Board of Trustees, Huntley Project School Dist. No. 24, Worden v. Board of County Com'rs of Yellowstone County

• Decision Date: 06 February 1980
• Docket Number: No. 14908,14908
• Parties: BOARD OF TRUSTEES, HUNTLEY PROJECT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 24, WORDEN, Montana, Petitioner and Appellant, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF YELLOWSTONE, State of Montana, and M. E. McClintock, Duane E. Christiansen and J. A. Straw, Constituting the members of said Board, Respondents and Respondents.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 1069

606 P.2d 1069

186 Mont. 148

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, HUNTLEY PROJECT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 24, WORDEN, Montana, Petitioner and Appellant, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF YELLOWSTONE,

State of Montana, and M. E. McClintock, Duane E.

Christiansen and J. A. Straw, Constituting the members of

said Board, Respondents and Respondents.

No. 14908.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted Jan. 17, 1980.

Decided Feb. 6, 1980.

Davidson, Veeder, Baugh & Broeder, Doris M. Poppler argued, Billings, for petitioner and appellant.

Harold F. Hanser, County Atty., David W. Hoefer argued, Deputy County Atty., Billings, for respondents and respondents.

DALY, Justice.

This action arose from an application for a peremptory writ filed on the 26th day of January, 1979 by the Board of Trustees of Huntley Project School District No. 24, Worden, Montana, asking the court to compel the Yellowstone County Commissioners to void the meeting of December 28, 1978 and all actions taken at said meeting. This was based on petitioner's contention that the said meeting was not held in conformance with the laws of the State of Montana requiring public boards and commissions to hold open meetings after proper notice to the public whenever action is to be taken or a decision is to be made by the public agency.

The case was heard on stipulated facts without a jury and submitted on briefs to the District Court. The District Court denied the application. It is from this denial that the Huntley Project School District No. 24 appeals.

On December 26, 1978, a public meeting was held at the Yellowstone County Courthouse for the purpose of hearing testimony by the public and other interested parties in regard to the preliminary plat of Pryor Creek Estates Subdivision. A number of people testified both for and against the proposed subdivision. The Board's public hearing on the preliminary plat was then closed by the Chairman. The Commissioners announced that they would take the matter under advisement and that a decision would be made in the next day or two.

On December 28, 1978, pursuant to adjournment, the Board of Commissioners convened at 9:00 a. m. The minutes reflect that Commissioners Christensen, Kamp, McClintock and County Clerk Klundt were present. The minutes indicate that the subdivision was conditionally approved on the motion of Mr. Kamp and seconded by Commissioner Christensen. A footnote adds that Commissioner McClintock was not aware of the meeting on this matter, nor that a vote was to be taken at this time.

The actual decision was made at approximately 2:30 in the afternoon of December 28th, 1978. The vote was conducted by telephone. Duane Christensen was on the phone in his office; David Hoefer of the County Attorney's Office was on a phone in the secretarial area of the Commissioners' office; Bonnie Hudson, a Deputy Clerk and Recorder, was in the conference room on an extension phone; and Leo Kamp was on a phone at the Circle Inn. Mr. McClintock was also at the Circle Inn but was not notified of the call and was not at that time aware that a vote was being taken on the matter. However, Mr. McClintock, to the best of his recollection, had on the morning of December 28th, 1978, participated in a discussion with Commissioners Kamp and Christensen concerning the Pryor Creek Estates Subdivision, with no decision being made at that time.

On January 9, 1979, Commissioner Christensen attempted to have the December 28, 1978 action reconsidered, but failed when his motion was not seconded.

After the filing of the lawsuit, a letter was sent to Elmer Link, the developer of the subdivision, by Commissioner Christensen, which purported to be findings of fact and conclusions of law. The School District challenged these findings of fact on a procedural basis alleging they were not based on a resolution passed by the Board of County Commissioners as required by section 76-3-608, MCA. The District Court ruled that the requirements of section 76-3-608, MCA had been met. Apparently these alleged findings were never filed with the County Clerk and Recorder. Written findings of fact were, however, filed with the Yellowstone County Clerk and Recorder on March 22, 1979. These findings appear to comply with section 76-3-608, MCA.

