Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 3 in Natrona County v. District Boundary Bd. of Natrona County

• Decision Date: 12 November 1971
• Docket Number: No. 4038,4038
• Citation: 489 P.2d 1393
• Parties: The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 3 IN the COUNTY OF NATRONA and State of Wyoming et al., Appellants (Petitioners below), v. The DISTRICT BOUNDARY BOARD OF NATRONA COUNTY, Wyoming and the State Committee Established by Organization Law of 1969, Appellees (Respondents below).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 1393

489 P.2d 1393

The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 3 IN the COUNTY OF NATRONA and State of Wyoming et al., Appellants (Petitioners below), v. The DISTRICT BOUNDARY BOARD OF NATRONA COUNTY, Wyoming and the State Committee Established by Organization Law of 1969, Appellees (Respondents below).

No. 4038.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Nov. 12, 1971.

Order Filed Dec. 15, 1971.

Robert R. Rose, Jr., Ernest Wilkerson, Casper, for appellants.

John Burk, County Atty., W. T. Schwartz and Robert H. McCrary, Casper, for District Boundary Board of Natrona County, Wyoming.

C. A. Brimmer, Atty. Gen., Donald L. Painter, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for State Committee Established by Organization Law of 1969.

Before McINTYRE, C. J., and PARKER, McEWAN and GRAY, JJ.

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION

McINTYRE, Chief Justice.

We have retained jurisdiction in this case since the rendering of our original opinion, which is reported at 489 P.2d 413.

Subsequent to such original opinion, appellees have made application for an order clarifying the status of the countywide unified district in Natrona County. The unified district resulted from a decision of the District Boundary Board of Natrona County and the action of the State Committee for education which approved the decision of the boundary board. Appellants have objected and filed a written resistance to the application of appellees.

Regardless of whether legal and proper steps have been followed in all respects, it is apparent from the filings of both appellees and appellants that the formation of a countywide unified school district in Natrona County is an accomplished fact. We do not say such district is a de jure district. It is nevertheless a de facto district.

As stated in 47 Am.Jur., Schools, § 24, p. 314, the legality of the organization of a de facto school district, one operating under color of law, cannot be collaterally attacked, but can be determined only in a direct proceeding brought for that purpose.

In School District No. 21 in Fremont County v. Board of Commissioners of Fremont County, 15 Wyo. 73, 86 P. 24, 25-26, 11 Ann.Cas. 1058, it was held, for purposes of a suit to enjoin payment of a special school tax to a school district, the district must be presumed legally organized and existing; and its existence can be inquired into only in direct proceedings. Although that case was decided in 1906, there is no showing that it has ever been reversed or modified.

It was held in State ex rel. Smith v. Gardner, Mo.App., 204 S.W.2d 319, 322, where a meeting was held and a vote taken to consolidate designated school districts, a de facto consolidated district was created, and officers thereof who were elected at the meeting were de facto officers of the district, regardless of any irregularity in the proceedings.

A de facto officer is defined as a person who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of law; or an officer in possession of and exercising the powers of the office under the claim and color of an election or appointment, though he is not an officer de jure and may be removed by proper proceedings. Ballentine, Law Dictionary with Pronouncements, Second Edition (1948).

It is stated in 67 C.J.S. Officers § 4, p. 107, one distinction between an officer de facto and an officer de jure is that the former has only color of an appointment or election to the office, while the latter is in all respects legally appointed or elected and qualified to exercise the office as against the world. As sometimes stated, the difference between the authority of a de jure officer and that of a de facto officer is that the former rests on right and the latter rests on reputation.

It is settled law in this jurisdiction that quo warranto is the appropriate and exclusive remedy for trying title to public office. State ex rel. Pearson v. Hansen, Wyo., 401 P.2d 954, 956; Marion v. City of Lander, Wyo., 394 P.2d 910, 918, cert. den. 380 U.S. 925, 85 S.Ct. 929, 13 L.Ed.2d 810, reh. den. 380 U.S. 989, 85 S.Ct. 1352, 14 L.Ed.2d 283; Crawford v. City of Sheridan, Wyo., 392 P.2d 519, 520.

It is asserted in appellees' application for clarification that School District No. 1, the countywide unified district, is the only school district that has been operating in Natrona County since January 30, 1971, and such school district has been and is now administering the educational needs of all the pupils of Natrona County, which involves over 14,000 pupils, 700 teachers, and 100 custodial and maintenance personnel, with a monthly payroll in excess of $700,000 and an annual budget of over $11,000,000.

The application further states, an election has been held for the board of trustees for the unified district and all areas of the county are represented on such board. Also, that all county, state, and federal departments have recognized such school district and such board as the body charged with the responsibility of educating the children.

Appellants have not challenged or contradicted any of the facts set forth in the application of appellees for clarification. We are not a trial court and cannot make a determination of whether the facts are as represented by appellees. For purposes of this supplemental opinion, however, we will assume, without so deciding, that the facts are as represented by appellees. Such facts are of course subject to challenge in any appropriate action attacking the legality of the organization of School District No. 1; or in any action directly contesting the right of the trustees to hold office.

Although we speak of such possible actions, it is apparent the issues therein would likely become moot before they could be decided. We indicated in our original opinion that the...