Board of Trade v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 8897

Citation156 F.2d 33
Decision Date21 October 1946
Docket Number8898.,No. 8897,8897
PartiesBOARD OF TRADE OF CITY OF CHICAGO v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION et al. GREAT LAKES ELEVATOR CORPORATION et al. v. SAME.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Weymouth Kirkland, Howard Ellis, and William H. Symmes, all of Chicago, Ill., for appellant Board of Trade.

Floyd E. Thompson, Frederick Mayer, A. L. Rittenberg, C. M. Meyer, Leo F. Tierney, Louis A. Kohn, Ferre C. Watkins, and Charles Meyers, all of Chicago, Ill., for appellants Great Lakes Elevator Corporation et al.

George F. Barrett, William C. Wines, Irvin Rooks, and Lee A. Freeman, all of Chicago, Ill. (Albert J. Meserow, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), for appellees.

Before MAJOR and KERNER, Circuit Judges, and BRIGGLE, District Judge.

Writ of Certiorari Granted October 21, 1946. See 67 S.Ct. 114.

MAJOR, Circuit Judge.

These are separate appeals from an order of the District Court, entered June 26, 1945, denying plaintiffs an injunction and sustaining defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' complaint, and dismissing their causes of action. The appellant in No. 8897 is the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, and the appellants in No. 8898 are operators of warehouses for the storage of grain located in Chicago, Illinois. The latter have been licensed by the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States (hereinafter referred to as the Secretary), pursuant to the United States Warehouse Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 241 et seq., hereinafter referred to as the Warehouse Act. The appellees in both appeals are the Illinois Commerce Commission, the members of such Commission, Daniel F. Rice & Company and the Attorney General of Illinois. While separate briefs and arguments have been submitted to this court in behalf of the parties in each appeal, the questions for decision are of a kindred nature and we are of the view that both appeals may be appropriately considered and disposed of in the same opinion.

On July 28, 1944, Daniel F. Rice & Company (hereinafter referred to as Rice) caused to be filed before the Illinois Commerce Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) their complaint against the appellants in Nos. 8897 and 8898, alleging violations of the Public Utility Act and the Illinois Grain Warehouse Act of the State of Illinois, Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, c. 111 2/3, § 1 et seq.; c. 114, § 293 et seq. Subsequently, there was filed before the Commission separate motions by the Board of Trade and by the warehousemen to dismiss such proceeding on the ground that the Commission was without jurisdiction. On October 10, 1944, the Commission, after consideration of briefs and oral argument, entered its order denying the motions to dismiss the Rice complaint and setting the cause for hearing on October 24, 1944.

Thereupon, the Board of Trade and the warehousemen filed in the District Court separate complaints for the purpose of enjoining the Rice defendants from the further prosecution of their proceeding before the Commission, of enjoining the Commission from entertaining further jurisdiction of said matter and the Attorney General of the State of Illinois from instituting any proceeding against the instant plaintiffs for the purpose of enforcing any order of the Commission in the case now pending before it. Motions to dismiss each of the complaints were interposed. The two causes were consolidated for hearing in the court below, and such motions to dismiss were allowed in a single order. As stated, there are two appeals from this order, one in No. 8897 and the other in No. 8898.

The contested issues in these appeals are predicated upon a similar pattern. While stated by the respective parties in somewhat different phraseology, the essential question for decision on the merits is whether the federal government has by legislation so occupied and pre-empted the field of regulation of the Board of Trade in one appeal and the warehousemen in the other as to deprive the Commission of authority to grant the relief and therefore to regulate in the manner prayed for by Rice. In contending that the federal government has so occupied and pre-empted the field, the Board of Trade (appellant in No. 8897) relies upon the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq., and the warehousemen (appellants in No. 8898) rely upon the Warehouse Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 241 et seq. While these legislative enactments are separate and distinct, they are as applied to the facts of this case somewhat dependent upon each other, as will be hereinafter disclosed. Another issue raised by the Attorney General of Illinois is that the court below was without jurisdiction to hear and decide the questions presented.

