Board of Trustees of Hamilton Heights School Corp. v. Landry

• Decision Date: 02 November 1993
• Docket Number: No. 06A01-9112-CV-380,06A01-9112-CV-380
• Citation: 622 N.E.2d 1019
• Parties: 86 Ed. Law Rep. 964 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF HAMILTON HEIGHTS SCHOOL CORPORATION, Ronald E. McGill, Sylvia Kay Hartley, Marcia A. House, Keith Schulenberg, and Laurence C. Beck, Individually and in their capacity as members of the Board of School Trustees of Hamilton Heights School Corporation, Appellants-Defendants, v. Roger V. LANDRY, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1019

622 N.E.2d 1019

86 Ed. Law Rep. 964

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF HAMILTON HEIGHTS SCHOOL CORPORATION Ronald E. McGill, Sylvia Kay Hartley, Marcia A. House, Keith Schulenberg, and Laurence C. Beck, Individually and in their capacity as members of the Board of School Trustees of Hamilton Heights School Corporation, Appellants-Defendants, v. Roger V. LANDRY, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 06A01-9112-CV-380.

Court of Appeals of Indiana First District.

Nov. 2, 1993.

Rodney V. Taylor, David J. Theising, Christopher & Taylor, Indianapolis, Steven A. Holt, Holt, Fleck & Free, Noblesville, for appellants-defendants.

Richard J. Darko, Mary Jane Lapointe, Lowe Gray Steele & Hoffman, Indianapolis, for appellee-plaintiff.

NAJAM, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In this case we decide whether an Indiana school corporation and its officers acting in their official capacities are amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Roger V. Landry, a schoolteacher, filed a complaint for damages against the Board of Trustees of Hamilton Heights School Corporation and its members, individually and in their capacities as members of the Board (collectively "Hamilton Heights"). Landry alleged violations of his constitutional rights, including infringement of academic freedom and denial of due process ("federal law claims") when Hamilton Heights suspended him for two days without pay and required him to make restitution after he permanently removed the glossaries from 146 science textbooks owned by the school. Hamilton Heights brings this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment on the federal law claims. We reverse and remand.

ISSUES

The parties have raised several issues concerning whether Landry's complaint established a violation of his federally protected constitutional rights. We need not

consider these substantive claims ¹ and decide only the following issues:

1. Whether the "law of the case" doctrine controls the outcome of this action.

2. Whether Hamilton Heights is a "person" amenable to a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 ("Section 1983").

FACTS

This protracted litigation began in 1988. The relevant material facts are undisputed and are summarized in our previous opinion, Board of Trustees of Hamilton Heights School Corporation v. Landry (1990), Ind.App., 560 N.E.2d 102, trans. denied, as follows:

"During the 1986-87 school year Landry was a certified permanent teacher at Hamilton Heights Junior High School. On February 6, 1987, he removed the glossary from the back of 146 science textbooks owned by the school. The superintendent met with Landry on February 25, 1987, and the following day advised Landry by letter that the superintendent recommended Landry be suspended from work without pay for two days and repay the School Book Rental Fund $1.00 for each textbook damaged. After a Board hearing requested by Landry, the Board approved and ratified the disciplinary action recommended by the superintendent. On May 21 and 22, 1987, Landry was suspended from his teaching duties, and his paycheck was reduced by $220.00 for that period. The $146.00 damage charge also was paid."

Id. at 103-04.

Landry then filed a five count complaint and moved for summary judgment on Counts II, III and IV ("state law claims"). Hamilton Heights moved for summary judgment on all five counts. The trial court granted summary judgment for Landry. In the first appeal we reversed and directed the trial court to enter summary judgment for Hamilton Heights on the state law claims, concluding that Hamilton Heights had the authority under state law to suspend Landry without pay and also to require him to make restitution for the damage to school property. Id. at 107. We also held that Landry did not allege or present evidence that the Board Members acted as individuals, and we directed the trial court to enter summary judgment for the Board Members. Id. at 108-09.

In this second appeal, Hamilton Heights appeals from the denial of its motion for summary judgment on Counts I and V, the remaining federal law claims in Landry's complaint. In its entry denying Hamilton Heights' motion, the trial court found that it had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. We granted the petition for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 4(B)(6).

