Board of Trustees of Hamilton Heights School Corp. v. Landry

• Citation: 560 N.E.2d 102
• Decision Date: 27 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 06A01-8909-CV-384,06A01-8909-CV-384
• Parties: 62 Ed. Law Rep. 1123 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF HAMILTON HEIGHTS SCHOOL CORPORATION, Ronald E. McGill, Sylvia Kay Hartley, Marcia A. House, Keith Schulenberg, and Laurence C. Beck, Individually and in their capacity as members of the Board of School Trustees of Hamilton Heights School Corporation, Appellants-Defendants, v. Roger V. LANDRY, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

Page 102

560 N.E.2d 102

62 Ed. Law Rep. 1123

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF HAMILTON HEIGHTS SCHOOL CORPORATION Ronald E. McGill, Sylvia Kay Hartley, Marcia A. House, Keith Schulenberg, and Laurence C. Beck, Individually and in their capacity as members of the Board of School Trustees of Hamilton Heights School Corporation, Appellants-Defendants, v. Roger V. LANDRY, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 06A01-8909-CV-384.

Court of Appeals of Indiana First District.

Sept. 27, 1990.

Rodney V. Taylor, David J. Theising, Christopher & Theising, Indianapolis, Stephen A. Holt, Holt, Fleck & Free, Noblesville, for appellants-defendants.

Richard J. Darko, Mary Jane Lapointe, Lowe Gray Steele & Hoffman, Indianapolis, for appellee-plaintiff.

David J. Emmert, Indianapolis, Indiana School Boards Ass'n, in support of Hamilton Heights School Corp., for amicus curiae.

RATLIFF, Chief Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Board of Trustees of Hamilton Heights School Corporation (Board) and its individual members, Ronald E. McGill, Sylvia Kay Hartley, Marcia A. House, Keith Schulenberg, and Laurence C. Beck, (collectively, Board Members) appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Robert V. Landry (Landry) on Counts II, III, and IV of Landry's complaint and the trial court's denial of summary judgment for the Board and Board Members ¹ on Counts I and V of Landry's complaint. We reverse.

FACTS

During the 1986-87 school year Landry was a certified permanent teacher at Hamilton Heights Junior High School. On February 6, 1987, he removed the glossary from the back of 146 science textbooks owned by the school. The superintendent met with Landry on February 25, 1987, and the following day advised Landry by letter that the superintendent recommended Landry be suspended from work without pay for two days and repay the School Book Rental Fund $1.00 for each textbook damaged. After a Board hearing requested by Landry, the Board approved and ratified the disciplinary action recommended by the superintendent. On May 21 and 22, 1987, Landry was suspended from his teaching Landry filed a five count complaint against the Board and Board Members on April 28, 1988. Count I and Count V alleged federal law claims, whereas Count II alleged a violation of the Indiana Teachers' Tenure Act, Count III alleged a breach of Landry's individual Teacher's Contract, and Count IV alleged the assessment of an unlawful fine against Landry's wages. Landry filed a motion for summary judgment, and later clarified his motion to indicate he was seeking summary judgment on Counts II, III, and IV, but was not seeking summary judgment on Counts I and V. The Board and Board Members filed a motion for summary judgment against Landry on all five counts.

duties, and his paycheck was reduced by $220.00 for that period. The $146.00 damage charge also was paid. ²

On August 30, 1989, the trial court entered judgment for Landry and against the Board on Counts II, III, and IV. The court granted judgment against the Board for the amount of compensation withheld from Landry, the $146.00 damage charge, and interest. On September 1, 1989, the trial court clarified its judgment with an entry denying the Board's motion. The court again granted Landry's motion on Counts II, III, and IV and awarded him $146.00 plus compensation for lost wages in the amount of $220.00 plus interest.

Because the court's entries appeared to adjudicate fewer than all of Landry's claims, the Board filed a motion on September 26, 1989, to make the September 1, 1989, entry on summary judgment motions final or, alternatively, to certify the entry for interlocutory appeal. The trial court made the September 1, 1989, entry on summary judgment motions final. The Board then filed this appeal. The parties have filed a joint statement of proceedings since no record of the hearings on summary judgment was made. Further facts will be provided as necessary to the discussion.

ISSUES

The Board and Board Members raise seven issues for our review which we restate as:

1. Whether the Board had the legal authority to suspend Landry for two days.

2. Whether the Board had the legal authority to suspend Landry without pay.

3. Whether Landry's suspension for two days without pay violated the Master Agreement between the teacher's union and the Board or Landry's individual contract.