We shall first consider the appeal by the warehousemen (No. 8898). In so doing, it appears desirable to relate further the facts as alleged in the complaint. Jurisdiction was alleged because the controversy arose under the laws of the United States, more particularly under the Warehouse Act, together with the regulations promulgated thereunder, and also by reason of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution. It was alleged that each of the plaintiffs was engaged in the public storage of grain for hire for interstate commerce under a license duly issued by the Secretary, pursuant to the Warehouse Act, and under a schedule of rates, charges and practices duly filed with the said Secretary, as required by law, and that each of said plaintiffs as a holder of such license was subject to said Warehouse Act and the rules and regulations duly promulgated thereunder. Each of the plaintiffs, except Great Lakes Elevator Corporation, dealt in grain, both on its own account and as agent for others.

The grain market at Chicago is the world's largest grain market. For the year ending December 31, 1943, approximately two billion bushels of grain were shipped into and out of that market both by rail and water, from and to states other than Illinois. Over 90% of the trade in grain futures contracts in the United States was transacted at the said market on the said Board of Trade, a corporation which has been designated a contract market by the Secretary under the Commodity Exchange Act. Under that Act futures contracts on the Board of Trade and other contract markets may be satisfied by offsetting settlements between the contracting parties, by delivery in kind of the grain involved in the contract, or by the delivery of valid negotiable warehouse receipts of certain characteristics, including receipts issued under the Warehouse Act. The warehouse receipts issued to plaintiffs were issued under, and complied in all respects with the Warehouse Act, and were in general use upon the said Board of Trade in satisfaction of futures contracts on the interstate market, and as such were instruments of interstate commerce.

Then follows a review of the proceedings initiated by Rice before the Commission, plaintiffs' motions to dismiss and the action of the Commission thereon, as heretofore related and which need not be further detailed at this point. It was alleged that each of the plaintiffs, except Great Lakes Elevator Corporation, did business as an owner and merchandiser of grain and regularly stored, for interstate commerce, grain owned by it as well as that of others in its warehouse or warehouses; that this right was permitted by the Warehouse Act and regulations, but that under the Constitution of the State of Illinois as construed by the Illinois Supreme Court it was illegal for a public warehouseman to store his own grain in a public warehouse operated by him. It was alleged that plaintiffs issued to themselves negotiable warehouse receipts for grain, in form prescribed by the Warehouse Act, representing in the aggregate many millions of dollars annually, and that such receipts represent the grain belonging to the owners of such warehouses. Such receipts were used by plaintiffs for the purpose of transferring title to such grain in sales to others and also as collateral for commercial loans obtained from banks. Such receipts were also used by others for a similar purpose. Many of such warehouse receipts were alleged to be outstanding and pledged as collateral for such loans. It was alleged that an application of the Illinois law would make the storing of such grain illegal and would destroy and seriously impair the value of such warehouse receipts in commercial transactions.

It was alleged that a hearing by the Commission on the Rice complaint would have the immediate effect of creating a cloud upon such warehouse receipts outstanding or to be issued and that plaintiffs as well as the public would be subjected as a result to irreparable damages. It was further alleged that plaintiffs were subject to fine and imprisonment for failure to take out a state license under the Illinois law, and that the Commission by its refusal to dismiss the Rice complaint has decided that plaintiffs are subject to the laws of the State of Illinois and the penalties provided for violations thereof.

Each of the plaintiffs filed an affidavit in support of the motion for preliminary injunction, disclosing in detail the national scope of its business. These affidavits show the amount of grain in bushels and value shipped and received by such warehouses from states other than Illinois. (We see no occasion to detail such information inasmuch as no question is here raised but that plaintiffs were engaged in interstate commerce.) The affidavits recite the issuance by each of the plaintiffs of warehouse receipts on forms furnished by the Department of Agriculture, which state on their face that the grain received by each warehouseman was "for storage in the course of interstate or foreign commerce." For the purpose of showing the value of the federal licenses held by plaintiffs, the amount of grain for a designated period stored in each warehouse, including that owned by the warehouseman...

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