four year terms, and it was not intended to reserve to the supervisors the right to remove them at will.

Appellants argue that the trustees 'hereafter appointed' within the meaning of § 15.1--609.1 should be construed to mean those appointed after a county has adopted the county executive form of government. But they concede that the Act speaks from its effective date and there is nothing to suggest that 'hereafter' has any meaning in this statute other than 'after the effective date of this act'. Moreover, if 'hereafter' is construed to mean after a county has adopted the county executive form of government then 'the effective date of this act' should be held to be the date when a county commences to operate thereunder. Such a construction is of no benefit to appellants.

In order to construe the Act to reach the result sought by appellants it is necessary to ignore the italicized words in the clause 'the trustees of the county school boards In office on the effective date of this act and those hereafter appointed shall be appointed or reappointed . . .'. But these words cannot be ignored. 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction 339 (3d ed. 1943). It is true, as appellants point out, that other statutes, inapplicable here, extending the terms of certain school board trustees (Code § 22--83.1), fixing the terms of others (Code § 22--83.2), and providing that trustees in counties not operating under a special form of government complete their terms after a change in the method of selection has been effected (Code § 22--79.3), have never required the reappointment of existing trustees. All these statutes, nevertheless, evince a continuing legislative interest in cushioning the shock to the public school system from sudden changes in local government. Staggered terms afford some continuity in the operation of school boards. But the continuity is subject to abrupt disruption if the appointing body may at will replace an entire board, as the construction placed upon § 15.1--609.1 by the appellants would permit.

We conclude that a fair reading of Code § 15.1--609.1 requires that it be construed to mandate the initial appointment of the school board trustees in office on December 31, 1971, either for four year terms each or, at the supervisors' option, for one, two, three and four years, respectively. As terms...