4. Whether the Board Members are personally liable for Landry's claims.

Landry raises an additional issue:

5. Whether the denial of the Board's motion for summary judgment on Counts I and V of Landry's complaint is properly before this court.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

In our review of the grant or denial of summary judgment, we stand in the trial court's shoes and consider the same matters it considered. Chambers v. Central School District School Board of Greene County (1987), Ind.App., 514 N.E.2d 1294, 1296. As neither party contends any material issues of fact exist as to Counts II, III, or IV of Landry's complaint, we will review the trial court's grant and denial of summary judgment motions to see whether the trial court correctly applied the law. Chambers, 514 N.E.2d at 1296; City of Hammond v. Cataldi (1983), Ind.App., 449 N.E.2d 1184, 1186.

Issue One

The Board contends the trial court erred in granting Landry summary judgment and in denying the Board summary judgment on Count II of Landry's complaint. Count II alleged the Board's action in suspending Landry was a violation of the Indiana Teachers' Tenure Act and was otherwise outside the Board's authority.

The Teachers' Tenure Act, now codified at IND.CODE Sec. 20-6.1-4-9 et seq., is based upon the public policy of protecting the educational interest of the state and its principal purpose is to secure permanency in the teaching force by creating a uniform system of permanent contracts. See State ex rel. Tittle v. Covington Community Consolidated Schools of Fountain and Warren Counties (1951), 229 Ind. 208, 215, 96 N.E.2d 334, 336; Watson v. Burnett (1939), 216 Ind. 216, 222, 23 N.E.2d 420, 423; School City of Lafayette v. Highley (1938), 213 Ind. 369, 376, 12 N.E.2d 927, 930 (all three cases interpreting prior versions of the Teachers' Tenure Act). The Teachers' Tenure Act was not meant to grant special privileges to teachers as a class or as individuals. State ex rel. Clark v. Stout (1933), 206 Ind. 58, 64, 187 N.E. 267, 269; Engel, Trustee v. Mathley (1943), 113 Ind.App. 458, 469, 48 N.E.2d 463, 467, trans. denied. Therefore, since it is legislation in which the public is interested, we must liberally construe the statutory provisions to effect the Act's general purpose. Tittle, 229 Ind. at 215, 96 N.E.2d at 336.

IND.CODE Sec. 20-6.1-4-9 et seq. establishes a uniform state system for local school boards to contract with public school teachers. Mandatory procedures for termination, described as cancellation of an indefinite contract, of a semi-permanent or permanent teacher are provided in I.C. Sec. 20-6.1-4-11.

The teacher tenure provisions do not expressly prohibit suspension of a teacher. To the contrary, IND.CODE Sec. 20-6.1-4-11(a)(8) provides that: "Pending a decision on the cancellation of a teacher's contract, the teacher may be suspended from duty; ..." In addition, IND.CODE Sec. 20-6.1-6-13 provides: "A school corporation may not ... suspend any employee because of affiliation with or activity in an organization unless that organization advocates ... overthrow of the United States government ... or violation of law ..." Finally, IND.CODE Sec. 20-6.1-6-14(a) provides: "A governing body may not ... suspend ... a teacher who is a candidate for public office unless ... the teacher's activity has impaired his effectiveness in his service or has interfered with the performance of his contractual obligations. Any suspension is valid only during the period of the impairing activity."

Although I.C. Sec. 20-6.1-4-11(a)(8) expressly authorizes a school board to suspend a teacher pending contract cancellation and I.C. Sec. 20-6.1-6-13 and I.C. Sec. 20-6.1-6-14 both implicitly acknowledge a board's power to suspend by prohibiting a board from exercising its power in the identified instances, nothing in the teacher tenure provisions expressly gives a board the power or authority to order a disciplinary suspension of a teacher absent the pendency of contract cancellation proceedings. Thus, while we find the Board violated no express provision of the teacher tenure act by suspending Landry for two days without pay, we must look beyond the teacher tenure provisions for the source of the Board's authority.

The power and authority of a school board in Indiana must be expressly conferred by statute or arise by necessary implication. See Myers v. Greater Clark County School Corporation (1984), Ind.App., 464 N.E.2d 1323, 1329. The provisions of the Indiana General School Powers Act do not expressly empower a board to order a disciplinary suspension of a teacher, but do give broad authority and flexibility to school boards. In fact, IND.CODE Sec. 20-5-6-3 declares that the General School Powers Act:

"shall be liberally construed to permit the governing body of school corporations to conduct its affairs in a manner consistent with sound business practice to the ends that the authority of the governing body shall be clarified and that it shall be permitted to operate with the maximum efficiency consistent with accountability."

The specific powers section of the General School Powers Act provides in IND.CODE Sec. 20-5-2-2:

"In carrying out the school purposes of each school corporation, its governing body acting on its behalf shall have the following specific powers: ...

(2) To take charge of, manage, and conduct the educational affairs of the school corporation ...

(7) To employ, contract for, and discharge ... teachers ...

(17) To prepare, make, enforce, amend, or repeal rules, regulations, and procedures for the government and management of the schools ... and ... its ... employees...