Board of Trustees of Community College Dist. No. 508 v. Illinois Community College Bd.

• Decision Date: 28 August 1978
• Docket Number: No. 77-1664,77-1664
• Citation: 63 Ill.App.3d 969,20 Ill.Dec. 779,380 N.E.2d 988
• Parties: , 20 Ill.Dec. 779 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT NO. 508, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS COMMUNITY COLLEGE BOARD, Hugh D. Hammerslag, Toussaint L. Hale, Jr., Frank F. Fowle, Paul B. Hanks, Vivian Medak, James W. Sanders, Sharon Sharp, Lila B. Teer, John Goudy and Dennis W. Trueslsen, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 988

380 N.E.2d 988

63 Ill.App.3d 969, 20 Ill.Dec. 779

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT NO. 508 Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS COMMUNITY COLLEGE BOARD, Hugh D. Hammerslag Toussaint L. Hale, Jr., Frank F. Fowle, Paul B. Hanks Vivian Medak, James W. Sanders, Sharon Sharp, Lila B. Teer John Goudy and Dennis W. Trueslsen, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 77-1664.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division.

Aug. 28, 1978.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Chicago, for defendants-appellants; Karen Konieczny, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, of counsel.

Arvey, Hodes, Costello & Burman, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee; George L. Siegel, Chicago, of counsel.

LORENZ, Justice:

Defendants appeal from an order granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and requiring defendants to certify to the State Comptroller plaintiff's claimed credit hour grants. On appeal defendants contend that: (1) the circuit court lacked the jurisdiction needed to hear the action, and (2) assuming the circuit court had jurisdiction, its order was erroneous.

The following evidence, which is not in dispute, is pertinent to the disposition of this appeal.

On August 3 and August 18, 1977, plaintiff filed with defendants its claims for a reimbursement for accumulated "credit hours." Plaintiff filed its claims under section 2-16 of the Public Community College Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 122, par. 102-16), which provided that a community college district "is entitled to claim a credit hour grant for all instructional categories, the average of which is not less than $17.61 for each semester hour or equivalent in a course carried through each mid-term by each student in attendance." Plaintiff claimed a total of 102,082.44 credit hours, all of which related to the 1977 summer school session, which is included in fiscal year 1978. Effective July 1, 1977, the legislature appropriated $100,127,000 for credit hour grants for fiscal year 1978 (P.A. 80-59). Defendants, in their answer to plaintiff's complaint, admitted that they refused to certify plaintiff's claims "as required by Section 2-16 of the Illinois Community College Act for reason that said Act states: 'the rate of the credit hour grant shall be specified for each year in the Act making the appropriation for this purpose' and the Appropriation Act * * * did not specify the rates for the credit hour grants * * * ." Plaintiff filed suit for an injunction and mandamus to compel certification of its claims at the statutory minimum of $17.61 per hour. On October 19, 1977, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and directed defendants to certify to the State Comptroller plaintiff's claims at an average rate of not less than the statutory minimum.

On November 7, 1977, defendants filed a notice of appeal.

OPINION

Defendants first contend that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to hear this case because it is a suit against the State and barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. They cite Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 127, par. 801, which provides that: "Except as provided in 'AN ACT to create the Court of Claims * * * ', filed July 17, 1945, as amended, the State of Illinois shall not be made a defendant or party in any court." Defendants stress that this action was brought against State officials, and cite the "general rule" that where suit is brought against a State official, and the judgment or decree although nominally against the official could operate to control the action of the State or subject it to liability, the cause in effect is a suit against the State. (Struve v. State Dep't of Conservation (1973), 14 Ill.App.3d 1092, 303 N.E.2d 32.) Whether a suit is considered to be brought against the State and barred by sovereign immunity depends, however, not on the identification of the formal parties in the record, but on the issues involved and the relief sought. (Moline Tool Co. v. Dep't of Revenue (1951), 410 Ill. 35, 101 N.E.2d 71; G. H. Sternberg & Co. v. Bond (1975),30 Ill.App.3d 874, 333 N.E.2d 261.) A suit against State officials which seeks to compel them to perform their duty is not held to be a suit against the State, and the payment of State funds may therefore be compelled. (See People ex rel. Hilger v. Myers (1969), 114 Ill.App.2d 478, 252 N.E.2d 924; People ex rel. Kaneland Community Unit School Dist. No. 302 v. Howlett (1964), 30 Ill.2d 128, 195 N.E.2d 678.) Defendants argue that this suit should be barred because the certification of claims for reimbursement is the type of discretionary rather than ministerial action which the courts have consistently refused to compel government officials to take. (See Mora v. State of Illinois (1977), 68 Ill.2d 223, 12 Ill.Dec. 161, 369 N.E.2d 868.) As support for this argument defendants cite section 2-16 of the Public Community College Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 122, § 102-16) which states in part that "(u)pon approval of any claim under this Section, the State Board shall prepare and certify to the State Comptroller the report of claims for community college grants * * * ." Defendants argue that under this statute, they have the "power to approve" plaintiff's claims, and that this power makes the certification of claims a discretionary governmental action which cannot be compelled. Further, as support for their argument, defendants cite Boards of Education of School Districts 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 731/2, 74 and 219, Cook County v. Cronin (1977), 54 Ill.App.3d 584, 12 Ill.Dec. 396, 370 N.E.2d 19.

We disagree with defendants' argument. In Cronin, plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel defendants, State education officials, to disburse certain monetary amounts. These amounts were claimed as reimbursement for expenses plaintiffs incurred in providing extraordinary services to handicapped children. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had violated their statutory duty by authorizing reimbursement of some but not all of plaintiffs' claims. The statute authorizing such reimbursements specifically provided, however, that they could only be made after:

"(T)he Superintendent of Public Instruction has reviewed the case study and staffing recommendation for each child referred and has approved the district's recommendations regarding eligibility of the child for the extraordinary special education services and facilities. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 122, par. 14-7.02a3.)"

The court in Cronin accordingly held that because the defendants were under no legal duty to approve a reimbursement of all claims submitted by plaintiffs, the suit was one which sought a monetary judgment against the State and was not properly within the circuit court's jurisdiction. In the instant case, however, no language in the statute governing defendants' certification of claims indicates that defendants have the discretion and lack of duty to perform that existed in Cronin. Section 2-16 of the Public Community College Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 122, par. 102-16) indicates that community college districts, such as plaintiff in this case, are "entitled to a reimbursement" for properly claimed credit hours. That statute also states that:

"Credit hour grants shall be provided for courses that are normally part of the baccalaureate-oriented programs, occupational programs or general studies instructional programs approved by the Illinois Community College Board that apply to an associate degree or certificate."

Defendants do not claim that plaintiff's claims were improperly filed or arose from instructional programs which had not been previously approved for coverage. Further, the portion of the statute which refers to defendants' "approval" of claims does not confer any discretion to conduct a substantive review and approve or disapprove the claims for any cause; rather, it is part of the statute's timetable for the overall certification procedure. We note that after failing to raise the entire issue at the trial court, counsel for defendants admitted at oral argument on appeal that if a clerical determination revealed that the claims were arithmetically correct, defendants would normally be required by section 2-16 of the statute to certify them for payment. We conclude that the complaint filed by plaintiffs did not seek to compel defendants to take a discretionary, non-compellable...