The following issues are presented for review:

(1) Did the District Court err in determining that the Commissioners' meeting of December 28, 1978 was improper but that there existed insufficient grounds to nullify the action taken by the commission?

(2) Did the District Court abuse its discretion by not compelling respondents to void the meeting of December 28, 1979?

(3) Is mandamus a proper remedy in this matter?

The Montana Constitution guarantees that "(n)o person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state government and its subdivisions, except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure." Article II, section 9, 1972 Constitution of the State of Montana.

Montana also has a number of statutes which protect this right to an "open meeting", sections 2-3-201, MCA, et seq.

Section 2-3-201 provides:

"The legislature finds and declares that public boards, commissions, councils, and other public agencies in this state exist to aid in the conduct of the peoples' business. It is the intent of this part that actions and deliberations of all public agencies shall be conducted openly. The people of the state do not wish to abdicate their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. Toward these ends, the provisions of the part shall be liberally construed."

Section 2-3-203, MCA provides:

"(1) All meetings of public or governmental bodies, boards, bureaus, commissions, agencies of the state, or any political subdivision of the state or organizations or agencies supported in whole or in part by public funds or expending public funds shall be open to the public.

"(2) Provided, however, the presiding officer of any meeting may close the meeting during the time the discussion relates to a matter of individual privacy and then if and only if the presiding officer determines that the demands of individual privacy clearly exceed the merits of public disclosure. The right of individual privacy may be waived by the individual about whom the discussion pertains and, in that event, the meeting shall be open.

"(3) However, a meeting may be closed to discuss a strategy to be followed with respect to collective bargaining or litigation when an open meeting would have a detrimental effect on the bargaining or litigating position of the public agency.

"(4) Any committee or subcommittee appointed by a public body for the purpose of conducting business which is within the jurisdiction of that agency shall be subject to the requirements of this section."

A "meeting" is defined as ". . . the convening of a quorum of the constituent membership of a public agency, whether corporal or by means of electronic equipment, to hear, discuss, or act upon a matter over which the agency has supervision, control, jurisdiction, or advisory power." Section 2-3-202, MCA.

"Appropriate minutes of all meetings required by 2-3-203 to be open shall be kept and shall be available for inspection by the public." Section 2-3-212(1), MCA. Such minutes must include the:

"(a) date, time, and place of meeting;

"(b) a list of the individual members of the public body, agency, or organization in attendance;

"(c) the substance of all matters proposed, discussed, or decided; and

"(d) at the request of any member, a record by individual members of any votes taken." Section 2-3-212(2), MCA.

"Any decision made in violation of 2-3-203 may be declared void by a district court having jurisdiction. A suit to void any such decision must be commenced within 30 days of the decision." Section 2-3-213, MCA.

"Each agency shall develop procedures for permitting and encouraging the public to participate in agency decisions that are of significant interest to the public. The procedures shall assure adequate notice and assist public participation before a final agency action is taken that is of significant interest to the public." Section 2-3-103(1), MCA.

An agency shall be considered to have complied with the above notice provision if:

"(3) a public hearing, after appropriate notice is given, is held pursuant to any other provision of state law or a local ordinance or resolution; or

"(4) a newspaper of general circulation within the area to be affected by a decision of significant interest to the public has carried a news story or advertisement concerning the decision sufficiently prior to a final decision to permit public comment on the matter." Section 2-3-104, MCA.

There is no question that the above statutes apply to the County Commissioners and to this "meeting".

In addition, there are statutes which specifically regulate the meetings of County Commissioners.

Section 7-5-2122, MCA provides:

"(1) The governing body of the county shall establish by resolution a regular meeting date and notify the public of that date.

"(2) The governing body of the county, except as may be otherwise required of them, may meet at the county seat of their respective counties at any time for the purpose of attending to county business. Commissioners may, by resolution and prior 2 days' posted public notice, designate another meeting time and place."

Section 7-5-2125, MCA provides that "(a)ll meetings of the board of county commissioners must be public."

The outcome of this case rests on a determination of whether the "meeting" held by the County Commissioners on December 28, 1978 complied with the provisions of the above statutes.

Respondents argue that the "meeting" did not violate the above statutes. They submit that the "meeting" was a continuation of a meeting properly held on December 26, 1978. They further submit that notice was given...