Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Snell Const. Corp.
| Decision Date | 04 March 1974 |
| Parties | BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF FAIRFAX COUNTY v. SNELL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and Preston Construction Corporation. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
John F. Rick, Asst. County Atty. for Fairfax County (Frederic Lee Ruck, County Atty. for Fairfax County, on brief), for appellant.
David E. Feldman, Fairfax (Dexter S. Odin; Odin & Feldman, Fairfax, on brief), for appellees.
Before SNEAD, C.J., and I'ANSON, CARRICO, HARRISON, COCHRAN, HARMAN and POFF, JJ.
This appeal presents our first opportunity to consider the standard to be applied in judicial review of the validity of a zoning ordinance, enacted on motion of the zoning authority, which effects a piecemeal reduction of permissible residential density (downzoning).
Under the 1964 Annandale Comprehensive Master Plan, a 26 acre tract of land lying south of State Route 236 between Backlick Road on the east and Ravensworth Road on the west in Annandale, now owned by Snell Construction Corporation and Preston Construction Corporation (landowners), was zoned for low residential density. On May 16, 1969, landowners filed an application for increased density on a 16 acre portion of the tract. At that time, the 1964 plan was being considered for revision. On February 25, 1970, the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County (the Board) adopted a new Annandale Master Plan. That plan, comprehending the entire Annandale complex, included two zoning districts affecting the 26 acre tract, one permitting high density and the other medium density.
Representing the southern boundary of the high density district, the dividing line between the two districts is shown on maps of the 1970 plan as a 'collector' road running approximately parallel to Route 236 across landowners' property and connecting Backlick and Ravensworth. A dispute arose whether the eastern terminus of the dividing line was intended to be at Jayhawk Street 1300 feet south of Route 236 or at Falcon Street 1500 feet south. It was fixed in an undated errata sheet prepared by staff (never formally approved by the Board) at Falcon Street.
On December 28, 1970, at the express urging of the county land use staff, landowners filed an amended application requesting high density zoning in the northern portion of the 26 acre tract and medium density in the southern portion in accordance with the new Master Plan. Their application showed the eastern terminus of the dividing line at Falcon Street. The Planning Commission disapproved the amended application but recommended that the entire 26 acres be zoned to the density requested in the original application. On May 26, 1971 the Board declined the recommendation and adopted an ordinance granting landowners' amended application.
On April 17, 1972 a newly-elected Board of Supervisors, proceeding on its own motion adopted an ordinance reducing the high density authorized by the old Board in the May 26, 1971 ordinance to medium density and fixing the eastern terminus of the southern boundary of the high density district at Jayhawk Street.
Landowners filed a motion for declaratory judgment praying that the trial court declare the April 17, 1972 ordinance void and the May 26, 1971 ordinance valid. By letter opinion dated November 14, 1972 and final decree entered November 24, 1972 the trial court granted landowners' prayer, ruling that 'the defendants can change the zoning, provided there is a substantial change in circumstances or a mistake', finding that 'the evidence does not support a finding of substantial change in circumstances or mistake as to merit the downzoning on April 17, 1972', and holding that 'the action of Defendants . . . in downzoning the Complainant's property . . . (was) arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and, therefore, illegal, invalid and void'.
We look first to the policy and purposes of the zoning statutes adopted by the General Assembly, Code Title 15.1, Chapter 11. Read as a whole, the statutes strike a deliberate balance between private property rights and public interests.
'This chapter is intended to encourage local governments to improve public health, safety, convenience or welfare and to plan for the future development of communities to the end that transportation systems be carefully planned; that new community centers be developed with adequate highway, utility, health, educational, and recreational facilities; that the needs of agriculture, industry and business be recognized in future growth; that residential areas be provided with healthy surrounding for family life; and that the growth of the community be consonant with the efficient and economical use of public funds.' Code § 15.1--427 (Repl.Vol.1973).
The statutes recognize that public power over private property rights should be exercised judiciously and equitably. That policy springs not only from public respect for personal rights and individual integrity but also from enlightened public self-interest. The General Assembly has recognized that it is in the public interest that private land not required for public use be put to its optimum use to fulfill societal needs. One purpose of zoning ordinances is 'to encourage economic development activities that provide desirable employment and enlarge the tax base', Code § 15.1--489 (Repl.Vol.1973), and '(z)oning ordinances . . . shall be drawn with reasonable consideration for . . . the conservation of properties and their values . . .' Code § 15.1--490 (Repl.Vol.1973).
Under the private enterprise system, land use is influenced by the profit motive. Profit flows from investments of time, talent, and capital. Landowners venture investments only when the prospects of profit are reasonable. Prospects are reasonable only when permissible land use is reasonably predictable. The Virginia landowner always confronts the possibility that permissible land use may be changed by a comprehensive zoning ordinance reducing profit prospects; yet, the Virginia statutes assure him that such a change will not be made suddenly, arbitrarily, or capriciously but only after a period of investigation and community planning.
We look next to general principles governing judicial review of zoning ordinances.
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