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Standard of Review

When reviewing the propriety of a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we conduct the same inquiry as the trial court. HCA Health Services v. Gregory (1992), Ind.App., 596 N.E.2d 974, 975, trans. denied. We consider the pleadings and evidence designated under Trial Rule 56(C) without determining their weight or credibility. Id. Summary judgment will be granted only if the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The moving party bears the burden of proving the propriety of summary judgment, and all facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom are viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Although conflicting facts and inferences may exist regarding certain elements of a claim, summary judgment is proper where there is no real conflict regarding a fact dispositive of the litigation. Citizens National Bank v. Indianapolis Auto Auction (1992), Ind.App., 592 N.E.2d

                1256, 1257.   In this case, as in the first appeal, we conclude that the dispositive facts are not in dispute
                

Issue One: Law of the Case

We first address an argument which Hamilton Heights advances based upon the "law of the case" doctrine. Hamilton Heights contends that because we held in the first appeal that state law permitted the Board to discipline Landry, it is "simply beyond logical comprehension how such conduct" could be regarded as "a permissible exercise of academic freedom protected by the First Amendment." See Appellant's Brief at 34. Instead, we agree with Landry that the law of the case doctrine does not preclude our consideration of his federal law claims in this second appeal.

The "law of the case" doctrine provides that once a question has been decided on appeal, it is binding on both the trial court on remand and on this court in a subsequent appeal if the facts and parties are substantially the same. Hinds v. McNair (1980), Ind.App., 413 N.E.2d 586, 607. A prior appellate decision is conclusive on all questions actually considered and determined in the first appeal. Horine v. Greencastle Production Credit Association (1987), Ind.App., 505 N.E.2d 802, 804, trans. denied. The doctrine, however, does not foreclose appeals of issues not previously decided. State v. Kuespert (1981), Ind.App., 425 N.E.2d 229, 233, trans. denied.

In the previous appeal involving Hamilton Heights and Landry, we specifically noted that we were not deciding the federal law claims found in Counts I and V of Landry's complaint which remained pending. Landry, 560 N.E.2d at 109. The law of the case doctrine does not apply to Landry's federal law claims.

Issue Two: School Corporation's Status Under Section 1983

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights but provides a cause of action and remedy for the deprivation of federally protected civil rights. It provides:

"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."

Our courts have not previously considered whether an Indiana school corporation can be sued under Section 1983.

Neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" under Section 1983. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police (1989), 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45, 58. Hamilton Heights contends that it is an agency and arm of the state and, thus, is not a "person" amenable to suit within the meaning of the statute. We agree.

Landry maintains that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services (1978), 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611, is dispositive because in that case the Board of Education of the City of New York was found to be a "person" for Section 1983 purposes. Id. at 694-95, 98 S.Ct. at 2038, 56 L.Ed.2d at 638. In Monell, the Supreme Court reconsidered its holding in Monroe v. Pape that municipal corporations are immune from suit under Section 1983. See Monroe v. Pape (1961), 365 U.S. 167, 191, 81 S.Ct. 473, 486, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, 507. After re-examining the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the Court overruled Monroe v. Pape "insofar as it holds that local government units are wholly immune from suit under Sec. 1983." Monell, 436 U.S. at 663, 98 S.Ct. at 2022, 56 L.Ed.2d at 619 (emphasis added). The Court concluded in Monell that the Eleventh Amendment is not a bar to municipal liability and that Congress intended for "municipalities and other local government units" to be included among those persons However, the Supreme Court expressly limited its holding in Monell to local government units which are not considered part of the state for Eleventh Amendment immunity purposes. Id. at 690 n. 54, 98 S.Ct. at 2035 n. 54, 56 L.Ed.2d at 635 n. 54. Later, in Quern v. Jordan (1979), 440 U.S. 332, 338, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1144, 59 L.Ed.2d 358, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this Eleventh Amendment limitation on the reach of Section 1983 and ruled that Section 1983 does not "override the traditional sovereign immunity of the States." Id. at 341, 99 S.Ct. at 1145, 59 L.Ed.2d at 367. Recently in Will, the Court acknowledged the limitation it placed on the...